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FOREWORD 
 
 
 
Instead of applying one-size-fits-all theories to the 
diverse shapes of modern experience, we might 
equally well begin from that diversity in order to 
build a more expansive definition of what it means to 
be modern.  
This is what I mean by moving from history to theory.  
 
Carol Gluck 
 
 
 
 
This book was born as a consequence of the international conference 
“Historiography on Japan and East Asia: State, Trends and Perspectives” 
which was held in Venice in November 2010. The main purpose of the 
conference was to evaluate the present state and trends of historical research 
on East Asia. 
History at stake in East Asia deals mainly with relevant issues concerning 
East Asian history by adopting an inside perspective and comparing different 
views now prevailing in Japan, China and Korea. Actually, in the last 
decades many scholars explored some crucial phenomena of the historical 
process in Japan, China and Korea, acquiring a new methodology in 
investigating East Asia history and carrying out fresh research which 
changed the framework of traditional approaches. A deeper understanding of 
significant historical issues in these countries is highly important in 
improving the comprehension of the cultural and political interactions 
among the countries of a region which has strategic importance in the global 
geopolitical equilibrium as well as in its change.  
We should also rethink the interaction between the ‘universal’ and the 
‘local’ by overcoming the traditional view of East Asian history which 
prevails in the so-called Orientalism, and that is still prevalent in the 
Eurocentric historical narrative. Actually, an analysis of the real significance 
of the histories and micro histories of East Asia for global history is essential 
in overturning the conventional approach moving from the ‘universal’ to the 
‘local’. In fact, by travelling in the opposite direction (i.e. from the ‘local’ to 
the ‘universal’) it would also be possible to highlight the various meanings 
and historical inflections that some global phenomena have in national, local 
or transnational space of East Asia. The analysis of the interaction between 
East Asian histories and global history from this perspective could also be 
helpful in examining processes of encounters, connections, integrations and 
assimilations as well as historicising globalization.  
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 We express our sincere gratitude to Ca’ Foscari University and 
Geneva University for helping us produce this volume. And to the Toshiba 
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RELIGION AND MODERNITY IN MEIJI JAPAN: 
STRENGTHENING THE PEOPLE 
 
 
Brij Tankha* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The transformation of Buddhism under the impact of Christianity and the 
opening of Japan to Western influence frames the role of religious ideas and 
groups in a simple binary. It places a calcified Buddhism tied to Tokugawa 
power and divorced from the needs of the people and this moribund 
Buddhism is transformed by the liberating power of western ideas. This 
marginalizes, or rather compartmentalizes, the role of religion in social and 
intellectual debates and accepts the reading of those who sought to develop 
Japanese modernity on the assumption that religion never played a major 
role in Japan. In fact religion has always been important and was an integral 
element in shaping the debates in the late Tokugawa and post Meiji period as 
well. Religion, as part of a larger cultural system with a long history deeply 
imbedded in the social and political structure, shaped this discourse. The 
Meiji Restoration (ishin) and the changes that followed were made within 
this system. In contrast to Europe, religious wars had ended by the sixteenth 
century and the Tokugawa enforced sectarian boundaries. Thus, rivalries 
were muted, which perhaps helps to explain the relative ease with which 
Buddhists sects came together after the Meiji period. This is in contrast to 
the continued sectarian rivalries within Christianity or Islam.  
                                           
* I would like to thank professor Rosa Caroli and professor Pierre Souyri, the organisers of the 
conference “Historiography on Japan and East Asia: State, Trends and Perspectives”, for 
inviting me to participate in what was a very intellectually stimulating and friendly 
environment. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar organised by 
professor Iwasaki Minoru and professor Narita Ryūichi under the Workshop in Critical 
Theory (WINC), Tōkyō July 31, 2010. I would like to thank them and professor Shimazono 
Susumu, who was the discussant, for their very helpful comments and suggestions.  
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There was also a marked movement of priests leaving their sects and 
becoming “lay preachers”, to expand their ministry beyond their sects’ 
members and address issues of wider social concern. They were moving 
beyond the individual and family to see their constituency as the emerging 
nation. Their ideas provided the theoretical foundation for the institutions 
and practices that were created.  
In this essay I take the life of the Nishi Honganji monk Kitabatake Dōryū 
(1820-1907) to demonstrate the importance of religion in social and political 
debates, the expanding role of the clergy and to argue that there was a 
diversity of opinion among these groups. Religious groups did not all  
work to support the Meiji project of an “emperor system” nation-state. 
Kitabatake’s life demonstrates one way that Buddhists responded to the 
challenges of rethinking the role of the clergy, the place of religion and the 
nature of the state. Kitabatake’s public activities also point to the role of 
domains (han) such as Kii in the Meiji ishin, a role that has been largely 
obscured by the focus on Satsuma and Chōshū. Finally, I would suggest that 
these new developments, first at the han level and then later at the national 
level, were not driven only by the initiative of enlightened elites but rather it 
by the demands and pressures from below, by those excluded in a way or 
another, that forced those in power to change and adapt to ensure their own 
survival.  
 
 
The Question of Religion 
 
Religion, long denied a place within the modernist framework, has come to 
be acknowledged as a major force that shaped nationalism and inspired 
social and political thinkers across a range of intellectual positions. The old 
dichotomies of Western secularism and Eastern spirituality have given way 
to recognition that religion and religious movements have come to play an 
even greater role in shaping the public and private spheres of the modern 
world. The modern state and its relationship with religious groups and their 
exclusion from public affairs are questions now being thought afresh. Talal 
Asad has questioned the universal definition of religion and secularism and 
shown many varieties of secularism within the Western world. 1  He has 
argued that religion, as it is generally defined, is a modern Western invention, 
and so, underlined the need to rethink the religious-secular dichotomy. He 
argues that secularism is not just when human life emancipates itself from 
religion. Rather, in early modern Europe, it was a political strategy to build a 
                                           
1 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 1993. 
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particular conception of the world which was used to control the mobile poor, 
govern hostile sects and regulate colonial expansion.2  
David Bell, on the other hand has argued that it was the religious debates 
in Europe that created the intellectual conditions for the events that led to the 
French revolution and the “modern” world. He argues that it was the notion 
of the hidden god which placed the onus of responsibility and action on 
people who undermined the existing hierarchies of power.3 Martin Riesebrodt 
addresses this question through the notion of “referential legitimation” as a 
way of defining a common ground of shared premises that make dialogue 
and debate possible. 4  Following these attempts to re-define religion, the 
question of the relationship between the “secular” and the “religious” world 
has been opened to exploration and explanation in a variety of ways. The 
common theme that emerges is that there is little evidence of a clean division 
between the religious and the secular, even within the so-called Western 
world. Across the board we find secular thinkers incorporating and using 
religious symbols, or religious leaders using secular symbols to shape and 
unify religious traditions. This was clear in the beginning of the French 
Revolution as the debates within the National Assembly reveal that French 
revolutionaries saw the Catholic Church as a model to emulate in their 
project of forming a republican citizenry.  
Instead of seeing the two, the religious and the secular, as static concepts 
in opposition, it is far more productive to understand the relationship and, 
what Prasenjit Duara calls the “traffic” between the two, as cross flows that 
co-constitute notions of religion and nation.5 The state far from abdicating 
the sphere of religion plays an active role in demarcating and controlling the 
area of religious activity, the role of religious institutions and the 
dissemination of their ideas. It is because of this that by asking the question 
that Talal Asad asks, who defines religion and what assumptions are made, 
we can understand the relationship between religion and the state in Japan.6   
 
 
 
 
                                           
2 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford 2003, p. 192. 
3 For the complex relationship between religion and nationalism in revolutionary France and 
the role religion played in making the revolutionary change possible see David A. Bell, The 
Cult of the Nation in France Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 2001.  
4 Martin Riesebrodt, “Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion”, Numen. Religions in 
the Disenchanted World, vol. 47, n. 3, 2000, pp. 266-287. 
5 Prasenjit Duara, “A Comparative Perspective on Religion and Secularism in Modern China”, 
Nichols Distinguished Lecture, Duke University, February 18, 2005. 
6 T. Asad, Formations of the Secular, p. 201. 
BRIJ TANKHA 6 
Buddhism in Late Tokugawa 
 
The world of Buddhism in the late Tokugawa period was a complex and 
diverse universe which I will not explore here, except to indicate some 
crucial features to show that Buddhism, far from being ossified, was 
developing and changing even during the Tokugawa period. The bakufu’s 
policies towards religious groups and ideas based on the principle of control 
and isolation were closely regulated and sectarian boundaries enforced. 
Heretical ideas were controlled and sects that were seen as disruptive, 
banned. For instance, Christianity, as is well known, was banned, but so 
were others when they posed a threat to the social order. The Nichiren 
Buddhist sect “neither giving nor receiving” (fuju fuse) was banned in 1669. 
The temple registration (danka) system of compulsory temple registration 
along with measures that clearly defined sectarian boundaries actively 
prevented interaction and debate. However, this control was not always 
effective and these policies produced unintended consequences. These 
policies isolated and strengthened sectarian positions but they also led to 
developments that invigorated Buddhism. Sects established a system of 
schools, from the mid-Tokugawa period, to train priests and provide 
systematic religious instruction. The students were tested for advancement 
and qualification, standards were laid down. The body of religious teaching 
and ideas that developed within the sects was not always within politically 
acceptable limits and led to conflict with the authorities.7 
Two examples, one from the early and the other from the later Tokugawa 
period, illustrate the way Buddhist groups were developing strategies to meet 
the criticism leveled against them. First the case of the priest Taichū Ryōjō 
(1552-1639). He was a Kyōto Buddhist scholar of the Jōdō school, but also 
trained in geography, astronomy, Shintoism, and military affairs. He traveled 
widely in Japan building over twenty temples and had even planned to go to 
China. In 1604 he went to the Ryūkyū Islands and wrote of his stay there. 
The second is that of Jūen (1716-1804), a Shingon priest who worked among 
the common people and studied Sanskrit to learn the roots of Buddhism, 
propounded a theory of Shinto that united the people and the emperor 
(kunshinron) arguing that these links can only be understood within esoteric 
Buddhism. There are many similar examples of Buddhists preaching to 
householders and ordinary people, and writings that addressed the general 
population.8 
                                           
7  See p. 174 of Hakuhara Izumi 柏原泉 , “Kyōgaku no kakuritsu” 教学の確立  (The 
establishment of education and learning), in Takatori Minoru 高取実 (ed.), Zusetsu Nihon 
bukkyōshi 3. Kokumin bukkyō e no michi 図説日本仏教史３. 国民仏教への道 (Illustrated 
history of Japanese Buddhism 3. The road to national Buddhism), Hōzōkan, Kyōto 1981, 
pp. 170-185. 
8 Ibidem, p. 174.  
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In short the monks studied and codified the foundational texts, brought 
out authoritative collections and developed a scholarly tradition with all its 
intellectual benefits. Priests were also taking their teachings to the people 
and working outside the temples. The nenbutsu priests carried on the 
medieval tradition of wandering priests and built wide ranging networks 
between the people and the temples, those around Zenkōji or Kōyasan, for 
instance. The Meiji government, fearing the potential for social activism that 
these living connections with the people carried, banned these groups in 
1871. 
Buddhists responded not just to the bakufu’s policies but to the anti- 
Buddhist criticism directed against them by scholars such as Kumazawa 
Banzan (1619-1691), the Neo Confucian scholar of the Wang Yang Ming 
school, the National Studies scholars Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), Hirata 
Atsutane (1776-1843) and others. This influential tradition was critical of the 
Buddhist preoccupation with transcendental and otherworldly matters to the 
exclusion of social relations. The Confucianists and National Studies scholars 
saw the monks as an unproductive group and called for the abolishment of 
temple schools, reducing the number of parishes, and the end to both the 
privileges enjoyed by temples and the temple registration as well.9 But even 
more importantly the criticism of Buddhism on scientific grounds begun 
after the introduction of the heliocentric view forced them to rethink their 
ideas. For instance, during the genroku period Mori Shōken of Mito (1653-
1746) criticized the Buddhist cosmology that placed the centre of the world 
on the mythical mountain Sumer as unscientific and this line of criticism was 
reiterated later by kokugakusha and the Dutch scholars (rangakusha) as well. 
Hakuhara points out that it was Tominaga Kakamoto (1715-1746) who put 
forward a “modern” critique of Confucian, Buddhist and Shinto ideas and 
argued for them to be seen as part of one whole, a view that influenced 
Hirata Atsutane who used these ideas to build a conception of Shinto as the 
true religion of Japan.10  
The Buddhists reacted to these criticisms by advancing a syncretic view 
of Buddhism, Shintoism and Confucian ideas. The Shinshū stress on 
marriage, eating meat and the importance of self-discipline are a reflection 
of this line of thinking.11 Buddhists were developing intellectually and alive 
to the world around them. Signs emerged that they were responding, as other 
sections of society were, to the new challenges. The story of a “funeral 
religion” unresponsive to the people is part of the imagery of the post Meiji 
view of the Tokugawa as the “long night of darkness”, to use Okakura 
Tenshin’s description. This view also works to support the view of the 
                                           
9 Ibidem, p. 173. 
10 Ibidem, p. 173. 
11 Ibidem, p. 173.  
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marginality of religion in Japan. So the policies that regulated religion and 
restricted debate worked to strengthen the intellectual and institutional 
foundations of the sects sustaining links with the people and making the 
changes in the post Meiji world possible. 
 
 
Arming the People 
 
In this section I would like to look at the changes in the han of Kii as they 
provide one example of how social and political changes were carried out 
within an existing religious framework. The han of Kii is seen as marginal 
and its activities rarely mentioned in histories of this period. Yet the changes 
that occurred in the last few decades of the Tokugawa regime show the 
crucial role that the han and the domainal leaders played in the Meiji 
transformation. The reform programme carried out in the han grew out of the 
influence both of the long tradition of kokugaku teachings as well as the 
rangaku or tradition of Western scholarship. The social and economic 
changes that convulsed the han created a politically unstable climate and the 
reforming elites were forced to concede the need to be inclusive to 
strengthen the ability of the han to retain its control. The creation of militias, 
the spread of education, the appeal to the people to unite and defend the han 
were a product of the new claims on power that were being made. The ruling 
elites aimed to strengthen defence in the widest sense and for this a new 
militia was obviously necessary, but far more importantly, they saw that by 
uniting the people they could reduce social discontent and strengthen the 
political structure to meet the threat of the foreign powers.  
Kitabatake Dōryū, as a Honganji monk in the temple of Waka no Ura, 
was close to these newly emerging classes as well as tied to the ruling elites 
through the Honganji. His understanding that the han could strengthen itself 
by expanding its power provides the basis for his activities. His early years 
are bound up with reforms at the domainal level, establishing a peasant-
monk militia to protect the han and country from foreign threat as well as 
against han threatening the bakufu through these reforms. The second period 
from the Meiji Restoration revolves around how to reform the Honganji, and 
here his ideas are at odds with the dominant groups in the temple 
establishment, such as Shimaji Mokurai (1838-1911) and others associated 
with Western inspired reform. His failure leads to the third period of his life 
where he first establishes a law school, and then later, together with Nishimaki 
Sakuya (1866-1908), a former people’s rights (jiyū minken) activist, preaches 
religious reform and gender equality.  
After the failure of the Honganji reform attempt, he journeys to Europe 
and on his return travels to the Buddhist sites in India. This trip, taken when 
he was seventy, interesting as it is, is really a side show to the main concerns 
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of his life. I would suggest that the life of Dōryū is an example of how a new 
concept of the nation under an emperor was based on popular rights, gender 
equality and a vision that saw the unity of the religious and secular. The 
reforms that the Buddhist carried out grew, not just from the influence of 
European ideas but from the changes that took place during the so-called 
“opening of Japan”. The arrival of the United States’ fleet under Com-
modore Perry was not just a peaceful port call: the threat of invasion and 
danger set in motion internal debates and reforms within the country that 
provided the impetus to rethink the contours of the political system.  
Kitabatake Dōryū was born in Waka no Ura in the han of Kii and 
distinguished himself as a sharp and perceptive student studying Tendai and 
Shingon as well as Confucianism and jūjutsu. He rose to the rank of what is 
in today’s terms an “associate professor”, a qualification that few priests 
managed to secure. He was 34 when Commodore Perry landed in Uraga Bay 
and a priest at the temple of Hōfukuji. Kitabatake saw that the general clergy 
were ill-educated and unconcerned with the affairs of the country. The 
appeal to support secular power was not a problematic one as the Buddhist 
sects all had worked out explanations to justify their support of the current 
political authority.  
The han of the late Tokugawa exercised a degree of autonomy but there 
were layers of trans-han links and these dense networks laid the foundations 
of the Meiji policies. In Kii, the reforms were inspired by the influence of 
kokugaku teachings, the Dutch scholarship (rangaku) that transformed into 
an interest in Western scholarship, the concern of local officials with 
improving the state of affairs, and the demands of the people for change. The 
reforms cannot be seen as only carried out by the elites responding to the 
foreign threat to save the country, rather they were responding to two threats, 
the external presence of the Western powers but also the claims being made 
from below for a share in the system.  
A detailed discussion of the reforms in the han are not germane to the 
argument but the general context shows the depth and scale of the changes 
taking place. Commodore Perry landed in Uraga Bay in June 1853 and 
stayed till December of that year. This was the period when the han 
reformists led by Tsuda Izuru (1832-1905) and Hamaguchi Goryō (1820-
1885) and other such as Kitabatake, carried out a series of reforms. Many of 
those involved had already been working in their private capacities to spread 
education and train the people to fight a possible foreign invasion or 
suppress internal revolts. The factional politics and demands on Kii for 
troops by the bakufu when it launched two expeditions against Chōshū, 
helped to further military reforms and increased the urgency to break status 
and sectional interests.  
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Hamaguchi Goryō for instance, established a school to train the young 
peasants and fisher folk to read and write.12 The school predates by three 
years the better known Shōka Sonjuku school started in 1856 by Yoshida 
Shōin (1830-1859). At Hamaguchi’s school ending status differences went 
hand in hand with strengthening the han as he also set about acquiring arms 
to train the villagers and form a local militia.13 Similarly, Kitabatake Dōryū 
also turned his attention to strengthening the village through a revitalised 
education and a militia trained in modern methods. The militia of monks and 
peasants broke the monopoly of the samurai and pointed to a new political 
imagination that put the defence of the country in the hands of the people. It 
probably drew inspiration from the tradition of warrior monks (sōhei) such 
as those of Mount Hiei, whose power was famously destroyed by Nobunaga 
in 1571. Kitabatake provided the funds to train and maintain the militia even 
pawning a family heirloom that had been in the family for six hundred 
years.14 
The militia was formed before the Kiheitai raised by Chōshū, under the 
banner of “justice and patriotism” (seigi aikoku). This militia was used to 
supress a rebellion in Kōyasan, to put down the Yamato ikki, and along with 
other bakufu troops, and in two expeditions against Chōshū. It was in August 
1863 the battle against the Heavenly Avenging Force (Tenchūgumi), a jōi 
group of Tosa defeated by bakufu troops, that the image of Kitabatake, a 
headscarf tied around his head, firing a cannon at Sawada Monosuke, the 
leader of the Heavenly Avenging Force, became a popular image of the war 
and defined him as a fearless monk.  
In 1868, as the political climate changed, Tsuda and his group employed 
the two German soldiers Julius F.W. Helm (1840-1922) and Carl J.W. Koppen 
(1833-1907) to train the han militias.15 These military reforms provided a 
model for the Meiji government and Tsuda Izuru, on the invitation of the 
imperial court, joined the newly established Meiji army and Kitabatake was 
made the head of a military school.16 In the course of the han reforms Dōryū 
came into contact with other han officials and reformers. One of these was 
Mutsu Munemitsu, a younger man who looked at Kitabatake as a father 
figure. Kitabatake’s relationship with reformers and political activists also 
led to trouble. He closely escaped being imprisoned when members of the 
                                           
12 Sugimura Hirotarō 杉村廣太郎 (ed.), Hamaguchi Goryō den 浜口梧陵傳 (Biography of 
Hamaguchi Goryō), Hamaguchi Goryō Dōzō Kensetsu Iinkai, Wakayama 1920, pp. 75-77. 
13 Ibidem, pp. 81-84. 
14 Kitabatake Dōryū kenshōkai (ed.), Gōsō Kitabatake Dōryū: Denki Kitabatake Dōryū  豪僧
北畠道龍: 伝記・北畠道龍 (The monk Kitabatake Dōryū: a biography), Ōzonsha, Tōkyō 
1994, p. 8. 
15 Wakayama kenshi hensan iinkai (ed.), Wakayama kenshi. Jinbutsu 和歌山県市 − 人物 
(History of Wakayama ken. People), Wakayama 1989, pp. 422 and 104. 
16 Kitabatake Dōryū kenshōkai (ed.), Gōsō Kitabatake, pp. 32-38. 
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Self Help Society (Risshisha), with whom he was associated, were caught, in 
1874, in an anti-government plot and imprisoned.17 
  
 
Strengthening the Priests 
 
The reforms within the han of Kii had brought Kitabatake a certain 
prominence and set the stage for his role in the abortive and brief attempt to 
reform of the Nishi Honganji between April-June 1879. The changes in 
society also meant that the religious groups such as the Honganji, mostly run 
by small elites, had to face demands from the temple priests clamouring for 
changes in the way that temples were administered as well as their system of 
teaching and their relationship to society.  
The Nishi Honganji had begun to make changes in 1868 when the then 
head of the order was replaced by the young Myōnyo. These reforms saw the 
temple changing the teaching curriculum, opening its schools to the laity, 
sending priests out to study in England and Europe to gain degrees and study 
the religious situation abroad. These priests came back to revamp the whole 
system and adapt it to the challenges posed by Christianity and Western 
ideas. Myōnyo was concerned with the reform agenda of Shimaji Mokurai 
and other monks who had returned inspired by the European experience. 
Kitabatake writes that Myōnyo feared that in their zeal they would destroy 
the whole edifice of Buddhism. Myōnyo is quoted as having written in the 
newspaper, Kyōgi shinbun, that “what they are doing to our religion is a 
great sin against our ancestors”.18 Kitabatake’s relationship with Myōnyo 
and the exact role that Kitabatake played in the reform attempt are not clear 
and the source of the information is mostly Kitabatake so these questions 
cannot be answered. Kitabatake reportedly played a role in helping to 
arrange Myōnyo’s marriage and this may have given him access to the head 
of the order but Kitabatake had also developed a network of contacts and 
was widely known and respected.19 It was decided that the reforms would be 
carried out not from Kyōto, the centre of the temple administration, because 
of the restrictive environment, but from the Tōkyō branch of the Nishi 
Honganji, the Tsukiji Honganji. 
It is not clear who was the main architect of the reform plan but 
regardless of the individual contributions it is clear that Dōryū played an 
important role, especially considering his later exclusion. It was because he 
was considered a threat by the Shimaji group that, after the reforms were 
                                           
17 The Risshisha was a society founded in 1874 in Tosa. Some of its leaders sympathised with 
the Satsuma Uprising but others such as Ueki Emori opposed them. Ibidem, pp. 43-45. 
18 Ibidem, p. 54. Kitabatake quotes Myōnyo, writing:  こう我一宗にとって皆祖の罪人なり. 
19 Ibidem, p. 38. 
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aborted, he was given a large sum of money to go to Europe to study the 
religious situation, an excuse to get him out of the country.  
Kitabatake’s thinking, according to his biographer, was based on his 
understanding of shinzoku nittai and on that basis he felt that Honganji must 
work to build a citizen’s state, a “kokka kokumin”. Kitabatake learned 
German during the period of the han reforms and had spent five years, 
beginning in1868, in Kyōto studying German legal texts with the help of a 
German. He developed an understanding of Western law which he later 
incorporated into his ideas. The crux of the reforms was the idea that the 
Honganji was a public body inextricably linked to the nation and so it should 
be returned to the country. The role of the Ōtani family, direct descendants 
of the founder Shinran who had ruled the temple, must be separated from the 
daily management of the Honganji and its temples.20 The Ōtani family would 
continue to be religious heads of the temple but would no longer exercise 
any power in the daily administration of the Honganji temples. The family 
would continue to live in Kyoto and carry out all ceremonial and religious 
functions and would receive 3.000.000 yen to support themselves and their 
establishment. The temple head had exercised absolute power and this 
represented a major change.  
The separation from daily politics would in fact, according to Myōnyo 
and Kitabatake, underline their sacred nature. The temples and priests would 
elect representatives and manage the temple affairs. The sects’ administra-
tive headquarters would be moved to Tōkyō ensuring space for building a 
democratic management structure and give all temples and priests would 
have equal authority.21 The reforms echo the later reforms of the imperial 
court and the role of the emperor in the Meiji constitution. Kitabatake writes 
that the reforms were supported by members of the government and Okuma 
Shigenobu donated 100.000 yen in support of the Hongaji reforms. It is 
possible as Kitabatake, it is known, had close links with many political 
leaders.22  
The Kii han reforms had worked because of the wide network of support 
from the elites. The social forces pressing for changes in the Honganji 
reforms faced opposition from both conservative monks, who were opposed 
to any change, as well as from Shimaji and those of the Yamaguchi group 
(the former Chōshū han), who had a different reform agenda and were able 
to stop these reforms and sideline Kitabatake. Myōnyo was brought back to 
Kyōto and this reform effort ended. The political situation in the post Seinan 
war was also unsettled and not conducive to realising deeply contested and 
divisive changes. Iwakura asked Kitabatake not to press on with his plans 
                                           
20 Ibidem, p. 57. 
21 Ibidem, p. 57. 
22 Ibidem, p. 54. 
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and so in a matter of some two months—in April 1879 Kitabatake had been 
given an official letter asking him to proceed—in June he was asked to stop 
the reforms. Myōnyo was whisked away to Kyōto and not allowed to 
communicate with Kitabatake. 
 
 
Teaching the Law 
 
Dōryū was sidelined after the reforms, persuaded to go out on a long foreign 
tour and sidelined once he returned. Dōryū rather than go back to his temple 
in Waka no Ura went to Tōkyō and established a law university and wrote a 
widely read account of his travels. These activities built on and developed 
his earlier ideas and widened their scope to go beyond sectarian and 
religious boundaries to address the citizenry. His ideas were still grounded in 
the basic approach that widespread and equal participation would strengthen 
the country.  
To this end he established the Kitabatake Law Centre (Kitabatake 
hōwajo). The educational philosophy and objectives of this institution were 
based on Kitabatake’s concept of “improving the priest”. This would be 
done through an education system that stressed the principles of the empire 
and support for “national principles and national strength” (kokutai 
kokuryoku). The university curriculum was based on spiritual education 
(seishingaku) and offered history and other subjects. Kitabatake wrote his 
own textbooks based on teaching material from Austria and Germany. He 
was helped by his wife, and was successful in raising funds for the school 
but religious groups were lukewarm to his approaches.23 The law school was 
established with teachers such as Ōi Kentarō and bureaucrats from the Law 
Ministry also came to lecture.  
Kitabatake had developed an early interest in law. Perhaps a life devoted 
to upholding the law quickly saw that the law provided another way to 
organize a community on principles of equality. He had, as stated earlier, 
spent five years studying German legal texts and during his European tour 
met with legal scholars and written a book on law. He now used this learning 
to train a new generation but the German legal ideas he learnt were used 
very differently from Itō Hirobumi and other Meiji leaders who sought 
constitutional models when pressed by the demands of foreign powers to 
“civilize” and the need to contain the rising protests around the demand for 
constitutional government. The experience of Bismarckian Germany 
provided a model for the Meiji leaders to develop a political structure around 
a new type of emperor, the so called tennōsei system.  
                                           
23 Ibidem, p. 81-89. 
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Kitabatake uses the language of strengthening the country under the 
imperial house but the meaning these words carry is not the same. The 
emperor, a political institution with a long history, was the natural source of 
legitimacy and continuity and could be imbued with modern meanings. The 
imperial house was an institution central to Japanese culture and history and 
it resonated with the people even when they perceived it dimly. Kitabatake 
and many of his contemporaries saw this as the natural base on which to 
build a more democratic political structure. The imperial links with 
Buddhism have a long history, as well as the traditions of the religious 
uprisings of the Jōdō shinshū followers, known as the ikkōshū uprisings, of 
the fifteenth and sixteenth century should not be ignored. These traditions 
allowed monks to turn to the people even as they extolled the emperor. 
Kitabatake did not last long in the university before there were 
differences, possibly over financial management but the break-away group 
was composed of former bureaucrats of the newly formed Law Ministry and 
there may have been a split over approach and objectives. The university 
under Kitabatake had brought those within the peoples rights movement, 
such as Ōi Kentarō and the Law Ministry bureaucrats who had studied law 
under the French jurist Boissonade.24 
   
 
Preaching Gender Equality 
 
Kitabatake was a popular preacher and during one of his talks he came in 
contact with Nishimaki Sakuya, an early jiyū minken activist, a teacher and a 
journalist. She was drawn to his thinking and became his disciple and then 
his wife. Little is known about her life but as a pioneer political activist her 
life shows that the “traditional” educational system was producing critically 
conscious people. Nishimaki’s work as a people’s rights activist and her life 
with Kitabatake provide two crucial windows into the forces that shaped her 
ideas and brought these two people, separated by age and education, together 
in a common quest. 
Nishimaki’s father had established a temple school or terakoya and 
taught his daughter in the traditional manner emphasizing Chinese poetry. 
Nishimaki studied Chinese poetry and English in Tōkyō and in 1880 became 
a teacher at Kashiwazaki Normal High and Primary School. It is reported 
that she was often late for school because of her work in the political study 
meetings of the people’s rights movement. In September 18, 1881 Baba 
                                           
24 The history of the Meiji University on the website says that it was found in January 1888 by 
a group of young lawyers, Kishimoto Tatsuo, Miyagi Kōzō and Yashiro Misao. It does say 
that they had lectured in Dōryū’s academy but when students who were dissatisfied with 
Dōryū’s policies turned to them they established a new school. http://www.meiji.ac. 
jp/cip/english/about/history.html 
RELIGION AND MODERNITY IN MEIJI JAPAN: STRENGTHENING THE PEOPLE 
 
15 
Tatsui and other leaders were touring the area giving speeches about the 
need for a constitutional government. They spoke at the Nishi Fukuji temple, 
where she was also a speaker. Nishimaki spoke on the importance of 
education as a way to ensure equality for women. Baba was reportedly 
impressed with her ideas and publicly supported her views. The next year 
she wrote an article on the subject. 
However, her political activities were brought to an end by the public 
assembly law passed in April 1880. The law severely curtailed political 
activity and meetings, particularly restricting teachers and women, amongst 
other groups, from taking part in public meetings. Nishimaki debated the 
new law arguing against restrictions on public assembly because they would, 
she felt, restrict debate and further increase inequalities. Nishimaki argued, 
like other people’s rights advocates, that in the struggle for existence 
national unity was vital to meeting the threat of western countries, such as 
England, Russia and France and that political equality and democracy and 
the establishment of a parliament was the best way to unite the people and 
build national strength. She noted that it was often pointed out that the 
English became stronger after the Magna Charta.  
Nishimaki joined the Freedom Party of the Youth (Seinen jiyūto) in 
November 1881 and this was a violation of the law. She was arrested, as 
were other members, under Article 14 of the People’s Assembly Law and 
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a year and also a fine of 1.50 yen 
(the party was subsequently dissolved and its members absorbed in the 
Jiyūto). It is not clear what she did after her release but it seems that at some 
point in time she went to Tōkyō, studied and then taught in a school run by 
an American priest in Yokohama. In September 1885 she heard Kitabatake 
give a talk, by the following year she had become his disciple. Her emphasis 
on the need for education and equality from the perspective of democracy as 
a way of strengthening the nation resonated with Kitabatake’s ideas of 
creating the basis of national strength on spiritual autonomy and constitu-
tional government. Kitabatake had also come to see that the social progress 
of women was also an important component of progress. Strengthening the 
citizenry by removing status differences and reducing economic disparities 
also required removing gender differences.  
It is possible that Kitabatake had come to see the importance of women in 
national development and therefore the need to address gender inequality to 
create not just politically and economically but also spiritually independent 
individuals. This led the two of them to establish the Nonnen Society (the 
name was written in phonetics), modeled on a women’s reform association 
in Germany. They gave a lecture to bring in members and raise money to 
establish a school for women. The two began lecturing mainly in northern 
Japan, where the Honganji was not so active, and branches of the society 
were quickly formed in Yamagata and Akita (August-December 1886) and 
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then in Fukushima, Aomori, Ishimaki, Sendai, and Hakodate (between May 
1886-May 1887).25 The idea behind establishing the Nonnen Society was to 
address the women, as they were seen as crucial to initiating change. The 
woman was regarded as the mother of civilization as her role as a mother in 
raising children gave her a powerful position in shaping the religious life of 
the young. However, to meet the demands of modern life women needed to 
develop autonomy, knowledge and economic independence so that they 
could contribute to the national effort. Women, they argued, also needed to 
have an international perspective and this led them to encourage the learning 
of English as necessary to gain a wider world view. Government policy was 
taking a different route. In 1889 English had been replaced by sewing as a 
subject in Women’s Normal Schools. The Meiji Civil Code, based on 
patriarchal ideas would place them in a subordinate and dependent legal 
position. In contrast Kitabatake and Nishimaki were arguing that “spiritual 
autonomy”, combined with education would give women the possibility of 
economic independence and allow them to be self-reliant.26  
This is a theme that had begun to interest other thinkers and social 
activists, including Buddhists, as well. Tanaka Chigaku (1861-1939), a 
Nichiren monk who left the order and became an influential lay speaker 
emphasized the importance of the family and particularly the role of the 
wife/mother. In a significant essay, Bukkyō fūfuron (On Buddhist marriage) 
initially given as a lecture in 1886 and presented to the Emperor Meiji and 
his consort on their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary in 1894, Tanaka 
argued that since Buddhism had been transformed from a religion of the 
house (ie) to that of the individual, the husband-wife relationship had to be 
reformulated as the major axis of the family and consequently of the state.27  
The nature and function of the family became an important area of 
examination in books and periodicals and a new sense of family and home 
                                           
25 Tanaka Kazunori 田中和徳, “Josei minkenka Nishimaki Sakuya no shōgai” 女性民権家西
巻開耶の生涯 (Life of Sakuya Nishimaki: Civil rights activist in the Meiji era), Niigata 
Kenritsu Rekishikan Kenkyū Kiyō 新潟県立歴史館研究紀要, 4, 2003, pp. 25-48, see pp. 35-37, 
and Id., “Josei kaihō ni tsukushita Nishimaki Sakuya no ashidori – Nishimaki Sakuya ni 
kakawaru shinshiryō no shōkai” 女性解放に尽くした西巻開耶の足どりー西巻開耶にかか
わる新資料の紹介  (On the traces of Nishimaki Sakuya, who devoted her life to the 
emancipation of women. Presenting new materials on Nishimaki Sakuya), Kashiwazaki Kariwa 
gōshi kenkyūkai 柏崎刈羽郷士研究会, vol. 26, March 1993, pp. 32-57, see pp. 41-42. 
26 Tanaka K., “Josei Minken-ka”, pp. 35-38. 
27 See Mizugaki Gentarō 水垣源太郎, “Bukkyō kakushin undō no sezokuteki aidentiti” 仏教
革新運動の世俗的アイデンテイテイ(The identity of the Buddhist reform movement), in 
Aoki Tamotsu 青木保 (ed.), Kindai Nihon bunkaron 9: Shukyō to seikatsu 近代日本文化論
９：宗教と生活 (Theory on the culture of modern Japan: religion and life), Iwanami Shoten, 
Tōkyō 1999, pp. 26-54. On Tanaka Chigaku see Tanaka Chigaku 田中知学, Bukkyō fūfuron 
仏教夫婦論 (On Buddhist marriage), Aoyamakatsu Shuppan, 1894, no page numbers. The 
book is based on a lecture given in 1886. I have discussed this in an earlier unpublished essay. 
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emerged in the late Meiji period. This differed from the early Meiji years 
when the traditional forms were being criticized and a family based on equal 
relations was advocated. These new debates defined the principles on which 
the drafting of the Meiji Civil Code began in 1890. So, this was not only a 
“religious debate”, but had wide social and political implications. The new 
family (katei) lost this idea of equality and made the home the domain of the 
woman. Buddhist debates, according to Fukushima Eiju, who has discussed 
the notion of woman, man-woman relations and the concept of the family in 
Buddhism, argues that Buddhists too began to think along these lines. He 
shows that the magazine Katei (Family) brought out from 1901 depicts the 
family as a “small paradise” where each member gave up his ego to become 
a part of the whole but it was the woman who would manage and run this 
little paradise while the man worked outside in society.28  
Significantly, the central argument that Kitabatake and Nishimaki put 
forward is that marriage is a partnership of equals, and the two can only be 
equal if both of them are politically, economically and spiritually equal. 
Such a family based on the principle of equality will support an independent 
and strong nation. They are not putting forward a set of essentialised 
traditions that the woman will transmit to the future generations but there is 
also no clear statement about the nature of political activity and how women 
could play a political role but the tenor of the arguments they advance 
supports a reading that they view citizenship as based on equality, the family 
as the nation writ small, and that in both equality would nurture and sustain 
strength. This is the major motif and it defines his conception of social and 
political relationships and family and places them within the broad contours 
of the advocates for civil rights. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The examination of Kitabatake and Nishimaki’s life and their ideas was used 
to point out the interplay between “religious” and “secular” ideas, bracketed 
because, in the case of Japan as shown here, they were not clearly 
demarcated nor seen to be. The demarcation was itself a product of the post 
Meiji changes and this view of a society where religion was marginal 
gradually gained dominance. To read it back distorts, marginalizes and hides 
the activities of religious and religious-minded people that continue to play a 
role in shaping the social discourse. Kitabatake, both as a Honganji monk 
and as a lay preacher took an active role in contemporary debates and was as 
much shaped by them as he contributed to them. The idea of the imperial 
                                           
28 Fukujima Eiju 福島栄寿, Shisō to shite no “seishinshugi” 思想としての‘精神主義’ 
(‘Spiritualism’ as thought), Hōzokan, Kyōto 2003, pp. 190-200. 
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house and the role of the emperor had yet to solidify into the “emperor 
system” and Kitabatake and others like him used this ancient symbol in new 
ways to build a stronger han and later a stronger nation. There is no mention 
in Kitabatake’s writings that would suggest that he saw the emperor as 
anything that resembles the emperor of the Meiji leaders.  
The role of Mito in the intellectual debates has been studied but the role 
of Kii has been neglected. Kitabatake’s political agenda matured in the 
period of the han reforms and that was when he began to study German as 
well, so the movements in Kii and their relationship with the imperial house 
and the bakufu need to be explored. Nishimaki’s political learning began 
through her participation in the people’s rights movement and developed 
through her exposure to Christianity in the same direction as Kitabatake, so 
the two had many shared concerns that brought them together. Their 
emphasis on the idea that national strength can only be built on the basis of 
an equal citizenry and the need to develop autonomous individuals brought 
them in conflict with both the authorities of the temples as well as the state. 
This underlying objective of their thinking differentiates them from the Meiji 
leaders and the project of “enlightenment and modernity” as represented by 
Fukuzawa Yukichi and the Westernisers. They and others like them were 
articulating a political and social programme to strengthen the rights of the 
people and would provide an alternative to fracture the secular and the 
spiritual that European modernity had created. Their history shows the limits 
of Meiji success and points to the unfinished agenda of modern Japan.  
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ROLE OF THE STATE AND STATE-BUILDING  
IN MODERN CHINA: REVIEW AND NEW INSIGHT 
 
 
Kent G. Deng 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the period from 1800 to 2000 China endured many serious crises and 
changes. The common root of changes in China can be traced to the state and 
state-building, something that has been overlooked so far. The failure of the 
Qing Confucian state opened many doors for non-Confucian state-builders to 
impose a different type of state on Chinese society. They had three things in 
common: they were all Social Darwinists; they formed a tiny minority in 
society; and their institutions often had no “Chinese characteristics”.  
In this context, not all changes were necessary. Not only that, many 
crimes against ordinary people were committed in the name of the state. This 
is justifiable given that with the changes, the living standards of ordinary 
Chinese citizens declined. By the end of Mao’s rule, for example, about half 
of the population were under the official poverty line. China did not become 
a better place to live until 1978. 
This chapter probes into the issue of the role of state-building and a new 
state and its impact on the well-being of the general public. 
 
 
Overview 
 
From 1800 to 2000 China endured a great many serious crises often on a 
huge scale: opium abuse; society-wide uprisings; the political movements of 
the Republicans and Communists; civil wars; political purges; and the 
unparalleled 1959-62 man-made famine. Meanwhile, China had been 
defeated five times by foreign powers: two opium wars, one Sino-Japanese 
war, one Sino-French war and one war with Eight-Power Allied Forces and 
signed treaties with 12 foreign powers. A third of China’s territory was also 
placed under control of the Japanese during the Second World War. Peace 
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became a rare luxury in China, a country which had more than its fair share 
of havocs in the world.1 
 
 
Interpretations of changes in China 
 
Coupled with the messiness of China’s experiences, narratives of this period 
are full of contrasts and contradictions. Some emphasise China’s success; 
others, China’s failure, much depending on one’s taste. 
 
 
China’s success and failure 
 
There has been a long European tradition of respect for China. From the 
early sixteenth century onwards a string of Jesuit missionaries followed in 
the footsteps of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and managed to enter the 
heartland of the Empire. They created a notion of ‘Sinophilism’ and viewed 
Qing China as an orderly, efficient and sophisticated society and a land of 
plenty where ordinary people had a decent material standard of living.  
Such a view influenced an array of European elite, including the 
philosophers Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Voltaire (or 
François-Marie Arouet, 1694-1778),2 the economic thinkers François 
Quesnay (1694-1774) and Adam Smith (1723-90),3 as well as driving the 
European fashion movement chinoiserie. Prior to the British Industrial 
Revolution, China was recognised, at least implicitly, as a model for 
Europe.4 In circa 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), the most powerful 
man in Europe, famously warned the world to take China seriously: “When 
                                                 
1 Thomas P. Bernstein, “Stalinism, Famine and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during 
the Great Leap Forward”, Theory and Society, vol. 13, n. 3, 1984, pp. 339-377; Neville 
Maxwell and Bruce McFarlane (eds.), China’s Changed Road to Development, Pergamon, 
Oxford 1984; Warren Sun and Frederick C. Teiwes, China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, Central 
Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward 1955-1959, 
M.E. Sharpe, New York 1999; C.X. George Wei and Xiao-yuan Liu, Chinese Nationalism in 
Perspective: Historical and Recent Cases, Greenwood Press, Westport 2001; Woei-lien 
Chong (ed.), China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-
Mao Counternarratives, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 2002. 
2 Voltaire openly advocated the Qing Empire as the best in the world; see Geoffrey F. 
Hudson, Europe and China, Beacon Press, Boston 1961, p. 322. Leibniz went as far as 
suggesting that missionaries from Qing China were needed to teach Europeans natural 
religion; see Donald F. Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’s Novissima Sinica, University of 
Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1957, p. 75. 
3 Quesnay, nicknamed “the Confucius of Europe”, was inspired by China and established 
physiocracy or agricultural fundamentalism. He also favoured Mencius’ view on market 
laissez-faire. Smith’s notion of laissez-faire came from China, even if indirectly. 
4 Lewis A. Maverick, China: A Model for Europe, Paul Anderson, San Antonio, Texas 1946. 
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China wakes, she will shake the world”. Such a tradition continued after the 
Second World War, as evidenced by the lifetime works on Chinese science 
and technology by Joseph Needham (1900-1995) and, more recently, by the 
current debate over China’s economic power led by the California School. 
The comparative advantage of the sinophiles lies in their expertise in 
Chinese studies. Most are fluent in the Chinese language with a good 
knowledge of history. Their problem is explaining how and why a vibrant 
civilisation failed so suddenly and so badly after 1800. Foreign interference, 
such as opening China for trade in the wake of the 1840 Opium War, has 
become imperative for this group. But foreign trade accounted for only a tiny 
share in China’s total GDP of the 1840s. This is their impasse. 
In opposition to this is “sinophobia” which seems to have begun with 
Montesquieu (or Charles-Louis de Secondat, 1689-1755). In his bid to 
promote democracy, Montesquieu attacked Qing China as despotic.5 His 
commitment to the idea of liberty was followed by Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) and David Hume (1711-1776), while his critique of China was picked 
up by Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max Weber (1864-1920) and Karl A. 
Wittfogel (1896-1988) who viewed China as a civilisation of stagnation, 
incompetence, and misery. 
Sinophobes usually do not read Chinese and their knowledge of China is 
often limited. Their works depend heavily on guesses and speculations from 
a Eurocentric norm. Typically, they ignore China’s relative egalitarian 
landholding (freehold and leasehold) and easy access to markets, which 
guaranteed some economic freedom for all. They can hypothesize China’s 
alleged despotism-cum-failure after 1800 but cannot elucidate China’s 
success under the alleged despotism before 1800. This is an impasse of 
another kind. 
So far, there is no reconciliation between the two camps. This book aims 
to surmount these impasses with a consistent and convergent argument to 
show how China’s great success during the Qing prepared the ground for its 
own downturn with all the aforementioned troubles. 
 
 
Myths of China’s modern history 
 
There are a wide range of myths in circulation about Sino-foreign 
relationships, Chinese nationalism, industrialisation and modernisation. The 
standard view and normative has been that the Opium War, a small event 
with a total of a few thousand casualties, awoke the Chinese general public 
who then supported the Nationalist Movement. This Nationalist Movement, 
                                                 
5 See chapter 21 (“Of the Empire of China”) of book 8 (“Of the Corruption of the Principles 
of the Three Governments”) in his 1743 monograph The Spirit of Laws, reprinted, Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge 1989. 
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in turn, ushered in China’s industrialisation and modernisation. This is a very 
neat and linear narrative. 
But neatness is not automatically accurate. During my decade-long 
research, time and again evidence confronts such a narrative. For example, 
until the 1930s, ending China’s “unequal treatises” was not on the agenda of 
most political parties. Instead, China’s movers and shakers were 
overwhelmingly pro-foreigners and pro-foreign powers. They included the 
Taipings, “Westernisers” (yangwu pai), Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his fellow 
Republicans, and the Communists.  
Then, there is the issue of foreign powers carving up China. Most writers 
tend to ignore the fact that after the 1850s the majority of provinces in China 
were heavily armed and no foreigner could stroll in without permission. 
China was in effect carved up first by Chinese officials themselves to attract 
foreign powers in exchange for capital and technology. These officials even 
disobeyed Beijing when the Qing Court declared war in 1900 against the 
invading powers. Maintaining neutrality all the way, not a single bullet was 
fired upon the invaders. 
The next issue regards revolutions. So far there is no evidence that the 
Taipings did anything remotely revolutionary, ideologically, politically, or 
economically. The commonly cited Tianchao Tianmu Zhidu (Land System 
of the Heavenly Dynasty) dealt predominantly with how to subjugate the 
captured population by coercion. There is no indication that Sun Yat-sen was 
involved in the 1911 Mutiny in Wuhan, or played any decisive role in ending 
the Qing monarchy in 1912. The following 1927 Northern Expedition was a 
proxy war between the Soviet Union (backing the Republicans and 
Communists) and Japan (supporting the northern warlords). The Soviet 
Union did not care about whether its protégés were revolutionary or not, as 
long as they were pro-Soviet Russia. Then, there is the question of Mao’s 
movement. The fact that Mao carefully plotted and ferociously fought eleven 
rounds against his fellow party members and communist sympathisers, often 
in large numbers, means that his victims were not unintended or incidental 
“collateral damage” by friendly fire. Either large numbers of Mao’s victims 
or Mao himself was an enemy of the revolutionary. Politically, Mao’s 
victims and Mao himself were mutually exclusive. 
Finally, there is the question of modernisation. From 1860 to 1937, 
China’s state-run industrial schemes, foreign investment projects and growth 
in treaty ports, including Shanghai, were too small to upset China’s 
traditional economy and its growth trajectory. Industrial expansion in 
Manchuria under the Japanese colonial rule did not offset the extensive 
damage caused by the Japanese invasion and conquest, not to mention the 
fact that most industrial assets were eventually lost to the looting of Stalin’s 
Red Army in Manchuria during 1945-1946. After 1949, according to Maoist 
official statistics, China was still characterised as an agrarian economy 
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although with a nuclear arsenal. Ordinary people’s daily calorie intake was 
noticeably lower than in the 1930s, not to mention the largest peacetime 
man-made famine which cost 30-40 million lives. Such a thing had never 
occurred during the Qing. 
 
 
Old narratives and new debate 
 
Historians often claim that under the Marxist Eurocentric doctrine that 
before 1800 China had already been infected with a wide range of social ills. 
China’s alleged “feudal system” comprehensively stifled the growth of 
progressive capitalism, holding China back in the grip of an agrarian 
deadlock with perpetual poverty and military weakness. China managed to 
survive only because it was isolated from the rest of the world.6 This has 
been seriously challenged by a non-Eurocentric view which sees no harm in 
the isolation of China: after all, most of Chinese premodern inventions and 
innovations were made largely independent in China.7 Even so, changes 
were unanimously viewed as good for China, regardless. The term 
‘revolution’ has been particularly favoured by writers on China.8 In their 
                                                 
6 See e.g. Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo jindai shi (An early modern history of China), People’s 
Press, Beijing 1978; Hu Siyong and Yuan Shuyi, Zhongguo Jingdai Shi Xinbian (A new early 
modern history of China), People’s Press, Beijing 1981; Hu Sheng, Cong yapian zhanzheng 
dao wusi yundong (From the Opium War to the May Fourth Movement), People’s Press, 
Beijing 1981; Yan Zhongping, Zhongguo jindai jingjishi (An economic history of early 
modern China), People’s Press, Beijing 1989; Liu Kexiang and Chen Zhengping, Zhongguo 
jindai jingjishi jianbian (A brief economic history of early modern China), Zhejiang People’s 
Press, Hangzhou 1999; Zhang Yan, Qingdai jingji jianshi (A concise economic history of the 
Qing period), Henan Classics Press, Zhengzhou 1998; Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, 
Zhongguo zibenzhuyi fazhan shi (A history of capitalist development in China), People’s 
Press, Beijing 1990; Liu Foding, Wang Yuru and Zhao Jin, Zhongguo jindai jingji fazhan shi 
(A history of economic development in early modern China), Tertiary Education Press, 
Beijing 1999; Wang Jingyu, Zhongguo jindai jingjishi, 1895-1927 (An economic history of 
early modern China, 1895-1927), People’s Press, Beijing 2000. 
7 Joseph Needham (ed.), Science and Civilisation in China, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1954-1994; Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford 1973.  
8 E.g. Joseph W. Esherick, “Ten Theses on the Chinese Revolution”, Modern China, 21/1, 
1995, pp. 45-76; Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
France, Russia and China, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979; John K. Fairbank, 
The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985, Harper & Row, New York 1986; Jonathan D. 
Spence, The Search for Modern China, W.W. Norton, New York 1999; Alan Lawrance, 
China since 1919: Revolution and Reform – A Sourcebook, Routledge, London 2004; June 
Grasso, Jay Corrin and Michael Kort, Modernisation and Revolution in China: from the 
Opium Wars to World Power, M.E. Sharpe, New York 2004. For the debate, see Ramon H. 
Myers and Thomas A. Metzger, “Sinological Shadows: the State of Modern China Studies in 
the U.S.”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, n. 4, 1980, pp. 1-34. Also see Kent 
G. Deng, “A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History”, Economic 
KENT G. DENG 
 
26 
eyes, a revolution justified almost everything the state and state-builders did 
in China. 
As a result, the history of modern China has often been portrayed as 
having six neatly constructed causalities: (1) By 1800, Chinese civilisation 
had become inward-looking, complacent, decadent and lethargic. People 
were universally poor. The Manchu Qing government was corrupt and 
despotic. China was doomed. (2) Qing weakness was ruthlessly exploited by 
predatory powers that spared no effort to make a kill in China, ranging from 
opium trafficking to invasion to foreign privileges on China’s soil. China 
became a “semi-colony” of foreign powers. (3) Copied from Western and 
Japanese patriotism, Republicans emerged from the sovereignty crisis to 
modernise China’s politics, economy and culture under a republic. (4) 
However, the Republicans soon ran out of steam after being infected by 
vested interests. They fell into the same trap of corruption and despotism as 
the Qing elite. (5) The left-wing elite finally selected communism from 
Russia. Mao led China to independence, fast development and a better 
material life marked by China’s nuclear arsenal. (6) Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reforms were the icing on the cake to improve the Maoist system. 
China’s miraculous growth soon followed and stunned the world in recent 
decades. Since the 1960s, the field of Chinese studies in the United States 
has moved towards a China-centred and sinophile interpretation. This 
narrative has formed the normative and mainstream interpretation of China’s 
modern history.9 If true, step by step, China has become a better place to 
live, the most reliable yardstick that cannot be compromised either in the 
short run or in the long run. In other words, if people’s living standards did 
not improve monthly and yearly, any change, no matter how much the state-
builders promised, was not worth having. This should be valid for all liberal 
utilitarianists and those who believe in Marxian historic materialism. 
Changes inevitably involve what is commonly labelled as “moral judgment”. 
Indeed, it is politically correct to condemn the excessive exploitation of the 
working class either during the early stages of the British Industrial 
Revolution and during Stalin’s super-industrialisation drive, or the brutal 
slavery and massacre of millions by the Nazis and the Japanese during the 
Second World War. The same standard should apply here. 
The revisionists have however argued the opposite. They tell us that by c. 
1830, China’s economy was strong. Qing China matched the West reasonably 
                                                                                                                   
History Review vol. 53, n. 1, 2000, pp. 1-28; and Id., “Development and Its Deadlock in 
Imperial China, 221 B.C.-1840 A.D.”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 51, 
n. 2, 2003, pp. 479-522. 
9 See Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the 
Recent Chinese Past, Columbia University Press, New York 1984. 
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well in manufacturing outputs.10 It remained a major exporter of consumer 
goods and a major importer of silver.11 It is estimated that a total of some 
seven thousands metric tons of the metal was imported by China by 1815 (if 
counting the “Manila Galleon Trade”). It has been argued that China’s 
lasting demand sustained for centuries a high relative price for silver and 
hence facilitated world trade and the Spanish Empire. The Qings maintained 
a respectable living standard despite little modern input.12 Undeniably also, 
the large quantities of opium imports suggest high disposable income 
(although for the wrong reason).13 With China’s high yield agriculture and 
regular surpluses, the wealth was spread among ordinary citizens, not just 
the upper classes.14 All of this challenges the notion of socio-economic 
malfunction under the Qing.15 The California School suggests that China’s 
indigenous economy could have continued indefinitely if it were free from 
external shocks.16 Revisionists have also indicated that the Qing Confucian 
state was anything but despotic.17 It was not the oriental version of the 
                                                 
10 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York 1987, 
p. 149; also Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World 
Order, Simon and Schuster, New York 1996, p. 86. 
11 See Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-
1700, University of California Press, Berkeley 1996, pp. 140 and 232; Gang Deng, Chinese 
Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development, c. 2100 B.C.-1900 A.D., Greenwood 
Press, London and West Port, Conn. 1997, pp. 120-121. See Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo 
Giráldez, “Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century”, 
Journal of World History, vol. 13, n. 2, 2002, pp. 391-427. 
12 See for example Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, 
University of California Press, Berkeley 1993; R. Bin Wong, China Transformed, Historical 
Change and the Limits of European Experience, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 
1997; Andre G. Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, University of California 
Press, Berkeley 1998; Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, Europe, China and the 
Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2000; Thomas 
Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age, University of California Press, 
Berkeley 2002; also Samuel Adrian M. Adshead, Material Culture in Europe and China, 
1400-1800, Macmillan, Basingstoke 1997. 
13 Timothy Brook and Bob T. Wakabayashi (eds.), Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and 
Japan, 1839-1952, University of California Press, Berkeley 2000, chapters. 1, 3, 7, 13 and 14. 
14 Deng Gang, The Premodern Chinese Economy – Structural Equilibrium and Capitalist 
Sterility, Routledge, London and New York 1999; Kent G. Deng, “Development and Its 
Deadlock”, pp. 479-522. 
15 The term they use is dongya bingfu, or “the Sick Man of East Asia”, to portray their own 
civilisation under the Qing. 
16 E.g. R.B. Wong, China Transformed. 
17 Jane K. Leonard and John R. Watt, To Achieve Wealth and Security: the Qing Imperial 
State and the Economy, 1644-1911, Cornell University East Asia Program, Ithaca 1991; 
Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong, Nourish the People: the State Civilian Granary System 
in China, 1650-1850, University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, Ann Arbor 1991; 
K.G. Deng, “Development and Its Deadlock”.  
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French ancien régime.18 Despotism was in fact systematically introduced 
from Soviet Russia to China together with the party-state. So, Maoism (or 
Stalinism with a Chinese face) marked a major discontinuity in Chinese 
history. 
The revisionist insight raises three doubts about China’s changes that 
“teleologists” take for granted. First, these changes often took place randomly 
with various motives. The players had very different mindsets and approaches, 
ranging from top-down to bottom-up, from liberal to radical, from pro-foreign 
to xenophobic, from pro-growth to anti-growth, and so forth.19 One wonders 
whether such changes can ever be justified as necessary. Second, most 
changes were driven by imported ideologies. There is an inevitable issue of 
how relevant these ideologies were and hence, the changes affected ordinary 
people’s needs in China because their application in the country was often 
counterproductive. Third, China’s political systems shifted persistently away 
from people’s need and/or people’s power: from a bureaucratic monarchy to a 
constitutional monarchy then to a dictatorship. With political centralisation, 
choices were routinely made by a tiny minority in society. Opportunities were 
seized by a few careerists and rent-seekers. This begs the question of who 
truly benefited from those changes. Logically, if the economy went well, the 
problem could only be the state.20 
The point is that if changes in China were not all that necessary why 
should they have ever occurred? This tough question cannot be answered by 
the Hegelian-Marxian circular argument that “all that is real is rational and 
all that is rational is real”.  
 
 
The role of the state seen by different groups 
  
Scholars have sensed the role of state-building in modern China, but only 
touched on it lightly.21 Others have either considered one-off changes or 
                                                 
18 Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford 1990; K.G. Deng, Premodern Chinese Economy, chapters 2-4.  
19 J.D. Spence, Modern China.  
20 This study draws wisdom from the “state-market” paradigm; see e.g. Jan-Erik Lane, State 
and Market: the Politics of the Public and the Private, Sage, London 1985; James 
M. Buchanan, Liberty, Market and State, Wheatsheaf, Brighton 1986; David Miller, Market, 
State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1989; Peter Nolan, State and Market in the Chinese Economy, Macmillan Press, 
Basingstoke 1993; Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State, Macmillan 
Press, Basingstoke 1994; Robert Boyer, States against Markets, Routledge, London 1996; 
Christian Joerges, The Market without the State, States without a Market?, European 
University Institute, Florence 1996; Charles K. Rowley, The Political Economy of the 
Minimal State, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 1996.  
21 Vito Tanzi, The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: a Historical Perspective, IMF, 
Washington 1997; Steve Chan, Cal Clark and Danny Lam, Beyond the Developmental State: 
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have had no reference to state-building at all.22 Equally surprising, many 
took a static view as if the state was frozen.23 
The modern economics’ view on the state is technical. It shuns the issue 
of “who serves whom” between the state and society. Power hierarchy has 
no special bearing. In macroeconomics, the state can be considered as one of 
the many variables which jointly contribute to the total output of the 
economy in the form of a production function Q = f (K, L, M, S, …), where 
Q stands for the total output which depends on inputs of capital investment 
including land (K), labour (L), market (M), state or government (S), and so 
forth. Each variable often has a weight (a, b, c, d and e, called parameters), 
as in a linear function Q = a + bK + cL + dM + eS. Whether these variables 
are endogenous or exogenous, or how weights are granted is a matter of 
personal taste. Needless to say, there are highly simplified Cobb-Douglas 
production functions, based on Q = FLαK1–α; where F is the total factor 
productivity; α is the output elasticity of labor; (1–α) is the output elasticity 
of capital. Admitted, state policy alters labour and capital inputs and the 
visible hand of the state no longer shows.  
Political sciences however, see the state differently. As the antonym of 
anarchy, conventional wisdom on the definition and the raison d’être of the 
state is threefold. First, the state is an organisation which exercises the 
exclusive power to maintain social order among a population living within a 
territory, or area of governance. Second, the state has exclusive power to 
shield against foreign interference and take-over. In other words it has 
sovereignty. Third, the state also controls certain information not available to 
the general public, typically in the name of national interests or national 
security.  
But the problem is that there are always multiple ways to establish and 
maintain a social order and hence to fulfil the basic duty of the state. In this 
context, the state can be autonomous from the economy per se, and may or 
may not build and maintain rapport with society. It may support economic 
growth or ruin it. In history, any chosen way was often personal, accidental, 
imperfect and inefficient. National interests or national security were always 
subject to manipulation by the few. The reason is that state-builders and 
state-minders are primarily selfish beings and often pursue their own 
                                                                                                                   
East Asia’s Political Economics Reconsidered, St. Martin’s Press, New York 1998; Meredith 
Woo-Cumings, The developmental state, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1999. 
22 E.g. Robert E. Bedeski, State-building in Modern China: the Kuomingtang in the Prewar 
Period, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley 1981; Julia 
C. Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Politics: State Building in Republican China, 1927-
1940, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998. 
23 See Gordon White, The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform: the Road to Crisis, 
Macmillan, London 1991; Mark Selden, The Political Economy of Chinese Development, 
M.E. Sharpe, New York 1993; Shih Chih-yu, State and Society in China’s Political Economy: 
the Cultural Dynamics of Socialist Reform, Lynne Rienner, Boulder 1995. 
KENT G. DENG 
 
30 
interests in the face of the majority. Sadly, there is no single case in human 
history where a state has been completely free from the influence of vested 
interest. This phenomenon is well captured in what is known as “Olson’s 
Thesis”.24 In this regard, the notion that the state acts on behalf of public 
interest is too often untrue even in a modern democracy. 
What grants a state such special ability to act independently from public 
interest is its unique power or authority over individuals and over other 
lesser organisations. By definition, the state is always at the top of the social 
hierarchy. To view the state as an open and enlightened body bargaining 
with the masses on the basis of equality is no more than a fantasy. Usually, 
the state does not respond to a popular opinion unless its legitimacy is 
seriously challenged.  
On the other side of the equation is the relative powerlessness of the 
general public for whom collective action is a risky undertaking,25 a problem 
deep-seated in what is called the “prisoner’s dilemma.” In this case an 
individuals choices are constantly under pressure by the authority that 
actively blocks inter-personal communication (hence the term prisoners).26 
Paradoxically, the risk of collective action often functions as a stabilising 
factor in society even when public resentment is apparent. So powerful, it 
can offset disability caused by the state’s excessive coercion. A good 
example was the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. The risk of 
collective action stabilised China because of the brutality of Mao’s regime. 
In this context, the state-society relationship is always power-
asymmetrical and information-asymmetrical. The general population as a 
whole is constantly at a disadvantage when bargaining with the state. As a 
result, the state is always in the right, regardless of whether it falls into the 
wrong hands. As it often happens, a regime can be very unpopular but still 
politically invulnerable. Of course, in the long run, history gives the final 
verdict on a state and a state-builder. However, the verdict always comes too 
late as damages have been long before done to the people. So, the verdict is 
often cold comfort. Cases from the twentieth century alone include the 
Holocaust, the Cultural Revolution, the Khmer Rouge and Somalia 
genocide. 
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to downgrade the role of the state in 
society. The state is or should be a docile pussy cat, not a blood-thirsty beast. 
In classical and neo-classical economics (here they are being taken as a 
                                                 
24 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities, Yale University Press, New Haven 1982. 
25 Id., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. 
26 E.g. Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York 1984; 
Amos Tversky, Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass. 2004. 
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branch of social sciences), human society is considered a collection of 
atomised individuals who act universally independently and rationally. In a 
functional market an optimum in resource allocation will be achieved for all, 
that is the Pareto optimum. Any meddling with the market by the state only 
distorts the process and creates losers.27 Admittedly, the market model (or 
free market model) has some tough conditions attached: e.g. a free flow of 
complete knowledge of demand and supply, voluntary and autonomous 
market participants, and perfect competition amongst all producers and 
consumers. A vast body of literature has pointed out how impossible it is for 
such a market economy to function when one considers in reality the 
perpetual existence of asymmetrical information, transaction costs, price 
distortion, imperfect competition and economic rent, not to mention the 
possibility of market failures with negative externalities from seemingly 
harmless market activities. Likewise, changes in politics and the state will 
have little bearing on economic performance so long as the market still 
functions democratically. To classical and neo-classical economics, the best 
state is a servo system that Adam Smith called “night watchmen”. So far, 
this has remained wishful thinking apart from a few rare cases. Post-war 
Hong Kong may be the closest case but even there, the state showed its 
visible hand daily in terms of governance of law, public housing, and 
regulated food prices. 
The Marxist School arrives at a similar conclusion via a very different 
route. From the viewpoint of historical materialism, individuals are not 
atomised but socialised in a web of relations with the rest of the population. 
Amongst all such relations, the economic ones are given paramount 
importance and hence are believed to determine the nature of ownership, 
production, exchange and consumption. The economy or the material basis 
dictates politics and the state the superstructure which are meant to submit 
and serve the economy,28 although ironically in all communist countries the 
superstructure routinely determined the material basis and the economy 
always served the state. Lenin argued that during the stage of imperialism 
the communists could only pin their hopes on the weakest link in the 
capitalist world. This is a total violation of Marx’s historical materialism. 
The fact that so many communist states were artificially established after 
World War Two, involving at best limitedly industrialised societies (East 
Germany and Czech Slovakia) and at worst nomadic economies (Mongolia), 
                                                 
27 John Harriss, Janet Hunter and Colin Lewis, The New Institutional Economics and Third 
World Development, Routledge, London 1995, p. 87. For an easy read, see Wolfgang Kasper 
and Manfred E. Streit, Institutional Economics: Social Order and Public Policy, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham 1998. 
28 Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of Embeddedness”, 
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, n. 3, 1985, pp. 481-510. 
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clearly tells us that communist state-building was purely an ideological 
phenomenon. 
In Western Europe, there was indeed a case when the newly emerged 
bourgeoisie won over the state support for capitalism, which may prove 
Marx right. One often forgets, however, that even with their wealth it took 
the European bourgeoisie decades if not centuries to raise their voice and 
that the final outcome of their struggle was not guaranteed. Otherwise, a 
capitalist industrial revolution should have occurred simultaneously across 
Western Europe (as Karl Marx famously predicted). It did not happen. The 
British bourgeoisie proved an exception. Even so, it took the new class in 
Britain a long revolution in 1640-60 (the English Revolution) with 
Cromwell’s Dictatorship (1649-60) to seal their victory. For the non-British 
bourgeoisie, the outcome of their bargaining with their states was very bleak. 
Here, the exception of the British only demonstrates the power asymmetry 
when bargaining with the state. 
On this note, there is a tradition of liberal thought, known as public 
choice, in favour of a market-like exchange of views in political life. It 
assumes that all players—be they state-builders or interest groups—can 
bargain more or less equally and peacefully. The state is viewed merely as a 
service provider in terms of law and order and national security; and the 
public, service users or clients.29 So, the relationship is all but equal between 
demand, supply, prices (tax revue) and quantities (amount of law and order 
and national defence).  
Although plausible, what is often overlooked is that this is no ordinary 
market and that the state is no ordinary service provider. It is a market with a 
monopoly. Any standard textbook of economics will tell us that monopoly 
distorts the market for economic rent. This is because the state and state-
builder always have more than their fair share of bargaining power unless 
there is a third force to check them. So, the romanticised public choice is 
incompatible with the harsh reality. The common notion of state-society 
reciprocity is a rarity, especially in a non-democratic society. There is simply 
no guarantee that the state serves the public. The timeless problem of “who 
watches the watchmen” (Latin: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies”) is still fully 
valid. According to Confucius’s metaphor, the un-restricted state is more 
ferocious than a man-eating tiger (“Kezheng mengyu hu ye”).30 China’s 
                                                 
29 E.g. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, Chapman & Hall, London 
1951; Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1957; James M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Rand 
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Cambridge 1979. 
30 Confucius, “Tangong Xia”, in Wu Genyou (ed.), Sishu Wujing (The Annotated Four Books 
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history from 1800 to 2000 has demonstrated that an unchecked state is by far 
the most dangerous organisation for society. 
So far, the most accurate account of the nature of the state is probably 
still that made by Max Weber. In his 1918 speech entitled “Politik als Beruf” 
(Politics as a Vocation), Weber described the state as an organisation that 
holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence against a population 
within a given territory. Weber’s simplified version is that the state means a 
small group dominating the rest of the population by means of unilateral 
force.31 Charles Tilly simply called this “state coercion”.32  
Of course, the execution of this monopoly of violence does not have to be 
present all the time. Often, it is just a threat in the background, similar to 
controlling drivers’ speed on public roads. A parked police patrol car without a 
policeman often does the same job as one with a policeman. Also, the power 
of the state does not have to be top-down all of the time. Sometimes, a degree 
of cooperation, voluntary or not, or even sheer passivity and tolerance amongst 
the general public will be enough to re-assure the state power. After all, there 
is the “Stockholm Syndrome” where captives fall in love with their torturers. 
All of this signals caution against the common misconception of mass 
movement. Most of these often involve only a tiny fraction of the total 
population despite the impressive absolute numbers of participants. In the 
case of Maoism, the most outrageous state orchestrated “mass movement”, 
the Red Guards in the 1960s, counted for at most a mere 1.5 percent of 
China’s eight hundred million population of the time.33 So, Weber’s idea of 
minority rule by violence is highly valid. 
In essence, in Weber’s asymmetrical relationship the state is necessarily 
arbitrary, intrusive, compulsory and coercive. It is a force majeure to 
overrule choices by individuals who are at the receiving end of the power, 
dominance, and violence. By analogy, the state can, and often does, force the 
horse to drink, especially if democracy is absent. It means that moral 
persuasion for the support of the masses is not even a necessary condition for 
the state-builder to rule a country. In this regard, the power of the state-
builder is the same as the state itself. The only difference is that the latter is 
an established monopolist while rival state-builders are oligopolists heading 
for that monopoly.  
The state or the state-builder is autonomously and unilaterally capable of 
imposing changes on society by force. They are able to end what is 
commonly known as the “Nash equilibrium”, under which no player can 
                                                 
31 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, in Han Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), Essays in 
Sociology, Oxford University Press, New York 1946, pp. 117-128. 
32 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, Basil Blackwell, 
Cambridge, Mass. 1990. 
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gain by an unilateral change. Again, under a monopoly, unilateral changes 
yield monopolistic gains. 
As with Weber, the New Institutional School argues that throughout 
history the relationship between the market and the state has been 
demonstrably asymmetrical: the market almost always needs the state, while 
the state can live without the market, at least in the short run. Empirically, a 
state can correct a bad market, but a bad state cannot easily be corrected by 
the market alone. One can mention the New Deal during the Great 
Depression and the Stimulus Packages after the 2008 Credit Crunch. In other 
words, it is the institutions (including the state) that determine the shape, 
size, health and growth potential of the market, not vice versa.34 This idea 
came from Hegel who believed that the “absolute spirit” determines the 
developmental status of the economy and society. It is fair to include 
Alexander Gerschenkron who implicitly indicated that exogenous factors 
should be brought in to modernise a backward economy. Of all relationships 
in human society, the state undoubtedly rules the roost.  
Accordingly, Gerschenkronism and Neo Gerschenkronism no longer 
enshrine a state-less market. The state is able to correct the market when the 
market becomes faulty and substitute the market when the market fails. In 
particular, a pro-growth state is imperative for a society to catch up in 
modernisation.35 Such a state is generally the only hope for a developing 
country to vault over growth stages which hold the economy back. So much 
so, that the term “developmental state” was coined.36 The new doctrine of 
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“getting market prices wrong” indicates that the state is fully capable of 
overruling the market to achieve pre-determined developmental goals.37 A 
few countries certainly have had such a state, e.g. Germany before the First 
World War and the “Asian Tigers” after the Second World War. But overall, 
they are rather rare. 
On balance, Weber, the New Institutional School and Neo Gerschenkronism 
see the state as the engine for change. Indeed, the state has the resources, 
power and freedom to make changes. On the other face of the same coin, 
when changes take place, institutions, especially the state, bear the bulk of 
responsibility.  
 
 
The role of the state and state-building 
 
The nature of state-building and state rebuilding in China 
 
Strictly speaking, state-building means the construction of a functional 
organisation to govern a nation.38 Modern state-building in Europe was a 
bloody process with a cycle of extraction of resources from the economy to 
make wars.39 These wars were all about handling internal resistance and 
external rivals. The gain was then made from the economies of scale in an 
enlarged territory and revenue.40 This was because the pre-condition for 
governing a nation is always the monopoly over violence. Monopoly by 
definition means a minority activity.  
State-building also includes state-rebuilding when the preceding state has 
collapsed. We see many events of this sort in China after 1800. To the state-
builder, revolutions usually signalled liberation in the form of freedom from 
an old regime. But they did not automatically free the general population 
from coercion by the new one unless there was a democracy.41 In modern 
China, genuine political freedom for individuals only occurred under short-
lived anarchy.  
State-building therefore differs from changes in bureaucracy. Different 
states may adopt similar types of government administration (e.g. economic 
                                                                                                                   
Theories in the Light of East Asian Experience, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1995; 
Hsüeh Li-min, Hsu Chen-kuo and Dwight H. Perkins, Industrialization and the State: the 
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37 A.H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, pp. 134-157. 
38 For the European case, see Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1975. 
39 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States. 
40 Victoria T. Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, pp. 29-30. 
41 J.W. Esherick, “Ten Theses”, p. 48. 
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planning in the Soviet Bloc and in the West); and different types of 
government administration may serve the same type of state (administrative 
reforms without change in a country’s constitution and laws). State-building 
is not the same as community-building, society-building, nation-building, or 
empire-building. Community-building and society-building refer to the 
creation or enhancement of interpersonal bonds among individuals within a 
location. It is relevant, for example, for a cluster of unrelated migrants 
among whom a code of conduct or communal ethos needs to be established 
in order to hold them together. By 1800 China had long passed this phase. 
Nation-building is the creation or enhancement of a trans-tribal and trans-
regional entity; while empire-building means the creation or enhancement of 
a trans-national entity. Often, a common language and a set of universally 
applicable laws have to be introduced. By 1800, China had long passed this 
phase, too. Conceptually, community, society, nation and empire-building 
may to some extent overlap with state-building. However, state-building and 
state rebuilding can take place independently from these. 
For our purposes, state-building and state rebuilding can be defined as a 
radical regime change in both the structure and nature of the body politic. It 
involves a constitutional change to say the least. China experienced many 
such changes and shifted from a bureaucratic empire to provincial 
federalism, from a benevolent Confucian state to despotism, from civilian 
rule to military dictatorship and so forth.  
State-building has a few distinctive characteristics. Firstly, conditions for 
state-building are almost always opportune when a regime encounters 
difficulties and the state monopoly of violence begins to slip away. It is then 
that dormant, armchair revolutionaries become active, armed revolutionaries. 
Therefore, state-building is a highly conditional and transient affair. Nothing 
is historically pre-programmed. 
Secondly, in a regime change, one monopolist of violence has to be 
replaced by another. War is thus the prerequisite for state replacement.42 
“War made the state, and the state made war”, as Tilly wittily put it.43 He 
even treated state-building as an organised crime,44 for it is fully possible 
that the state-builder behaves like a mafia member who first bullies society 
to create a need for protection, and then offers that very protection for a fee 
that society did not originally require. Moreover, as state-building is 
necessarily destructive and always produces losers, it is therefore seldom 
Pareto-efficient. 
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Thirdly, state-building is seldom conducted by the majority. Rather, it is 
always an arbitrary move by the minority. Of course, in an ideal world, the 
state should be built by society-wide negotiations, culminating in a state “of 
the people, by the people and for the people”.45 In turn, the state would have 
a much easier task in maintaining social order via general consensus.46 In 
reality, however, such an ideal is not always guaranteed even in a modern 
democracy. In a non-democratic society, state-building is often done by the 
minority and for the minority. This notion of arbitrary imposition by the state 
clashes with the notion of rational choices by individuals (and hence 
democracy) advocated by political liberalism and classical and neo-classical 
economics; but it can be well explained by the “patron-client relationship” in 
the moral economy.47 For the lay person, neo-classical economics suggests 
that, as long as a bigger cake is baked, the economy as a whole is doing 
better than before (i.e. “output maximisation”), while the moral economy 
and political economy insist that what matters is who gets what share of the 
cake after negotiations and compromises (i.e. “return optimisation”). 
Fourthly, state-building seldom operates according to the principles of 
market efficiency (i.e. the lowest marginal cost option), nor through market 
freedom (voluntary entry and exit) or market fair play (equal and reciprocal 
rights). State-builders aim to set up a social order on their terms and often 
pursue their goal coûte que coûte. A new state is not always a better one. 
Once a new regime is established, individuals in society usually have no 
freedom to exit unless they migrate, often illegally, to another country. 
Fifthly, in state-building, “heroes” make history. This is determined by 
the aforementioned asymmetrical power relationship between the state and 
society. Thus, personal qualities rather than public opinion influence the 
direction which state-building takes. State-builders vary greatly from 
reformers to evildoers. It is a lottery for the general public. For example, 
George Washington could have agreed to be crowned as the King of the 
United States. His refusal (contrary to certain public opinion) safeguarded 
America as a republic. Mao Zedong might have shared power with the other 
parties after the Second World War. His rejection (again contrary to public 
opinion) led China to a dictatorship. 
Finally, the powerlessness and helplessness of the general public only 
reflect the absolute power of the state and state-builder. In this context, a 
state failure is often a failure by the state or the state-builder himself. The 
demise of a state almost always begins inside the state. This phenomenon 
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was well understood by early Confucians in the fourth century B.C.: as 
Mencius put it, “a state injures itself before being overthrown by others”.48 
 
 
State-builders as prime movers 
 
The question that is raised here is, what mechanisms are necessary for changes 
to occur? It is common for theorists to envisage some sort of social force that 
always acts rationally: society changes only when it feels ready to do so. That 
is the view of a painless, modern democracy-centricism. According to 
Douglass North, an increase in population pressure is the ultimate driving 
force for institutional changes to take place (including in the state itself) 
because the population pressure changes the relative prices of factors of 
production which makes protection of ownership of these factors 
necessary.49 This hypothesis is not borne in Chinese history, to say the least. 
Given that China faced greater population pressure than Europe after 1000 
A.D., it is puzzling why China did not have more advanced institutions than 
the less densely populated Europe. Later, when China had unprecedented 
population growth during the eighteenth century, its institutions remained 
rather stable. But when aggressive institutional changes did take place during 
post-1800, China lost a large share of its population. Marx’s historical 
materialism is even less explanatory because China’s traditional agrarian 
material basis fundamentally disagreed with capitalist and communist 
superstructures. But state-builders sought them anyway. To justify that, 
state-builders have tried very hard to make us believe that China was already 
a proto-capitalist society under the Qing where anti-Qing revolutions worked 
as a midwife for a new society. 
If population pressure and the material basis of the economy were not the 
determinants of state-building in China, a possible factor was ideology. 
Ideology is about the establishment and reinforcement of a specific outlook, 
propensity and rationality in choices, rules of engagement and the code of 
conduct. In human history, an ideology chosen by the elite was often backed 
by the law or law-like sanctions. Thus, an ideology chosen by a minority was 
able to marginalise and overrule unilaterally popular choices based on the 
common sense of the local cultures. Likewise, the elite were able to abandon 
unilaterally an old ideology. In this context, introducing a new ideology can 
never be cost-free. It produces losers.  
But there was a problem even more serious here: in the beginning, only a 
tiny minority knew about those alien ideas. In effect, most political ideas and 
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economic models adopted or adapted in post-1800 China started this way; 
although the outcome of their implementation was often disastrous (e.g. 
Taipings’ second-hand Christianity and Mao’s second-hand Stalinism), the 
general population often had to put up with it. There was therefore a real 
danger that an alien ideology was a Trojan Horse for society.  
The point here is that unlike what has been claimed by Marx’s historical 
materialism, in a non-democratic society, a chosen ideology by elite can be 
independent from mundane life of the masses and the local culture and yet 
change vital institutions (including the state) and alter economic growth 
trajectories in society.50  
This phenomenon turns our attention to the human agent who imposes 
alien ideologies on society. State-builders are in a unique position to impose 
changes because they possess more power and more choices than the rest of 
society. The readiness to resort to violence makes that imposition easy.51  
Still, there is a question of incentives. We can now turn the problem on 
its head by questioning whether it is possible for state-builders to maintain 
the status quo ante. The answer is negative. The status quo ante means no 
change; but no change means no rent. So, all state-builders are impulsive 
change-makers because there is always some gain for themselves.52  
Therefore, all changes must be made on state-builders’ terms. To do that, 
the alien ideology has to be altered to suit their agendas and interests. Such 
alteration is commonly viewed as evidence of flexibility and enlightenment 
on state-builders’ part. But for whom? According to Weber’s observation, 
state power yields monetary returns for the power-holders;53 and so state-
builders are keen on “fighting for power, for power’s sake”.54 Weber’s view 
is echoed by Douglass North, who called the state a predator, and Mancur 
Olson, who viewed state-builders as professional rent-seekers, or simply 
bandits.55 Indeed, in history very few state-builders were angels and saints. 
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On the contrary, the history of state-building has been littered with thugs.56 
This reminds us of Lord John Dalberg-Acton’s (1834-1902) famous 
pronouncement that: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men”.57 We can no longer 
dissociate the vigour of human greed from state-builders. The motive of 
state-builders cannot be as noble, altruistic and innocent as it is said to be.58 
A state-builder may originally come from a humble section of society, but 
there is no guarantee that he represents and helps that part of society.  
Now, regarding changes, not only do we have the agent (state-builders), 
but also the motive (rent), the framework (ideology) and the physical means 
(violence). The package is complete. State-builders make changes, and 
changes make state-builders who they are. State-builders can thus be 
regarded as prime movers for change, independent from the rest of society. 
 
 
The effectiveness of the call from the state and state-builder 
 
The recognition of the state-builder as a prime mover does not mean that 
the general population is completely powerless all of the time. Popular 
support, voluntary or involuntary, often changes the outcome when different 
state-builders compete for the same power. Under the pressure of such 
competition, a state-builder will inevitably promise the public a paradise in 
exchange for resources. It is quite another matter, however, whether the 
promise actually materialises in due course considering the powerful 
asymmetry in favour of the state-builder. Even under a modern democracy, 
politicians’ promises during their election campaigns have to be taken with 
several large pinches of salt. In a non-democratic society, it is only too 
common for state-builders to have complete freedom to betray their 
supporters. 
Overall, the cheapest way for state-builders to get what they want is to 
make the population cooperate willingly. Apart from selling promises, hopes 
and dreams, brain-washing serves the same purpose of disarming public 
resistance. But in the long run, unless these promises, hopes and dreams in 
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some way materialise, state-builders cannot realistically expect quiescent 
collaboration. One simply cannot fool all the people all the time. A reliable 
sign of public non-cooperation is an ever-increasing web of surveillance by 
the state. Higher pressure from the state can only mean lower support from 
the population. 
But, here is the Achilles’ heel: no state or state-builder in human history 
is able to become self-sufficient. This is where agents come in. State-
builders always rely on their agents. In turn these may rely on yet other 
agents in a chain. One can expect that each time as the chain expands the 
control by the state-builder at the centre weakens due to the principle-agent 
problem. In the long run, this principle-agent problem defeats the state and 
the state-builder, because some agents may decide to become state-builders 
themselves. Alternatively, state-builders resort to brutality, as all slave-
drivers do, to force the public to serve the state. But this sharply increases 
the monitoring costs. Populous passive resistance is often enough to drag 
state-builders down. 
There is, of course, the third and more dangerous way. State-builders can 
and often do substitute foreigners (including diasporas) and foreign powers for 
domestic supporters. A great many of the external alliances, treaties and loans 
serve such a purpose. In the process, a country’s sovereignty is sacrificed. 
China has had more than its fair share in the world from 1800 onwards. 
State-builders often combine all the three ways to optimise returns. Even 
so, there is always a gap between what they wish the population to provide 
and what the population actually delivers.  
 
 
Was modern China exceptional? 
 
Despite so many political troubles, modern China has been viewed as having 
a very different state-building process. In P. M. Thornton’s phrase,  
 
Chinese state-making has not centered on the mobilization of troops and 
material resources for war. Rather, the geopolitical challenges associated with 
governing the imperium over the longue durée produced a trajectory of state-
building shaped in large part by the increasing elaborated drive for moral 
regulation and social control.59 
 
She went on to argue that the Yongzheng Emperor, President Chiang 
Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Zedong were all normative moral beings and 
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that China’s state-building was a journey towards the moralisation of 
society.60 We shall see whether such a view holds water.61 
 
 
State-building as a missing link 
 
So far there has been a lack of systematic assessment of the impact of state-
building in China. So far, the most systematic attempts have been made by 
Philip A. Kuhn and Victoria Tin-bor Hui. To Kuhn, the key to China’s state 
rebuilding was restoring China’s sovereignty. This required some 
cooperation from society (hence political participation of the population and 
legitimacy of the government) in the late Qing.62 This is no doubt very 
relevant but too narrow. Hui’s work is on war and state formation two 
millennia ago when the country was united for the first time.63  
 
 
New insight for China’s recent history 
 
Following the Weber-Olson tradition, a new insight offers three aspects: (1) 
There are a great many ways to establish and maintain social order and 
national security by a state. Hence, the state-builder has many choices which 
are not predetermined by a single Hegelian teleological destination but by 
multiple opportunistic improvisations. In other words, there is a high degree 
of randomness in forming a new state. (2) Due to power asymmetry and 
unilateral violence, the state and state-builder have a high degree of freedom 
to choose ex ante ideologies and political and economic systems that suit 
themselves the best. Their choices are often in the name of the general public 
but on the state-builders’ terms. Whether public goods are truly public and 
whether the general public are deservedly served can only be judged ex post. 
In other words, public goods can and do become the state-builder’s own 
private goods because of his selfishness and greed. State-building is thus not 
value-free. (3) Material life is where the public interest really lies, because 
simply making a better living is by far the key concern of ordinary people. 
Changes imposed by the state and state-builder mean little if the people’s 
material life is not improved. Thus, the quality of the state makes a great 
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difference in the growth performance and growth trajectory in a society, 
ceteris paribus. 
There is, however, a common zero-sum misconception. State-builders are 
often keen on lecturing the public that national security and a good material 
life are mutually exclusive and that a society cannot have both at the same 
time. Prime examples of this are Stalin’s Soviet Union and Kim Jong-Il’s 
North Korea where a state-of-the-art military stands side by side with 
widespread poverty. From the view point of welfare economics, there is no 
such unavoidable trade-off between economic health and national security: a 
country with military strength (as a symbol of national security) does not 
have to deplete a country’s living standards. A good material life can 
underpin a country’s national security. Similarly, there is no unavoidable 
trade-off between economic growth and people’s living standards: a country 
of fast growth is not always a country of low living standards. In principle, a 
high level mass consumption should come spontaneously and synchronously 
with growth, industrialisation and modernisation.64 Society should be persuaded 
and incentivised to partake in economic growth, not bullied to sacrifice in 
the name of them: this was known as “forced industrialisation” or “industrial 
dictatorship” under Stalin, and “the Great Leap Forward” under Mao. And, 
no one should be worse off in the process.  
If economic growth is forced upon society and achieved at the expense of 
ordinary people’s living standards, such growth does not qualify as public 
goods. So, conceptually, strong national security and fast economic growth 
without higher living standards for ordinary people only mean excessive 
rent-seeking by the state and state-builder. As a result, public goods become 
private goods of the ruling clique. Such transition is unfortunately common 
especially in a non-democratic society. Like state-building, national security 
and economic growth are not value-free. 
In terms of the actual mechanisms, the state and state-builder can 
influence two sets of factors that affect people’s material life: (1) physical 
factors of production in the forms of certain quality and quantity of capital, 
labour and natural resources (including land) which determine a country’s 
gross total output, and (2) institutional factors in terms of specific type and 
quality of law and order (including tax regimes and the tax burden), property 
rights and market opportunities for different economic agents.  
The current assumption is that the state-building process can alter the 
supply and distribution of the physical factors of production and hence alter 
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the final total stock available for people to live on. Likewise, the state-
building process can change institutional relationships in society to shape 
their incentives to invest and produce. The consequent redistributive 
arrangement determines what ordinary people actually live on. 
Understandably, if the economy is privately operated, the impact of the 
state and state-builder is often limited to what are called externalities. What 
the state and state-builder can achieve is to reorganise the previous rent-
seeking arrangement (taxes) via institutional factors. But if those physical 
factors of production are directly owned and operated by the state per se, the 
impact of the prime mover is far more extensive in all areas of production, 
distribution and consumption. In China, the watershed was the year 1950, 
after which the economy was at the mercy of the state’s control. The impact 
on people’s material life was direct and sometimes devastating.  
There is an issue of state strength and efficiency. People often talk about 
a strong state and a weak state, metaphors for whether a state is masculine 
enough to accomplish certain missions such as imposing policies ruthlessly 
and swiftly, keeping society in a tight grip, and cracking down on resistance. 
A weak and feminine state does the opposite. Empirically, however, a weak 
state is not necessarily malignant and malevolent (like a withering state) 
while a strong one is not always benign and benevolent (like a totalitarian 
state). Therefore, this strong-weak dichotomy is irrelevant unless one knows 
how ordinary people actually live in material terms. A weak but benevolent 
state may well be enough for the market to flourish and for ordinary people’s 
life to improve while a strong but malevolent state may enslave its popu-
lation to death. 
Equally, people talk about state efficiency. In economics, efficiency 
essentially means productivity, which is not always relevant to the performance 
of a state. So far, the term state efficiency, or what qualifies as an efficient state, 
has remained unclear. It can mean economies of scale by using fewer resources 
to govern an enlarged territory. It can also mean extraction maximisation in 
manpower, products and taxes. It can also refer to the capacity of securing 
people’s entitlement via wealth creation (with state investment and 
management) and income redistribution (through social security services). 
There have been no agreed criteria. 
Still, as a whole, we can identify two types of state efficiencies: (1) self-
serving efficiency solely in terms of extracting resources from the general 
public to strengthen the state itself (including the military), and (2) service 
efficiency regarding the protection of wealth and entitlement of the general 
public. These two types are not always compatible with each other. For 
example, a war-making state may be able to extract large quantities of 
resources but be useless in wealth protection, while a useless state in warfare 
may provide the population with material aid. For our purpose, the main 
concern is service efficiency.  
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Then, there is the issue of how to measure such service efficiency. 
Although it is convenient and effective to use GDP (total and per capita) to 
map out a country’s growth performance, GDP does not come without 
problems. First of all, China’s GDP figures in circulation are not necessarily 
the real data. For the period prior to 1980, most GDP figures for China have 
been a product of back-dating estimates. For the period of 1949-1976, there 
is no independent source of information inside China. It is not uncommon 
for figures to contradict each other. Therefore, caution is necessary and some 
commonly cited figures, typically the alleged near two-digit annual growth 
rate under Mao (as high as the Asian Tigers’ miracle growth record), are not 
blindly accepted. Related to the GDP approach, people often use food output 
per head to show that more food became available for everyone and thence a 
better life. Very few have asked whether ordinary people were permitted to 
consume more after more food was produced, as food ration did not increase 
under Mao’s rule. 
Secondly, there is a problem with the base year for calculating GDP. 
Choices of the base year are known to be ideologically charged. The base 
year for pre-1949 China is typically set at a high point (often in the early 
1930s) to demonstrate how badly the Republican government (Kuomintang 
or Guomindang) performed. A different base year is then chosen at a low 
point (often 1946 or 1948) to show what Mao’s government achieved. 
Economic recovery after 1949 is routinely counted as growth. Growth-
counting practitioners often forget that by including recovery as growth they 
are guilty of double-counting. One way to avoid these problems is to 
abandon the base year approach altogether. Instead, we can establish three 
long-term benchmarks for GDP, population and per capita GDP, all based on 
the real growth in China’s past. Population is used not only for per capita 
calculation but also as an alternative proxy for the size of the economy. 
According to these benchmarks, by 1977 when Mao’s rule ended the 
Chinese economy should have been 3.6 times larger than the level of 1830; 
China’s population should have grown over three times; and China’s per 
capita income should have increased over 90 percent. The reality was very 
different even according to the optimistic official data.  
Thirdly, there is the GDP fallacy, owed to the fact that GDP is merely the 
aggregate price of a country’s total output of goods and services in a given 
year. GDP growth means only a comparison of that aggregate price between 
the base year and the chosen year. Although GDP indicates the size and 
momentum of an economy, it tells us nothing about what goods and services 
were produced, or for whom the goods and services were produced. 
Likewise, per capita GDP is the total GDP divided by the population. It says 
very little about people’s actual living standards, e.g. what was in people’s 
food baskets, especially if resource allocation by the market is absent. The 
real danger is that one regards junk capital assets (shoddy buildings and 
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broken machines) and manufactured waste (outputs with no market) as 
goods with real utility and value. 
As GDP-counting conveniently blurs the true intention of the state, it is 
commonly used by regimes that deliberately avoid the issue of those who are 
the true beneficiaries of growth. If two countries have the same per capital 
GDP and the same GDP growth rate, they are conventionally viewed as the 
same. But one country may build overwhelmingly weapons to benefit the 
state and the other may manufacture consumer goods to improve ordinary 
people’s material life. They are poles apart.  
Furthermore, there is the issue of national security and sovereignty which 
have been commonly hailed as an undisputable public good under Mao. 
Before jumping to that conclusion, one has to consider the fact that national 
independence was a world-wide trend for all developing countries after the 
Second World War, Maoist China was not alone. In addition, there is the 
indivisible nature of national security and sovereignty. The despot must feel 
safe in his own country and hence he needs national security and sovereignty 
as his own first priority. As a result, national security and sovereignty 
routinely shelter dictators and despots, a phenomenon which has been clearly 
revealed during the recent changes in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
Often, in the name of national sovereignty ordinary people’s rights and 
freedom are restricted and other countries are not allowed to interfere with a 
country’s internal affairs even if that country’s population are grossly 
abused. In Mao’s China, we can name the cases of the Great Leap Famine 
and the Cultural Revolution. More importantly, our evidence has shown that 
the autocrat did not hesitate to sacrifice national security and sovereignty to 
benefit himself. In this sense, national security and sovereignty are the 
autocrat’s private goods. Only as externalities, national security and 
sovereignty may benefit the ordinary people. In other words, national 
security and sovereignty as state power-holders’ private goods may spill 
over to benefit the masses, not vice versa. 
The bottom line is that in history law and order, fast GDP growth rate 
with rapid industrialisation/modernisation, decent provision of public health, 
and effective protection of national security and sovereignty have all been 
achieved under capitalism and democracy. The Leninist party-state had no 
monopoly over any of them. 
In this context, all the changes, together with the state-builders who made 
them, are guilty unless they are proved innocent by hard evidence of 
generating a tangible increase in mundane consumption for the ordinary 
people. With this new insight, the aforementioned six neat causalities 
become highly questionable. 
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BEARERS OF MODERNITY:  
THE WEST, JAPAN AND ITS PERIPHERIES  
 
 
Rosa Caroli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If it is considered a phenomenon to draw the world into a state of greater 
connectedness and interdependence, then globalisation is not an unprecedented 
historical event. Modernisation, industrialisation or colonialism testify how 
various forms of worldwide connectedness and interdependence were 
developed in the past. One feature characterising both the present and the 
past global phenomena, is represented by the threat they pose to culture and 
identity in being dramatically different from past human experiences. 
Not unlike what happened to those living in such processes of modernisation, 
industrialisation or colonialism, historians today are called upon to look at 
the different responses that formulate this new global phenomenon in terms 
of culture and identity, as well as re-examining the past in light of current 
events. Thus, even if the globalisation phenomenon is yet to loom completely, 
historiography has provided some different tools to both interpret the present 
and re-examine the past.  
Global history or (as Patrick O’Brien calls it) the “restoration of global 
history” is considered one result of such activity. When possible, it offers a 
method and a framework that allows one to “construct negotiable meta-
narratives”.1 In the essay he wrote as a prolegomenon to the first issue of the 
Journal of Global History in 2006, O’Brien states that:  
 
[…] recommendations that historians concentrate attention upon micro-
histories of difference, diversity, locality, biography [seem] to have produced 
some of the best and most provocative historiographical writing in recent 
years.2  
                     
1 Patrick O’Brien, “Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of 
global history”, Journal of Global History, n. 1, 2006, pp. 3-39.  
2 Ibidem, p. 35. 
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The prospect of reconsidering the value and the meaning of micro-histories 
in terms of “negotiable meta-narratives” seems to have a relevant 
significance for historians on East Asia who, in exploring the various micro-
histories which are inside and across the histories of East Asian societies, 
face many problems and challenges, starting with the continuous re-
formulation of a vocabulary to both interpret and narrate these histories.  
In fact, many of the words we use when speaking or writing about East 
Asian societies are not always adequate to both interpret and narrate them, as 
they do not belong to these societies. On the other hand, many of the words 
used by East Asian historians when discussing or writing about their own 
societies do not belong to them. This is mostly because the terms they use 
are simply a translation of words which have been coined elsewhere. This 
creates many difficulties, yet at the same time, provides opportunities for 
historians dealing with East Asia who must adopt a philological approach to 
their research. Focusing on reading the language that East Asian people 
write and have written regarding themselves and the outside world 
(particularly when they interacted with global phenomena), can reveal a 
variety of different meanings and inflections of both the present and the past 
global phenomena. 
In dealing with the subject of Japan’s modernisation, I will take into 
consideration both Japan’s interaction with an overpowering modernity 
coming from the West and its reverberation at Japan’s peripheries, especialy 
Okinawa. I will adopt three different points of view: firstly, I will delineate 
how some Japanese scholars interpreted Okinawa from the perpspective of 
Japan’s interaction with modernity. Secondly, I will try to illustrate how 
Okinawa’s interaction with modernity was perceived by local scholars of the 
so-called Okinawa gaku 沖縄学 (namely the research on Okinawa carried 
out by Okinawans since the beginning of the twentieth century), with 
specific regard to Iha Fuyū 伊波普猷 (1876-1947), who is considered the 
father of modern Okinawanology. Finally, I will consider how attempts by 
both Japan and its periphery to construct their own version of modernity was 
deeply thwarted by an adamant idea of modernity as well as by its 
assumption of universality.  
 
 
The historical framework  
 
A brief summary of the major events regarding Japan’s modernisation, as 
well as the premises and the consequences of the transformation of the 
former Kingdom of Ryūkyū 琉球 into a Japanese prefecture, can be helpful 
in contextualising this issue.  
This region had been historically external to the Japanese empire, despite 
the fact that after 1611 the kingdom had become a vassal of the Japanese fief 
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of Satsuma while maintaining its tributary relations with China. People 
living in Ryūkyū were in many respects behind Japan’s cultural and 
jurisdictional orbit; also, the culture and the socio-economic organisation of 
this region were quite different from those prevailing in Japan proper. Such a 
difference is clearly demonstrated by the fact that after it was incorporated 
into Japan in 1879 as Okinawa prefecture, the Meiji government 
progressively adopted drastic measures aiming at Japanising the Okinawans. 
Assimilation policy focused on the primacy of the civilisation that Japan 
claimed to embody by virtue of being the sole Asian country to have taken 
the road of modernisation and industrialisation. In the early Meiji era (1868-
1912), such an idea was enforced by the diffusion of social Darwinism. The 
latter proved helpful “to demonstrate ‘scientifically’ that some cultures were 
advanced and civilized while others remained backward and uncivilized”.3 
Therefore, the idea of civilisation (bunmei 文明) prevailing after 1868 was 
based on a vision equating geographic remoteness with lower stage of 
progress and modernity.4  
Since Japan was involved in the global phenomena with its re-opening 
and stipulation of unequal treaties with Western powers in the 1850s, a 
growing sense of crisis had obviously emerged among intellectual and 
political elites. They acutely perceived the problem of how Japan could 
preserve its independence. Such a sense of crisis did not decline even after 
Japan chose to follow the Western model of industrialisation and 
modernisation as a unified nation state; rather it became particularly intense 
in the wake of a new Western colonisation wave which, starting in the 
1880s, not only crashed over Africa but also headed towards Asia. And, even 
if modernisation and industrialisation seemed to lead Japan away from Asia 
and closer to the West, it nevertheless seemed to be insufficient in 
persuading Western powers to revise unequal treaties which limited Japan’s 
tariff autonomy and granted extraterritoriality to Western nationals in Japan. 
The threat that these dramatic events posed in identitarian terms can be 
summarized by borrowing the words of Oguma Eiji, who states that after 
1868 “Japan was not only interacting with the new ideologies imported from 
the West but also facing two distinct Others—the West and the East”.5  
                     
3 Michael Weiner, “The invention of identity. ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in pre-war Japan”, in Michael 
Weiner (ed.), Japan’s Minorities. The illusion of homogeneity, Routledge, London and New 
York 1997, p. 5. 
4 Cf. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 
New York and London 1998, pp. 24-25, 29.  
5 Oguma Eiji, A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-images (transl. David Askew, Tan’itsu minzoku 
shinwa no kigen. ‘Nihonjin’ no jigazō no keifu 単一民族神話の起源  −「日本人」の自画
像の系譜, Shin’yōsha, Tōkyō 1995), Trans Pacific Press, Melbourne 2002, p. xix.  
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With regard to the East, the idea of a “dissociation from Asia” (datsu A
脱亜) was formulated in the famous editorial written in 1885 by Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, who stated: “[since] those [who] are intimate with bad friends are 
also regarded bad, I will deny those bad Asian friends from my heart”.6 
Indeed, a dissociation from Asia—which would have had its epilogue in the 
war against China a decade later—seemed to be essential for both 
persuading Western power to change their prejudicial attitude and getting 
Japan out from under “the Orientalist framework of the West”.7  
The deep sense of crisis generated by Japan’s tortuous relationship with 
both the bearer of modernity West and the “bad Asian friends” was also 
perceived in identitarian terms, as the debate regarding the origin of the 
Japanese can well attest. Actually, since the first decades of the Meiji period, 
this debate developed around two main hypotheses—a homogeneous nation 
theory claiming that the bloodline of Japanese people had continued from 
time immemorial, and a mixed nation theory arguing that they consisted of a 
mixture between a previous aboriginal people and a conquering people who 
arrived afterward—which “were linked directly to the issue of whether 
Japan’s independence could best protected by returning to native traditions 
or by assimilating modern civilization”.8 Most Japanese scholars, especially 
anthropologists, accepted the mixed nation theory not only because it was 
the sole theory based on a modern scientific discourse,9 but also because it 
could serve the purpose of transforming the newly unified Japanese state into 
a multi-ethnic colonial empire.  
Such a debate first concerned the people of the newly incorporated 
peripheries, namely the Okinawans in the south and the ainu living in the 
northern island, which had been taken over by Japanese control in 1869 and 
renamed Hokkaidō. Indeed, for those supporting both the mixed and the 
homogeneous nation theory, these less economically dominant peripheries 
were functional in creating the idea of a modern and civilised Japan, as well 
as defining “the power relationship implicit in [the] taxonomies of 
differences”.10 
 
                     
6 Rekishigaku kenkyūkai (ed.), Nihonshi shiryō. Kindai 4 日本史資料・近代 4 (Sources of 
Japanese history. Vol. 4, modern age), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1997, pp. 186-187 (emphasis 
added); an English translation of Fukuzawa’s Datsu A ron in David J. Lu, Japan. A 
Documentary History, vol. II, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York and London 1997, pp. 351-353.  
7 Oguma E., A Genealogy, p. 11. Oguma uses this expression in regard to Japan’s status at the 
Paris Exhibition of 1878, which “was simply that of a small, quaint, Oriental country”; here 
Japan “had no choice but to submit traditional craftwork and content herself with satisfying 
the curiosity of those interested in Japonisme. […] Japan chose to assert herself by accepting 
the indignity of placing herself within the Oriental framework of the West”. 
8 Oguma E., A Genealogy, p. 14. 
9 Ibidem, p. 7. 
10 T. Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan, p. 160. 
BEARERS OF MODERNITY: THE WEST, JAPAN AND ITS PERIPHERIES  
 
57 
Okinawa in Japan’s view as the “bearer of modernity” and the birth  
of Okinawa gaku 
 
The first inquiries regarding Okinawa started soon after the establishment of 
the prefecture in 1879, and were carried out by Japanese bureaucrats and 
scholars who were generally commissioned by the central or prefectural 
government mainly in order to collect data and supply information about this 
newly incorporated territory.11 Surveys on Okinawans were also conducted 
by Japanese anthropologists, as in the case of Torii Ryūzō 鳥居竜蔵 (1870-
1953), who travelled there in 1896 and again in 1904. We should remember 
that, during his long career, Torii conducted ethnological research on 
Sakhalin, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Kuriles, Korea, Manchuria, China and 
Mongolia, following the entire arc of Japanese imperial expansion. Also 
worth remembering is—not differently from those carried out by his 
mainland’s colleagues—his inquiries on Okinawa examined both the local 
customs or cultural conditions and the racial characteristics of Okinawans. 
He tried to both individualize their characteristics and categorise them based 
on their affinity with or their contrast to Japanese in order to determine their 
similarities to the latter, as well as the stage of civilisation of Okinawans. 
These methods and approaches seem to forerun the “regional research” or 
the “imperial anthropology” which went along with Japan’s colonial policy 
in East Asia.12  
Torii’s investigation of Okinawa was carried out in conjunction with his 
survey on the natives or “savage” (seiban 生蕃) of Taiwan13—which had 
just become a Japanese colony—and he used the same methodology in his 
                     
11  Botanists, agronomists and foresters also visited these islands in order to check their 
economic potential. More details and bibliographical references in Rosa Caroli, “Recent 
Trends of Historiography on Modern Okinawa”, in Hans-Dieter Ölschleger (ed.), Theories 
and Methods in Japanese Studies: Current State and Future Developments – Papers in Honor 
of Josef Kreiner, V&R Unipress, Göttingen 2008, pp. 232-233.  
12 Cf. Ōsato Tomoko 大里知子, “Okinawa gaku – Okinawa kenkyū no dōkō (Rekishigaku). 
Okinawa kankei gaku wo kangaeru tame ni” 沖縄学・沖縄研究の動向（歴史学）ー 沖縄
関係学を考えるために (Trends of research on Okinawa (Historiography). Thinking about 
studies on Okinawa), in Okinawa kankei gaku kenkyūkai ronshū, Okinawa Kankei Gaku 
Kenkyūkai, Tōkyō 1995, p. 59; Tomiyama Ichirō, “The Critical Limits of the National 
Community: The Ryukyuan Subject”, in Social Science Japan Journal, vol. 1, n. 2, 1998, 
p. 169. For the linkage between the development of anthropological sciences and the 
execution of the colonial project as well as its interaction with the construction of a self-
referential national identity, Sakano Tōru 坂野徹, Teikoku Nihon to jinruigakusha. 1884-1952 
nen 帝国日本と人類学者ー一八八四ー一九五二年 (Imperial Japan and anthropologists. 
1884-1952), Keisō shobo, Tōkyō 2005.  
13 According to the Japanese dictionary Kōjien 広辞苑(第五版), seiban are “different people 
who do not conform to civilisation. Qing dynasty called [seiban] the people among the 
Taiwan’s aboriginal Kōzan tribe (Takasago) who did not assimilated with the Han people 
[Chinese] to distinguish them from the acculturated aborigines”.  
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survey of both the seiban and the Okinawans.14 By discovering “Japanese” 
signs within the Okinawans, he distinguished the latter from the seiban, and 
finally classified the Okinawans as “Japanese”.15 In doing so, he supported 
the theory of the common origins of Japanese and Ryukyuan (NichiRyū 
dōsoron 日琉同祖論) and thus confirmed the theory of the Japanese as a 
mixed nation. Yet, even if this theory placed the latter “on the evolutionary 
ladder of becoming ‘Japanese’”,16 when compared to the “bearer of modernity” 
Japan, Okinawa society appeared to be backward, uncultured and 
uncivilized, and these differences were helpful in justifying the unequal 
economic, political and social relationship between Okinawa and Japan 
proper.  
In Okinawa, among those who looked forward to a future as Japanese as 
well as those who resisted assimilation to Japan, there were attempts to react 
to these developments on a political field. In the last decades of nineteenth 
century, some political experiments (in the shape of resistance to 
assimilation or suffrage movements) were attempted.17 Nevertheless, they 
were silenced by Japanese authorities immediately.  
This is the context in which Okinawa gaku was born at the beginning of 
twentieth century. Similiarly to the members of those local political 
organizations which were banned soon after their beginning, the scholars of 
Okinawa gaku did not have a common attitude toward either the past and the 
future. Yet, even if some of them supported assimilation to Japan while 
others defended the local culture, all of them assumed a common stance in 
placing Okinawans in the centre of their research. In other words, much like 
the mainland scholars who started to theorize about Japanese, they shared a 
consciousness of the problem of how Okinawa could face the challenges 
generated by the epochal changes that were happening inside and outside 
their world. And, like those who were speculating about the Japanese and 
their origins, the scholars of Okinawa gaku formulated an identitary 
discourse that transcended the actual economic, social, geographical and 
linguistic heterogeneity existing inside Okinawan space. Thus, while the 
                     
14 Tomiyama I., “The Critical Limits”, passim. 
15  In this regard, Tomiyama notes: “Ultimately, Torii was unable to establish decisive 
anthropological difference between the ‘Seiban’ and the Ryukyuans, and as a result his 
classification system frequently fell into a state of confusion […] This confusion, however, 
would not in the least shake Torii’s basic conviction that ‘the Ryukyuan’ was essentially 
‘Japanese’”. Ibidem, p. 171. 
16 Richard Siddle, “Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa before 1945”, Japanese Studies, vol. 
18, n. 2, 1998, p. 125. 
17 For example, in 1896 the Kōdōkai (Society for public unity) was founded by former prince 
Shō En together with other former members of the aristocracy of the Ryūkyū Kingdom who, 
in order to resist the loss of their power and privilege, argued against assimilation. Two years 
later, the birth of Okinawa kurabu (Okinawa club) marked the beginning of a suffrage 
movement in Okinawa. 
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discourse over the Japanese developed vis-à-vis both the “bearer of 
modernity” West and the “bad Asian friends”, those coined by the Okinawan 
scholars on the Okinawans developed vis-à-vis both the “bearer of 
modernity” Japan and the natives—or the ‘savages’—who lived in the 
colonized or depressed Asian regions. And, to some extent, they both recall 
what Mary Louise Pratt calls autoethnography, referring to an “instance in 
which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that 
engage with the colonizer’s own terms”.18 
 
 
Okinawa’s interaction with modernity: Iha Fuyū’s pathway 
 
The decision to consider Iha Fuyū here is not only due to his reputation as 
the father of Okinawa gaku or to the fact that his large literary production 
has been investigated on a deeper level than that of his colleagues of 
Okinawa gaku.19 Rather, his tortuous intellectual route—which initially led 
him to exalt Okinawan peculiarities and then to consider such peculiarities as 
an increasing burden, dragging the Okinawans towards the uncivilised, 
savage and colonised world—seems to be emblematic of the transformations 
happening in Okinawa in the wake of those occurring inside Japan as well as 
outside of the country.20 
                     
18 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, Routledge, London 
and New York 1992, p. 7 (emphasis in original). 
19 Even if research on Okinawa gaku is mostly dedicated to Iha Fuyū, relevant works on other 
modern Okinawan intellectual and political figures are worth remembering; among them, 
Ryūkyū shinpōsha 琉球新報社篇 (ed.), Higashionna Kanjun zenshū東恩納寬惇全集 (The 
complete works of Higashionna Kanjun), 10 vols., Daiichi Shobō, Tōkyō 1978-1982; Hiyane 
Teruo 比屋根照夫 and Isa Shin’ichi 伊佐眞一編 (eds.), Ōta Chōfu senshū 太田朝敷選集 
(Selected works of Ōta Chōfu), 3 vols., Daiichi Shobō, Tōkyō 1993-96; Ishida Masaru 石田
正治, Okinawa no genronjin Ōta Chōfu. Sono aikyōshugi to nashonarizumu 沖縄の言論人大
田朝敷 – その愛郷主義とナショナリズム (Ōta Chōfu, an Okinawan media figure. His 
love for his native place and nationalism), Sairyūsha, Tōkyō 2001; Majikina Ankō zenshū 真
境名安興全集 (The complete works of Majikina Ankō), Ryūkyū Shinpōsha, Naha 1993; Isa 
Shin’ichi 伊佐眞一編 (ed.), Jahana Noboru shū 謝花昇集 (Collection of the writings of 
Jahana Noboru), Misuzu Shobō, Tōkyō 1998; Yakabi Osamu 屋嘉比収, “Kindai Okinawa” 
no chishikijin. Shimabukuro Zenpatsu no kiseki 〈近代沖縄〉の知識人 – 島袋全発の軌跡 
(An intellectual of “Modern Okinawa”. The trajectory of Shimabukuro Zenpatsu), Yoshikawa 
Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 2010. 
20 Among the works on Iha’s thought it is worth mentioning: Hiyane Teruo 比屋根照夫, 
Kindai Okinawa to Iha Fuyū 近代日本と伊波普猷  (Modern Okinawa and Iha Fuyū), 
San’ichi Shobō, Tōkyō 1981; Kano Masanao 鹿野政直, Okinawa no fuchi. Iha Fuyū to sono 
jidai 沖縄の淵  ― 伊波普猷とその時代  (Okinawa’s abyss. Iha Fuyū and his epoch), 
Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1993; Tomiyama Ichirō冨山一郎, Bōryoku no yokan. Iha Fuyū ni 
okeru kiki no mondai 暴力の予感− 伊波普猷における危機の問題  (Presentiments of 
violence. Ifa Fuyū and Okinawa’s crisis), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 2002; Isa Ken’ichi 伊佐眞
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Born three years before the annexation of Okinawa to Japan, Iha moved 
to Kyoto in 1896 and then to Tōkyō, where he studied at the Imperial 
University specialising in the Ryukyuan language.21 He also devoted himself 
through the philological study of the Omorososhi (おもろさうし), the 
famous anthology of Ryukyuan ancient songs and poems which were first 
formally written in 1532 using early records of ancient traditions that had 
been transmitted orally from generation to generation. If the period he spent 
in mainland Japan is considered crucial for his self-perception as an 
Okinawan, his encounter with Torii Ryūzō on the second trip that the 
Japanese anthropologist made to Okinawa in 1904, was decisive for Iha’s 
early works as well as the formulation of the theory of the common origins 
of Japanese and Ryukyuans. In fact, Iha assisted Torii during his field work 
across Okinawa and adopted Torii’s conclusion that Okinawans were 
essentially related to the Japanese. Nevertheless, Iha “worked in the opposite 
direction” to Torii’s one, since he discovered not only Japanese signs within 
the Ryukyuan, but also Ryukyuan similarities among the Japanese.22 In other 
words, in his searching for a common ancestry, he drew a comparison 
between Japanese and Okinawans on a neutral ground by resorting what 
Tomiyama Ichirō calls a “third category […] that [was] neither ‘Japanese’ 
nor ‘Ryukyuan’”.23  
However, for Iha the aborigines of Taiwan did not represent something 
apparently different from the Ryukyuan, and it led him to re-examine those 
elements that were considered by Torii as deficiencies preventing natives of 
Taiwan from being considered Japanese. Yet, instead of considering them 
defects, he interpreted them as dissimilarities in order to give them a new 
meaning and ascribe them to the realm of “individuality”, “distinctiveness” 
or “uniqueness” (kosei 個性).24 In his first major work published in 1911, Ko 
Ryūkyū 古琉球 (Ancient Ryūkyū), Iha wrote:  
 
In Japan there are innumerable individualities (個性) […] A nation that can 
afford to embrace people with so many different kind of individualities is 
actually a great nation.25  
                                                
一, Iha Fuyū hihan jōsetsu 伊波普猷批判序説 (A critical introduction to Iha Fuyū), Kage 
Shobō, Tōkyō 2007. 
21 The original manuscript of Iha’s degree thesis was recently found in the Library of the 
Faculty of Literature at The University of Tōkyō. Iha Fuyū, Ryūkyū shinpō 琉球新報, 25th 
July 2010. 
22 Tomiyama I., “The Critical Limits”, p. 170.  
23 Ibidem.  
24 Cf. ibidem, pp. 170-171. 
25  Iha Fuyū, “Ryūkyūshi no sūsei” 琉球史の趨勢  (Trends of Ryūkyū’s history), in Ko 
Ryūkyū古琉球 (Ancient Ryūkyū), Okinawa Kōronsha, 1911, p. 102. This assertion as well as 
the part that Iha dedicates to “Ryukyuans’ distinctiveness” are omitted in the editions that 
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Hence in Iha’s view, more than a peril endangering Japan nation, distinctiveness 
served as an ingredient to enrich it. Despite their link to both Japan and the 
Japanese, Okinawans had their own historical and spiritual existence 
embodying their unique nature by virtue of which they were considered not 
only the object of observation, but also as a historical subject.26 For him the 
dissolution of Okinawan distinctiveness would have been not only a “loss for 
the nation” but also a “spiritual” or “inner suicide” (seishinteki ni jisatsu 精
神的に自殺).27 
Hence, Iha transcended the actual social, economic and cultural differen-
ces and inequalities existing among Okinawans themselves in order to 
formulate an indentitary discourse. At the same time, he expressed an 
implicit political critique of assimilation (dōka 同化) which, while assuring 
Okinawans that they could “become the same” as the Japanese, enforced a a 
priori image of Okinawans as backward, uncivilised or unmodern and 
discriminated equally against them.28 Such a critic seems to be quite evident 
if we consider the following passage that he wrote in 1922:  
 
Until half a century ago, the Japanese state was a blood state […] But with 
the advent of Meiji the Ryukyuans, who had moved to the southern islands 
and become a variant race, entered this group […] a little before this the 
completely different race of the Ainu also entered […] in recent years 
Malayans, Chinese, and Koreans have also entered. Now is the time for 
Japanese politicians to be tolerant of these different nations of completely 
differing origins and attempt to create one great citizenry.29 
 
Yet, in that same period, a crucial change was taking place in his 
perception of Okinawans. For example, in a short essay published in 1924 
and written in the form of a monologue, he stated: “You [Okinawans] have 
no language of your own to express Okinawan uniqueness. What you have 
                                                
appeared in the following decades; cf. for example the edition published by Seijisha in 1942, 
pp. 37-52.  
26 Cf. Tomiyama I., “The Critical Limits”, pp. 170-171. 
27 Iha F., “Ryūkyūshi no sūsei”, pp. 101-102. 
28  Tomiyama I. (“The Critical Limits”, p. 171) states: “One might also argue that Iha’s 
conceptualization of Ryukyuan ‘uniqueness’ and ‘the great nation’ represents a critique of 
colonialism”; however, even if his approach to the problem of the common origins of 
Japanese and Okinawans had apparent political implications, namely a new perception of 
assimilation policy where Japanisation did not necessarily correspond to an acculturation of 
Ryukyuans, it seems to be difficult to ascertain if, at that time, Iha clearly perceived 
assimilation policy as a kind of internal colonialism. 
29 Iha Fuyū, Ko Ryūkyū no seiji 古琉球の政治, cit. in R. Siddle, “Colonialism and Identity”, 
p. 126 (emphasis added). Iha also conceived the coexistence of a wide variety of national 
cultures as a means to construct a new culture and a peaceful order among world’s countries. 
Hiyane Teruo, Sengo Okinawa no seishin to shisō 戦後沖縄の精神と思想  (Spirit and 
thought in postwar Okinawa), Akashi Shoten, Tōkyō 2009, pp. 54-55. 
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been raised on belongs to another [lit.: are borrowed things, 借り物]”.30 
Two years later, in a work significantly entitled Ku no shima 苦の島 
(Islands of pain), he expressed his concern with a more tormented tone:  
 
It is unbearable that a people that has exhibited ‘uniqueness’ in such areas as 
poetry and architecture should be linked in terms of destiny to the primitive 
aborigines of the South Seas (nantōjin 南島人).31  
 
Apparently, what he had considered as a people with a unique history and 
culture now took the form of an exotic and primitive people of South Seas, 
or a backward people living from Okinawa down to the South Pacific 
islands. 
Scholars are quite unanimous in the opinion that his intellectual shift can 
be understood in the light of the ruin of the Okinawan economy during 
1920s. At this point, the dramatic effects of the postwar economic crisis had 
reached the region causing a profound economic depression.32 The poverty 
generated by the harsh economic conditions of the prefecture made prejudice 
and discrimination against Okinawans even deeper and more widespread. 
Thousands of Okinawans moved abroad, mainly as farmworkers in the 
southern Pacific islands recently sized by Japan or to the mainland industrial 
areas as migrant workers. Here they generally received a lower wage and 
were looked down on by the Japanese, and occasionally portrayed by 
newspapers “as backward country bumpkins bewildered by the big city”.33 
                     
30 Sekihō no tameni 寂泡君の為に (For Sekihō), Iha Fuyū zenshū 伊波普猷全集 (The 
complete works of Iha Fuyū), vol. 10, Heibonsha, Tōkyō 1976, p. 314 (emphasis added). 
31 Cit. in Tomiyama I., “The Critical Limits”, p. 173. Ku no shima was firstly published in 
Taiyō 太陽, vol. 32, n. 8, 1926, pp. 54-35. 
32 Since the bad economic condition induced local population to survive on a diet of palm 
seeds, the decade is generally known as the “sago palm hell” (sotetsu jigoku ソテツ地獄).  
33  R. Siddle, “Colonialism and Identity”, p. 128. More details about the socioeconomic 
conditions of Okinawans who migrated in mainland Japan in Tomiyama Ichirō 冨山一郎, 
“Senzenki, Okinawa dekasegimin no kessha to ‘Okinawa sabetsu’. Kansai Okinawa kenjinkai 
no bunseki wo chūshin ni” 戦前期、沖縄出稼民の結社と「沖縄差別」－関西沖縄県人
会の分析を中心に (The associations of Okinawan migrants and ‘Okinawa discrimination’ in 
the prewar period. An analysis of the Kansai Association of Okinawans), in Rekishigaku 
kenkyū, n. 570, vol. 8, 1987, pp. 14-29 and Id., Kindai Nihon shakai to Okinawajin. 
“Nihonjin” ni naru to iu koto (Modern Japan’s society and Okinawans. Becoming 
‘Japanese’), Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, Tōkyō 1990. “The sign of a developing Taiwan next to 
a stagnating Okinawa led many Okinawans to look for ways to tie the development of Taiwan 
to Okinawa, making the island a major labour market for Okinawans from all classes […] In 
general, many from the educated elite classes sought participation in the development of 
Taiwan in administrative or professional positions. Unfortunately, in what became a pattern 
throughout the empire, many found job listing accompanied by the restriction ‘Ryukyuans 
and Taiwanese need not apply’”. Alan S. Christy, “The Making of Imperial Subjects in 
Okinawa”, positions: east asia cultures critiques, vol. 1, n. 3, Winter 1993, p. 617.  
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Iha might have become aware that exhibiting Okinawans’ “uniqueness” 
was tantamount to condemn them to be even more marginalised from 
progress, civilisation and modernity. And in admitting that Okinawans had 
no language of their own to express their uniqueness, he apparently 
recognised that, when translated in the bearer of modernity’s idiom, the 
meaning of this uniqueness was also translated, rather evoking an image of 
deficiency among Japanese. The neutral ground or “third category” that Iha 
had tried to use in order to build an intersubjective representation of 
Okinawans suddenly revealed to be inefficacious and illusory. Thus, 
Okinawans’ self-representation he had constructed earlier gave in to a new 
theoretical reformulation. Nevertheless, Iha’s intellectual shift also reflects 
new discourses that in the meanwhile some Japanese metropolitan scholars 
were enunciating. 
 
 
The neonativists’ discovery of Okinawa  
 
It was in the background of these dramatic conditions that some mainland 
Japan scholars turned their attention to Okinawa. Among them, the famous 
folklorist Yanagita Kunio 柳田国男 (1875-1962), the ethnologist, theorist of 
literature and poet Orikuchi Shinobu 折口信夫  (1887-1953), and the 
philosopher and founders of folk craft (mingei 民芸) Yanagi Sōetsu 柳宗悦 
(1889-1961). Their studies on Japan’s folklore and rural customs were later 
defined by Yanagita as “neonativism” (shinkokugaku 新国学), or a “science 
of the native place”, which aimed at preserving Japan’s real culture against 
the devastating effects caused by the fast modernisation and industrialisation 
both in urban and rural areas.34 The object of their research was not only 
material culture but also the inner, spiritual life of the native. Yanagita 
himself claimed: “Our collecting is also […] a consideration of the inner life 
                     
34 “[Yanagita’s] ‘science of the native place’ […] would enable Japan’s ‘real’ culture to hold 
its own against the twin threats of the bureaucratic and capitalist penetration of village life on 
the one hand, and Marxist notions of class struggle that pitted against each other people who 
should form—and continually reproduce—a unit based on lineage and communal ties 
bequeathed to them by their ancestors”. Andrew E. Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern 
Japan. The Marxian and Modernist Traditions, University of California Press, Berkeley 2004, 
p. 45. For the neonativism and its implications with socioeconomic development in coeval 
Japan also cf. Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity. History, Culture, and Community 
in Interwar Japan, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2000 (in part. pp. 293-357); Id., 
“Disciplining Native Knowledge and Producing Place: Yanagita Kunio, Origuchi Shibobu, 
Takata Yasuma”, in J. Thomas Rimer (ed.), Culture and Identity. Japanese Intellectuals 
during the Interwar Years, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990, pp. 99-127 and Id., 
“Figuring the Folk: History, Poetics, and Representation”, in Stephen Vlastos (ed.), Mirrow of 
Modernity. Invented Tradition of Modern Japan, University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles 1998, pp. 144-162; Hashimoto Mitsuru, “Chihō: Yanagita Kunio’s ‘Japan’”, in 
S. Vlastos (ed.), Mirrow of Modernity, pp. 133-143. 
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of the native”.35 And as it has been noted, with “this move [he] supplied 
native ethnology […] with a structure of desire for an origin that could never 
be reached and opened the way for a nostalgia driven by irretrievable loss”.36 
Their research gained new momentum with the “discovery of Okinawa” 
as a place where what had been lost in modernised and industrialised 
mainland Japan (naichi 内地) was still preserved. Yanagita, who travelled to 
Okinawa in 1921, later described it as an “epoch-making event in our 
studies”.37 Actually, during his trip, Yanagita  
 
was persuaded to believe that Okinawa offered a treasure trove of unchanging 
religious beliefs and practices, which were fundamental to the figure of an 
enduring Japanese daily life. Yanagita viewed Okinawa as a surviving 
reminder of what Japanese life must have looked like in archaic times.38  
 
And when he arrived in the remotest Yaeyama islands, he found a population 
who were “just starting to forget what [Japanese had] forgot since a long 
time”.39 
Nevertheless, at the end of his trip he wrote a work with an emblematic 
title, Kainan shōki 海南小記 (A short record of the South Seas), where the 
term kainan (South Seas) seemed to evoke a wild and exotic region, which 
was distant from the civilized and modern metropolis. Not differently from 
the nineteenth century evolutionists who considered people living in distant 
places as their primitive ancestors living in earlier times, Yanagita seems to 
perceive Okinawa’s remoteness both in geographical and temporal 
implications, suggesting a representation of Okinawa as both a far and a 
backward land.40 Also, it seems as if by situating Okinawa in a space where 
                     
35 Yanagita himself claimed: “Our collecting is also […] a consideration of the inner life of 
the native”. H. Harootunian, “Figuring the Folk”, p. 155. 
36 Ibidem.  
37 Yanagita Kunio, “Shiryō toshite no densetsu” 史料としての伝説 (Tradition as a source), 
in Yanagita Kunio zenshū柳田国男全集 (The complete works of Yanagita Kunio), vol. 4, 
Chikuma Shobō, Tōkyō 1989 (or. ed. 1935), p. 316. The term naichi (lit. inner land) appears 
in Kainan shōki 海南小記, a short travel note on the Southern Seas that Yanagita wrote soon 
after his journey in Ryukyuan islands in 1921. Firstly serialised in Tōkyō asahi shinbun, it 
was published as a book in 1925 and reproduced in Yanagita Kunio zenshū, vol. 1, pp. 279-
523. 
38 H. Harootunian, “Figuring the Folk”, p. 155. 
39 Yanagita K., Kainan shōki, p. 402. 
40 Regarding this, Alan Christy notes: “As the trip continues south, [he] records fewer and 
fewer description of the present, longer meditations on the ancient past, and imaginings of 
past common life and gruesome deaths. In particular, Yanagita’s tale of his trip is littered with 
the narrative bodies of the dead, […] as to suggest a descent into the past (the land of the 
dead). By the time he has reached the southern end of his journey, he has not only covered 
great distance, but also great time”. A.S. Christy, “The Making of Imperial Subjects”, p. 626 
(emphasis added). 
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modernity had yet to reach, Yanagita projected onto Okinawa the tensions 
arising from the contradictory interaction between Japan and the West.  
Actually, in the same year he travelled to Okinawa, Yanagita had another 
decisive experience in Geneva. He was invited to be a member of the 
Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations which had to 
determinate the form of rule to be adopted in the Ottoman Empire’s non-
Turkish provinces and the former German colonies, including the islands 
situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying north of the equator that Japan had 
seized in 1914.41 When Yanagita was asked to join the Mandate Commission 
in Geneva as a committee member in 1921, he had already resigned from his 
government position. In fact, he had been working as a high official in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and other government agencies 
(including the Imperial Household Agency) until 1920, when he became a 
writer for the newspaper Asahi shinbun. His first activity had given him an 
occasion to travel widely in Japan and in some East Asian countries “in 
white socks (tabi) in the manner of a feudal lord”.42 Both as an elite member 
of Tōkyō’s government and a representative of a modernised country, he had 
received “VIP treatment during these trips”.43 Nevertheless, according to his 
memoirs he  
 
was so nervous and reluctant to travel to Europe that, on seeing a child 
innocently playing on a railway platform, ‘thought how lucky that child is not 
to have to go to the West’.44  
 
And when he arrived in Geneva, he found that “Britain and France odiously 
lorded it over everyone else [and he] understood, for the first time, the true 
meaning of yamadashi [mountain bumpkin]”.45  
Once back from Switzerland, Yanagita wrote a short essay where he stated:  
 
The Peace Conference was held in Versailles and the League of Nations is 
based in Geneva. As much as two months before [Japan] has to equip and 
send over a great distance its delegates, delegates who cannot even put their 
point of view adequately.46  
                     
41 Charles H. Levermore, Second Year Book of the League of Nations, The Brooklyn Daily 
Eagle, New York 1922, p. 22. For Yanagita’s experience in Geneva, Oguma E., A Genealogy, 
pp. 182-189.  
42 Jan van Bremen, “Travel ethnography in Japan” in Maria Rodigriguez del Alisal et al. 
(eds.), Pilgrimages and spiritual quests in Japan, Routledge, London and New York 2007, 
p. 151. In 1917 Yanagita travelled to Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria. Oguma E., A Genealogy, 
p. 182. 
43 Oguma E., A Genealogy, p. 182. 
44 Cit. in ibidem. 
45 Ibidem, pp. 182-183.  
46 Yanagita Kunio, Shima no jinsei 島の人生 (Island life), Sōgensha, Tōkyō 1951, p. 120 
(emphasis added).  
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And addressing Okinawans, he also wrote:  
 
Even what you call the ‘centre’ is definitively not the real centre even in this 
small globe […] This is now the anguish of our Japan, and at the same time it 
is very similar to Okinawans’ lonely island ordeal (kotōku 孤島苦).47 
 
Apparently the experience in Geneva, where he received quite different 
treatment than that of his former trips to Japan and Asia, deeply affected 
Yanagita.  
In fact, in Geneva he first met the discriminatory universalism of a West 
that assumed to embody the universal paradigm for modernity and 
civilisation, and categorised the other societies and people of the world. Here 
he did not likely perceive himself as a representative of a modernised and 
civilised country, but as a provincial coming from a remote place who was 
unable to express his point of view adequately. And this conflicting 
experience with the West—which he perceived in the light of “broad 
geocultural notions of territoriality”, 48  namely shima (island) and tairiku 
(continent)—evidently influenced his concomitant “discovery of Okinawa”.  
Undoubtedly, Yanagita was sympathetic toward Okinawans not only 
because they lived in a place where the “true” Japan could be unearthed or 
because of their uncorrupted and uncontaminated inner life, which he 
associated with island’s unique culture and environment. He also felt that he 
shared with them a sense of “loneliness that has no meaning for those who 
are not islanders”.49  
In other words, within the dichotomy between shima (which could be 
associated with both Okinawa and Japan) and tairiku (primarily referring to 
a West that viewed islands peripheries as remote and exotic regions),50 
Yanagita identified himself as an islander who lived in a culturally, spatially 
and psychologically distant place.51  
                     
47 Ibidem. The term kotōku also appears in the title of Iha’s Kotōku no Ryūkyūshi 孤島苦の琉
球史 (The history of the ordeal of the lonely islands of Ryūkyū), published in 1926. 
48  Masamichi S. Inoue, Okinawa and the U. S. Military. Identity Making in the Age of 
Globalization, Columbia University Press, New York 2007, p. 74.  
49 Yanagita K., Shima no jinsei, p. 119 
50 For example, in Shima no jinsei he wrote: “In August and September of 1919, a dreadful 
influenza epidemic greatly devastated Tahiti, Samoa and other islands. While many [Western] 
civilised persons persevere in imagining South Seas’ palm leaves by seeing Gauguin’s 
paintings or reading Stevenson’s letters, young natives are tamed by illness and countlessly 
die”. Ibidem, p. 118.  
51  “The shima/tairiku dichotomy, has yet another overlooked function, however. That is, 
Yanagita’s focus on shima made it possible for him to hypothesize the origin of the Japanese 
people from the southern sea, while suppressing by default the issues related to Japan’ s 
colonization of another tairiku, i.e., the Asian continent to the north (northeastern China and 
Korea particularly)”. M.S. Inoue, Okinawa and the U. S., p. 75.  
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Nevertheless, instead of his effort to enhance the value of Okinawan 
culture, he failed to represent and explain it by translating the language, the 
idioms and the paradigms of the centre into those of this periphery. Thus, 
Okinawan discourse about themselves continued to be formulated “in 
response to or in dialogue with” a representation and an explanation 
constructed by metropolitan Japan.52 It seems to be attested by the fact that, 
in conjunction with both the “discovery of Okinawa” by Yanagita and his re-
creation of Okinawa as a primitive version of Japan, Iha started to use the 
term nantōjin (South Seas aborigines).53  
 
 
In search for a negotiable modernity 
 
If considered within the framework of both Japan and Okinawa’s interaction 
with an overwhelming modernity, then Yanagita and Iha’s discourses appear 
to be pervaded by a common anxiety and characterised by a common effort, 
namely a search for a “better modernity” or a “different inflection” of 
modernity. 54  It reveals that both Japan and Okinawa’s interaction with 
modernity was not quite so simple, as the debate on the origins of the 
Japanese and the Okinawans can well attest. Such a debate developed in 
conjunction with Japan’s self-emancipation from an Asian country to the 
“bearer of modernity” in East Asia. And, in order to construct Japanese as a 
modern subject, Japan employed the Occident/Orient, civilised/uncivilised, 
developed/underdeveloped dichotomy to identify and classify the multiplicity 
of others living along and behind the national border. Japanese anthropologists 
themselves borrowed the theories, methods and language of Western 
Orientalism and employed them to create Japan’s Orient.55  
                     
52 “[…] if ethnographic texts are a means by which Europeans represent to themselves their 
(usually subjugated) other, autoethnographic texts are those the others construct in response 
to or in dialogue with those metropolitan representations”. M.L. Pratt, Imperial eyes, p. 7 
(emphasis added). 
53 According to Murai, even if the term nantō existed since earlier times, it were Yanagita, 
Origuchi and their colleagues who gave a specific meaning to it. Murai Osamu 村井紀, Nantō 
ideorogī no hassei. Yanagita Kunio to shokuminchishugi 南島イデオロギーの発生−柳田国
男と植民地主義 (The birth of south island ideology: Yanagita Kunio and colonialism), 
Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 2004 (first edition Fukutake Shoten, Tōkyō 1992), pp. 24-60. 
54 I borrowed these expressions from Carol Gluck, “Meiji and Modernity: From History to 
Theory”, in Rosa Caroli (ed.), 1868. Italia Giappone: intrecci culturali, Libreria Editrice 
Cafoscarina, Venezia 2008, pp. 39-55. 
55 Such an attitude prevailing among Japanese anthropologists was clearly revealed at the fifth 
International Exhibition in Osaka in 1903, where Tsuboi Shōgorō supervised the “Pavilion of 
Academic Anthropology”, which ‘displayed’ several groups of “Orientals”, including Okinawans, 
ainu, Taiwanese aborigines, Malay, Javanese and some other groups of people who wore their 
traditional costumes. Engeki “Jinruikan” jōen wo jitsugen saretai kai 演劇「人類館」上演を 
実現させたい会  (ed.), Jinruikan. Fuin sareta tobira 人類館 ― 封印された扉 (The 
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Nevertheless, neither Japan’s modernisation of its political, economic and 
social institutions nor the dominant position that it went to consolidate in 
East Asia was fully successful in either altering Japan’s subordination to the 
West or escaping from the Orientalist framework of the West. Similiarly to 
Iha, in Geneva Yanagita experienced the question of self-representation from 
the remote periphery of a centre that refused to lend an ear to someone 
speaking another language than his own. This question reflected his inability 
to develop his arguments adequately by using the language of another; the 
implications of remoteness, where a spatial distance corresponding to “the 
denial of coevaleness”56 determines the stage of progress and civilisation; a 
new meaning of the word shima, which was not only related to an ancient 
purity or a spiritual life, but also to the signification of insularity, loneliness 
and separateness. Thus, the anxiety that Yanagita felt in discerning his image 
as an inlander or a “mountain bumpkin” may have not been too different 
from that of Iha. 
If Iha’s intellecual shift is generally linked to the dramatic conditions of 
the Okinawan economy during 1920s, Yanagita’s “discovery of Okinawa” 
appears to be one response to the effects of the fast industrialisation and 
modernisation which deeply altered Japanese society, particularly after the 
huge increment of industrial production during the First World War and the 
sudden decline it had soon after the end of the conflict. Yanagita felt that the 
modernity coming from the West menaced the “true” Japan and he came to 
identify Okinawa as a place where the “true Japan” could be unearthed; 
however “despite a rhetorical opposition, native ethnology actually worked 
to stabilize capitalism by offering the appearance of an alternative to 
capitalist modernity”.57  Besides, behind his escape from tairiku (the 
continent) as well as his self-identification as an islander, one could also 
discern a response to what not only industrialisation and modernisation but 
also Japan’s colonialism were producing.58 And even if he had experimented 
                                                
Pavilion of anthropology. Sealed doors), Attowākusu, Osaka 2005. For the construction of 
Japan’s Orients, including the re-invention of Asia as the other of a quintessential Japanese 
modernity, cf. Stephen Tanaka, Japan’s Orient. Rendering Past into History, University of 
California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1993; Kan Sanjun (Kang Sang-jung) 姜尚中, 
Orientarizumu no kanata e. Kindai bunka hihan オリエンタリズムの彼方へ ー 近代文化
批判 (Beyond Orientalism. A critic of modern culture), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1996; Murai 
O., Nantō ideorogī; Fukazawa Tōru 深沢徹 (ed.), Oriento gensō no naka no Okinawa オリエ
ント幻想の中の沖縄 (Okinawa in the orientalistic imagination), Kaifūsha, Ōsaka 1995. 
56 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object, Columbia 
University Press, New York 1983, p. 105. 
57 Stephen Vlastos, “Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History”, S. Vlastos (ed.), 
Mirrow of Modernity, p. 10. 
58 As a high official in the Ministry of Agriculture, Yanagita had contributed to the planning 
of the agricultural policy in Korea, and Murai argues that, by discovering Okinawa, 
portraying it as the archetype of Japan and trying to explain Japanese identity from the 
Ryukyuan perspective, Yanagita forged a “south island ideology” which served to obliterate 
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Western linguistic universalism that refused to speak in a language other 
than his own, Yanagita did not renounce to represent and explain Okinawans 
in his stead by employing the language of the “bearer of modernity” in Asia. 
Thus, while recognizing a common “lonely island ordeal” for both Japan and 
Okinawa, he relegated Okinawa to an Oriental or Asian realm named kainan 
(South Seas). 
In this same period Iha realised that Okinawans had been “crushed by 
[their] own unique history” and started to designate them as nantōjin (South 
Seas aborigenes), a term which was employed by colonial anthropologists 
since the end of nineteenth century.59 Until then, Iha appears to have been 
searching for a different inflection of modernity or a better modernity for 
Okinawans by emphasizing their uniqueness. Yet, by facing a modernity that 
did not leave any space for negotiable meta-narratives, he finally recognised 
that Okinawans were required to play the role that had assigned them to the 
Orientalist framework that Japan had borrowed from the West. Indeed, by 
both recognising the inexistence of a language that could express the 
uniqueness of Okinawans and admitting that he could no longer carry on his 
discourse in the language of another, Iha seemed to be aware of both the 
realm residing behind the use of language and the danger of drowning the 
indigenous, native centrality in a kind of self-Orientalism or an autoethno-
graphic representation.60 
In conclusion, the discourses of Iha and Yanagita were deeply affected by 
a coeval context dominated by a modernity that was ambiguous and 
contradictory. Indeed, just as it happened—and still happens—elsewhere, if 
many elements render modernity appealing and alluring, others makes it 
menacing and destructive. What was important for them both was to find a 
way to cope with it. Hence, their representation and narration of the 
Japanese and the Okinawans can be read in the light of the different 
                                                
the uneasiness he felt about his previous involvement in colonial policy. Murai O., Nantō 
ideorogī, pp. 24-60. 
59 The phrase is taken from Sekihō no tameni (p. 314), which was published in 1924; in the 
same year the term nantōjin began to appear in Iha’s work.  
60 Here Iha seems to become disillusioned with the possibility of building an intersubjective 
representation of Okinawans, at least on the basis of what David Butz writes: “dominant 
outsiders […] have conventionally assumed the prerogative to represent and explain the 
subordinate group in their stead. The latter definition […] foregrounds subordinate groups’ 
occasional reliance on the ideal of intersubjectivity as a tactic for resisting subordination. 
Autoethnographic expressions are likely to be aimed at quite specific audiences; those from 
which subordinate groups have some reason to expect a sincere effort at communications. To 
the extent that subordinate groups realize such audiences are rare, autoethnographic 
expression—and the search for intersubjective understanding more generally—is likely to be 
only a small part of a larger repertoire of everyday resistance to domination”. David Butz, 
“Autobiography, autoethnography and intersubjectivity: analyzing communication in northern 
Pakistan”, in Pamela J. Moss (ed), Placing Autobiography in Geography: History, Method 
and Analysis, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse 2001, p. 161.  
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interactions that Japan and Okinawa had with an alluring and menacing 
modernity which contained both creative and destructive potentials. They 
reflect identitary discourses molded around the political aim of searching for 
a different meaning of modernity, and reveals the dilemma that the 
interaction with modernity raised in Japan as well as in its margins.  
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REPRESENTATIONS OF THE “HISTORY OF JAPAN”  
DURING THE MEIJI ERA: FUTURE AT STAKE 
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This presentation concentrates on Japan during the Meiji era between the 
years 1868 and 1912. It was during these years that Japanese society 
extended itself to external trade and modernization. In order to tackle the 
issue of representations in history, I will focus on two moments: the first 
period is between the years 1868 and 1872. At the time, the new government 
implemented numerous institutional reforms and finally ended the Japanese 
old order, known as the Tokugawa regime. The second period I will 
concentrate on is between the years 1905 and 1910. It was during this time 
that Japan, who had been victorious over China and Russia, began to see 
itself as an imperialistic power and launched a policy of colonial expansion 
and became increasingly nationalistic. 
My goal is to prove how the representations of people influence their 
political practices. Our visions of the past therefore mold our practices in the 
present. Ideological representations are always more complex than one 
would expect. The nature of the Meiji regime and the reforms that were 
implemented have been a subject to historiographical debate in Japan and 
elsewhere. These reforms pushed the country down a road to economic, 
political and cultural modernization. It was often thought that the arrival of 
Americans and Europeans in 1853-1854 was an element that triggered the 
process of change leading to a putsch in favor of the emperor in 1867-1868. 
Japanese modernization was thus conceived as an outcome of a meeting with 
the Western world. This meeting did not actually happen in 1853, but took 
place earlier. Many historians insist—often rightly—on the role of the 
“Dutch Studies “, the so-called rangaku. Japanese people were aware of 
main technological and scientific breakthroughs since the early eighteenth 
century thanks to the presence of the Dutch trading post in Nagasaki. The 
Dutch studies elevated the country to a new intellectual level before the 
Americans did so on a political and economic level. 
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Other historians, on the contrary, insisted on the fundamental importance 
of the incubation process of modernity during the Edo period during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Before the industrial revolution, that 
began at the end of nineteenth century after the opening of the country, there 
was a so-called “industrious revolution“ which produced major changes in 
the economic and industrial sphere as of the end of eighteenth century. Some 
of these historians also showed how the kokugaku, “national studies” or 
nativist movement, played a major part in the criticism of old traditional 
ideologies. This form of thought paved the way for a modernization of 
knowledge. 
Thus a debate began between those who insist on exogenous factors as an 
explanation for the speed of the modernization process (but then, why would 
Western countries modernize Japan while they were colonizing the rest of 
the world?) and those who insist on endogenous factors. According to the 
latter, there would be a Japanese pre- or early modernity before the actual 
westernization and, for certain people, this is to be accounted to some form 
of national genius itself.  
However, the paradox comes from elsewhere.  
The Edo period corresponds to the period when Chinese thought, 
Confucianism or rather the new Confucianism of Zhu Xi deeply penetrate 
the social fabric. Japan had never been as “Chinese” as it was until right 
before the arrival of the Westerners. It is the very receptivity to Chinese 
thought that paradoxically prepared the subversion of old order, as much of 
“Dutch studies” or “national studies”. And to prove it, I will focus on a 
single aspect of this thought, namely the vision of History itself. 
The Japanese leaders who caused Meiji Restoration were not ideologues 
full of political and religious certainties. They were pragmatists. They had no 
clear-cut ideas, but that does not mean that they had no ideas at all. In spite 
of Western influences and the nativist movement, most of the men who 
created Meiji were raised with Confucianist tradition and even some of them 
partly reject it. This tradition constructed them intellectually speaking, and 
influenced their political reflection, a part that would be wrong to overlook. 
All of them, however, shared a view of history that is quite commonly 
spread in nineteenth century. 
Chinese thinkers had noticed that Chinese history seemed to be going 
through cycles. Chinese history went through periods when the government 
was centralized and leaned on an efficient bureaucracy; the country being at 
that time divided into counties and districts run by governors, 
commissioners, regional and local civil servants. In order to describe these 
historical phases, they used the expression junxian 郡県 (in Japanese gunken 
or gunken sei), that is to say, a “system in which the country is divided in 
counties and districts”. The Han empire from the second century B.C. until 
the second century A.C., or the Tang empire during seventh and eighth 
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centuries, were typically considered junxian phases in history. At other 
times, however, the emperor gave away land and fiefs for powerful ones to 
govern in his name. Chinese people then referred to this using the expression 
fengjian  封建 (in Japanese hōken). The Zhou era—from the tenth to the 
eleventh century B.C., or the period of warfare kingdoms, were described as 
the fengjian periods. These Chinese concepts had been appearing in classical 
Chinese works for at least two thousand years. And indeed Hegel used them 
to build up his conception of Oriental despotism, based on the idea that in 
China, history continues to repeat itself. This is by the way, an idea that 
Marx would later use too. During nineteenth and twentieth century, these 
beliefs contributed to the representation of Europe by Western thinkers as a 
progressive history, while Asia and more particularly China, were locked 
into a stagnant evolution thanks to these cyclical phases of history. 
In Japan, these concepts were known and especially re-used from the 
middle of the Edo period on, toward the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
Japanese thinkers have always been obsessed by the idea of making Chinese 
and Japanese History coincide. Hence, the great Neo Confucian scholar Arai 
Hakuseki explains in Dokushi yoron 読史余論  (My thoughts on the 
perception of History, 1712) that buke no yo 武家の世 (the warrior times) 
corresponds to a hōken phase of Japanese history, whereas the kuge era, that 
is a time when imperial court aristocracy prevailed, corresponded without a 
doubt to a gunken phase. From 646 and the Great Taika Reform, up until the 
end of twelfth century, Japan goes through a gunken phase: it imitates the 
codes of Tang’s China. This period corresponds to the ancient period of 
Japanese History or to Ancient Times. Then, the government of warriors was 
funded in Kamakura, in the East of Japan, at the end of twelfth century and 
the country thus entered a hōken phase: the authority of the state was 
delegated. The emperor allowed the shōgun to use the military force in his 
name, the warrior lords possessed the land and Japan’s government was 
decentralized. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Rai San’yo wrote a Nihon 
gaishi 日本外史 (An unofficial history of Japan) in which he stated that 
Japan officially entered a hōken period in 1185 when Minamoto no 
Yoritomo, the first future shōgun, appointed his vassals in the provinces as 
military stewards in smaller lands (jitō 地頭) and military governors in 
provinces (shugo 守護 ). There the centralized period gave way to a 
decentralized government of warriors. 
Japanese thought gradually distanced itself from Chinese concepts. The 
words junxian and fengjian were not morally connoted. Chinese people did 
not morally judge the two kinds of periods. According to Chinese classics, 
moral qualities of the sovereign and his vassals were the only two things that 
allowed one to define the ideal nature of regime. The Prince—centralized 
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emperor or local lord—had to be inspired by the ideal of a good government, 
by wisdom and virtue. The junxian regime could lead to a bloody tyranny if 
the Prince turned into a despot. This, for example, explains the reason for the 
fall of the first Qin empire. On the contrary, the fengjian regime could sink 
into chaos or anarchy if all central authority disappears. Local lords fight 
each other and the result is that the government collapses. 
In Japan, historians who are the heirs of another tradition tend to deform 
Chinese concepts by introducing a notion of moral virtue. Hōken periods—
as they are presented by Rai San’yō, a well-known influence on Meiji 
reformers—are thus seen as moments when the government was drifting 
away from the Imperial Court and looking for a lost legitimacy. It was 
searching for the legitimacy of a period when the emperors were 
undoubtedly in charge, namely the gunken period. In moral terms, the 
gunken system has a greater legitimacy because the emperor of Japan is 
more powerful and respected. The decentralized hōken regime—like that of 
the Tokugawas—is thus less good for the country than the traditional gunken 
regime. 
Furthermore, Chinese thinkers evoked those concepts to explain their 
own history. They surely did not imagine that these very concepts would 
account for an entire other country’s reality. Nonetheless, from the 1840s on, 
a new idea appeared in Japan. The intellectual élite started to believe that 
Chinese concepts could be applied to the history of the rest of the world. The 
Roman Empire became a gunken period. The European medieval era was 
seen as a hōken period and the absolute monarchies were regarded as 
gunken. The Western world was now understood in a gunken phase. In the 
early 1860s, Itō Hirobumi, future Prime Minister, was a young loyalist and 
xenophobic samurai from the fief of Chōshū. He was sent to study in 
England and when he returned he was convinced to have witnessed a 
particularly efficient gunken system in England. He gave up his xenophobia 
and dedicated himself to helping Japan come back from a hōken to a gunken 
system. 
For the men who were going to put the emperor back into power, 
legitimizing the regime that they were about to create and making it efficient 
was a major issue at stake. There is no contradiction between putting back 
into office a monarch in order to recreate a gunken—a centralized state—and 
opening the country to Western modernity. Modernization implies the 
destruction of the hōken/decentralized system in force during the Tokugawa 
period. 
In 1872, after a new policy of conscription had been put in place, the 
leaders of the new Meiji era wrote down an imperial rescript targeting the 
new conscripts. This text is a political manifest of the new regime. Here is 
what the emperor said in the preamble:  
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We believe that in the past a centralized/gunken system prevailed in the 
empire. The army enlisted young men to protect the state. There was no 
separation between soldiers and peasants. With the separation between those 
who fought and the others a hōken system was born. The process of renewal, 
which started in Bōshin year (1868), is the most important event of the past 
millennium. And now we need to create a system of conscription for the navy 
and the land forces adapted to these new times. We wish for this change to 
rely on the system formerly prevailing in our country, for the habits of 
foreign countries to be taken into account and for a national conscription act 
to be passed in order to lay the basis of the protection of the state. 
 
And further on, the rescript indicates that:  
 
Thanks to the restoration and to the abolition of seigneurial fiefs, we went 
back to the situation prevailing originally, that is to say to a gunken system. 
Warriors who by hereditary right did not work, saw their incomes diminish 
and we allowed them to stop wearing the sword [i.e. relieved them from war 
duty].1 
 
This text makes clear why the regime is a restoration. It is a restoration of 
the power of the emperor and is hence connected to national studies thinkers 
who actively encouraged the restoration of the emperor into his theoretical 
political functions. However, this is also connected to a Chinese-like vision 
of history, centralized with a mythified imperial system. The creation of a 
civil state, the suppression of fiefs replaced by prefectures lead by civil 
servants and the military draft were all reforms that we now spontaneously 
see as measures leading to the construction of a modern nation-state. But for 
the political leaders who implemented them, those reforms were perceived as 
a going back to an over-rated ancient order. Meiji is first and foremost a 
restoration: it was not only the emperor who came back to power, it was the 
ancient order as the Japanese then perceived it. 
Were Meiji leaders really convinced that they were coming back to an old 
order like the ones prevailing during the Nara (710-784) and Heian (794-
1185) periods? It is hard to tell. Nevertheless, we can recall that from the end 
of eighteenth century French revolutionaries perceived their movement as a 
return to the virtues of the Roman Republic and that Russian Bolcheviks 
attempted to mimic their own French revolution. But in the Japanese case, 
the abolition of the feudal order was conceived as a return to former 
freedom. It was probably a necessary step in shattering the structures and 
ideologies of feudal power. 
 
 
                                                        
1 Kodama Kōta, et al., Shiryō ni yoru Nihon no ayumi. Kindaihen (Japanese history through 
documents. Modern times), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 1951, p. 50. 
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Let’s skip a couple of decades. 
In 1906, a young historian named Hara Katsurō publishes a Nihon 
chūseishi 日本中世史 (History of medieval Japan). He graduated ten years 
earlier from the Imperial University of Tōkyō and he would eventually be 
appointed to the Imperial University of Kyōto two years later in 1908. Here 
is what he wrote in the introduction of his book : 
 
We are indeed trapped into the too frequent idea of a “dark age“ to designate 
the Kamakura and Ashikaga periods until the restoration of classical studies 
in the early Edo period. This is not my personal opinion. The Middle Ages 
are not a “dark age”. Such an idea is linked to the over-rating of Chinese 
civilization imported during Antiquity. At that moment, an imported culture 
was never assimilated or even used. […] In other words, this period [the 
Kamakura period], precisely because of the way Japanese society developed, 
constituted a healthy return to an authentic Japan, a coming back to the 
origins. It erased this adulterated civilization and thus helped Japan redirect 
themselves on a more genuine path. Japanese people have managed to 
recognize themselves as an independent nation. There is no doubt about it, 
this period was a great moment in Japanese history.2 
 
In his book, Hara Katsurō emphasizes what he calls the social diffusion of 
cultural forms, what he considers a certain indicator of “the progress of 
civilization”. The idea of cultural forms progressing throughout history had 
first been coined by Taguchi Ukichi in 1877 in Nihon kaika shōshi 日本開花
小史 (A brief history of Japanese civilization). This idea was to be re-used 
in the 1920s by the rather nationalistic literary historian Tsuda Sōkichi in his 
book Bungaku ni arawareru waga kokumin shisō no kenkyū 文学にあらわ
れる我が国民思想の研究  (Inquiry on Japanese national thought as it 
appears in literature) and then again in 1975 in Nihon bungakushi josetsu 日
本文学史序説 (An introduction to the history of Japanese literature) by 
Katō Shūichi who was closed to Marxist thought. The idea developed by 
Hara is very important and is found throughout the twentieth century in 
various intellectual circles. 
Hara’s main idea was that the new civilization emerging during medieval 
times was not the servile reproduction of Chinese Civilization but the 
creation of an original culture. Japan is not to be seen as a cultural extension 
of China. The medieval period is thus rehabilitated and now perceived as a 
period of independency and of Japanization of culture. According to Hara, 
the Middle Ages, or to be more precise, the Kamakura period (1185-1333), 
seals the actual birth of Japan. There is obviously a double displacement of 
paradigm here. The crucial moment in history is not Antiquity anymore but 
                                                        
2 Hara Katsurō, Nihon chūseishi (History of medieval Japan), Kōdansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 
Tōkyō 1978, p. 4. 
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clearly the medieval times. And the criteria to measure the importance of the 
period is not the forms of the state anymore but the diffusion of the culture. 
This importance is linked to a notion of autonomy and independence from 
Chinese civilization. It shows the reliance on a kenzenna chūkan shakai 健全
な中間社会, the “intermediate and healthy society”, a real middle class, or 
in other words warriors. This old period pervaded by a Chinese culture 
considered to be refined but in reality adulterated (hisōteki 皮相的 ), 
dominated by the court nobility, opposes a medieval period where a genuine 
rough but healthy Japanese culture dominated by warriors is born. Thus, the 
vision of History presented by Hara differs very greatly from the one 
presented in the imperial rescript of 1872 mentioned above. The warriors’ 
government is no longer seen as a factor of stagnation but as historical 
progress. 
It is true that in the meantime the general context changed a lot. The 
Japanese military won over China in 1895 and obtained the cancellation of 
unequal treaties from 1899 on. In 1905, the Japanese military defeated Russia. 
In less than a decade, the international position of Japan had completely 
changed. Obviously, new foundations were necessary. The national traditional 
thought granted much veneration to tradition and the idea of legitimacy was 
overly pervaded by Confucianism. Claiming that Heian culture was 
effeminated and adulterated, Hara developed a vision of history that denied 
the central link between Japan and China. Here we can measure the impact 
of such an approach, such a mental process. Seeing that Japan gradually 
constructed its independence from Chinese culture, claiming that Chinese 
culture was itself adulterated and effeminated, we can expect despising 
speeches and ideas against China to be echoed in a nationalistic discourse of 
a new style. 
By insisting on the role played by warriors and what he calls a middle 
class, Hara also displaced the frame of the discourse from State to society. 
The hōken aspect of Japanese society becomes a source of progress. And it is 
precisely at that time that the word hōken develops in Japan as the equivalent 
to the Western word, feudality, feudalesimo, féodalité, Lehnwesen. The word 
thus acquires a slightly different meaning. The old concept of decentralized 
society is replaced by the notion of feudal society. Feudal society implies the 
emergence of an armed middle class in the countryside, which sets itself 
between a refined but isolated imperial capital and a provincial world away 
from civilization. 
Furthermore, Hara Katsurō insists on his new narrative on the opposition 
Kansai vs Kantō, East vs West. If the Meiji era started because of a coup in 
1868 lead by samurai of the South West Japan, the “true Japan“ as for 
himself came from the East. It is probably interesting to remember that Hara 
came from Morioka, one of the last fiefs from the Tōhoku (North-East), 
which resisted the new imperial power out of faithfulness to the shōgun 
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regime. The idea of regional opposition is connected to a particular German 
historiography, which right at the same time, attributed a regenerating and 
progressive role in the Germanic people invading the corrupted and 
adulterated Roman empire. Hara Katsurō clearly parallels the Roman Empire 
and the Nara and Heian courts and he regards the Chinese-Korean culture, 
the way Greco-Latin culture could be regarded in Europe. In the same way, 
he assimilates the Germanic people’s values to the culture of warriors 
coming from Eastern Japan at the beginning of Kamakura period. He sites 
the link between both societies as being born a warrior class and a feudal 
regime. Japan was born as a nation as a result of the social rising of warriors 
and because of the country’s unification in the thirteenth century under the 
rule of the shoguns of Kamakura. 
Now if we come back to 1885, there is an important text by the intellectual 
Fukuzawa Yukichi entitled Datsu A nyū Ō 脱亜入欧 (Good bye Asia, hello 
Western world). Here he explains that since the Opening Policy was 
implemented in Japan, the country’s values grew more and more connected 
to Western values and less and less to Asian values, noting this as a good 
thing for Japan. The Asian Japanese culture is superficial. Japan has to assert 
its purity and strangely so, Hara develops a theory of the frontier in the same 
way that Turner did in the United States. The more East and North you go, 
the closer you get to wild regions that are independent from a too “sinized” 
West, the more asserted Japanese culture becomes.3 Since 1868 the power 
was in the hands of the old southern and western fiefs and Hara became the 
first historian to rehabilitate the role of the eastern and northern provinces.  
You will also find in Hara’s writings the idea that there are rhythms that 
are common in both Europe and Japan. He demonstrates that two medieval 
periods seal the emergence of modern nations, which culturally assert 
themselves at that moment. 
Hara and a number of Japanese historians who will follow his lead in the 
twentieth century, obviously try to restore the historical role of the warrior 
class thirty years after Meiji. But this is not related to a reactionary narrative 
calling for the return of the old order. It sounds like a hymn to the middle 
class, to Japanese cultural autonomy, a struggle against the “old” Chinese 
influence and a step towards the idea of a common and eventually shared 
history with the Western world. On a more anecdotical level, we can 
highlight the fact that the Chinese concept of gunken periods completely 
vanished at that time. It was no longer of any use. On the other hand, we can 
underline the fact that the hōken concept entered the modern historical 
vocabulary meaning no longer decentralization of power but feudalism. 
 
                                                        
3 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, Chicago 
1893. 
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The texts that I have briefly analyzed here are of significantly different 
nature. The first one has an official motive and represents a sort of intel-
lectual and political compromise. It provides a rather good summary of 
mainstream representations of history among those who initiated the Meiji 
Restoration. The second one is the work of an historian. But this text was 
read and often commentated on in the early twentieth century and it 
eventually became a sort of historical vulgate that spread through the 
country. I could have quoted other historians or Japanese thinkers who in the 
early twentieth century share the same views, such as Fukuda Tokuzō. 
Around 1910, he stated that he was studying German history with great 
pleasure because deep down it was the same history as his country’s. There 
is thus a narrative set around 1906-1910 that dominates the representations 
of Japanese history for a very long time. 
Nonetheless, what we saw in the 1870s was the influence of Chinese 
thought which was very revealing at the time. Today it tends to be belittled by 
historians who are always too prone to give way to ideologies and working 
trends of representation. But in 1868, it was the Chinese historical vision—at 
least the Chinese vision as it was understood by Japanese people—that 
prevailed and allowed the new regime to develop a new legitimacy. 
From a problematic vision of history dominated by “Chinese-like” 
thought, to the one Hara Katsurō establishes, we witness a displacement of 
agenda and paradigms as a result of the evolution of the political stakes. In 
1868, the imperative is to put an end to the Tokugawa regime. In the early 
twentieth century, it is necessary to be seen on the same level as Western 
powers. Obviously, here is what Francois Hartog calls a change in the 
“régime d’historicité” with a complete overturning of perspectives. The 
concept of feudalism appears as a pivotal concept and it becomes possible to 
connect and compare Japanese and European history, defending the idea of 
similar history on both ends of Eurasia. Finally, this notion paves the way for 
the idea of History as a progressive front in regards to the Ancient Times, the 
Medieval period and all the way to today’s world. 
Hara’s representations of history are obviously influenced by a sort of 
slightly romantic nationalism but they work on the basis of an explicit 
comparison between Europe and Japan. The idea that History is walking 
towards a beautiful future will also be used by Marxist thinkers when they 
explain how Japanese feudalism carried the seed of capitalism. Again, 
another way to assert the similarity between Japan and Europe. 
It will take the emergence of a new history in the 1980s and 1990s (with 
post modern theories) for historians to be able to break free from the 
paradigm defined by Hara and to build up a new one based on other notions 
such as those of networks, conflicting plurality of spaces, multiplicity of 
social agents and the perception of History beyond the framework of the 
nation-state. But this is precisely another history. 
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THE JAPANESE COLONIAL HISTORIOGRAPHY  
IN KOREA (1905-1945) 
 
 
Arnaud Nanta* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Japanese colonial empire was built on two distinct temporalities and two 
distinct dynamics. This makes the Japanese colonial empire similar to 
Western European empires. An Ancient Regime colonization, several 
centuries old, dating back to the end of the sixteenth century in Ezo 
(Hokkaidō) and after 1609 in the Ryūkyū (Okinawa), and later at the end of 
the seventeenth century in Karafuto (Sakhalin), was followed by a “modern” 
colonization, a State colonization, during the last third of the nineteenth 
century and during the twentieth century. The relevant territories are in this 
case Taiwan, Korea, Micronesia, the South of Manchuria and Karafuto, a 
generally ambiguous territory. Korea, conquered in 1905, was the “pearl” of 
this modern colonial empire.1 
This is where the question of colonial knowledges arises. Here, we 
mention an adjective that must be used with caution. We are referring to the 
knowledges that were used in studying the history of Korea, in the broad 
sense of the word (every historical era), during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Ancient history, philology and archaeology, all closely linked, had a 
                                            
* Translated into English by Constance Sereni (Inalco). I would like to thank Prof. Alain 
Delissen (EHESS) for his helpful remarks. 
1 Alain Delissen, “La Corée, perle de l’empire”, L’Histoire, n. 333, 2008, pp. 70-73. On 
Japanese colonization: Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese colonial 
empire, 1894-1945, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984; Ōe Shinobu (ed.) 
大江志乃夫, Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi 近代日本と植民地 (Modern Japan and its 
colonies), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1992-1993; Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The 
Japanese Penetration of Korea (1895-1910), University of California Press, Berkeley 1995; 
Michel Vié, Le Japon et le monde au XXe siècle, Masson, Paris 1995; Shin Gi-Wook and 
Michael Robinson (eds.), Colonial Modernity in Korea, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 1999; Alain Delissen, François Gipoloux, Claude Markovits, Nguyen The 
Anh and Hartmut O. Rotermund, L’Asie orientale et méridionale aux XIXe et XXe siècles, 
Puf, Paris 1999. 
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central position within those knowledges, as did of course anthropology. 
Although many Japanese and American writers have referenced appraisals of 
post-1945 historiography2 after decolonization, very few have studied 
colonial historiography in Korea, which is to say history written during 
colonization. The kind of historiography we are interested in is an object of 
history. Yet, is the border between colonial historiography and post-colonial 
historiography so obvious and well delimitated? It is worth noting, incidentally, 
that most contributions to this subject come from Korean historians.3 
We shall also mention the discourses that dealt with the history of modern 
Korea or the history of colonization during the same period. Although it 
cannot be discussed further here, there were a plurality of historian discourses 
on Korea: as early as the 1910s and 1920s, English-speaking historians such 
as Peason J. Treat or Paul H. Clyde,4 amongst others, analyzed modern 
Korea and colonization, and found Japanese presence in a Korea that was 
“incapable of ruling itself” perfectly legitimate. At the same time, Korean 
historiography of Japanese colonization was beginning with Pak Ǔn-sik’s 
                                            
2 See conclusion. 
3 Pai Hyung-il (Pae Hyǒng-il), Constructing “Korean” Origins. A Critical Review of 
Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories, Harvard 
University Press & Hallym, Harvard 2000; Cho Donggǒl 趙東杰, Hyǒndae hanguk sahak-sa 
現代韓國 史學史 (A history of historical studies in contemporary Korea), Na’nam Ch’ulp’an, 
Seoul 2002; Cho Donggǒl, “Singmin sahak ǔi sǒngnip kwajǒng kwa kǔndae-sa sǒsul” 
植民史學의 成立過程과 近代史 叙述 (The formation of colonial historiography and the 
writing of modern history), Yǒksa kyoyuk nonjip 歷史教育論集, 13-14 February 1990, 
pp. 749-807; Pak Kǒl-sun 박걸순 (朴杰純), Singminji sigi ǔi yǒksahak kwa yǒksa insik 
植民地 시기의 歷史과 歷史認識 (Historiography and the view of history during the colonial 
period), Kyǒng’in Munhwa-sa, Seoul 2004; Sakano Tōru 坂野徹, Teikoku Nihon to 
jinruigakusha 帝国日本と人類学者 (Imperial Japan and the anthropologists) Keisō shobō, 
Tōkyō 2005; Arnaud Nanta, “Savoirs et colonies: l’archéologie et l’anthropologie japonaises 
en Corée”, in Jean-Jacques Tschudin and Claude Hamon (eds.), La société japonaise devant la 
montée du militarisme, Philippe Picquier, Paris 2007, pp. 21-31; Yi Sunja 이순자 (李順子), 
Ilche kangjǒm-gi kojǒk chosa saǒp yǒn’gu 일제강점기 고적조사사업 연구 (The empire of 
Japan’s research on ancient sites during the occupation period), Kyǒng’in Munhwa-sa, Seoul 
2009; Arnaud Nanta, “Torii Ryūzō: discours et terrains d’un anthropologue et archéologue 
japonais du début du XXe siècle”, Bulletins et Mémoires de la Société d’Anthropologie de 
Paris, n. 22, 2010, pp. 24-37; Il’chogak, “Han’guk taehak ǔi yǒksa” (A history of university 
in Korea), Han’guk-sa simin kangjwa 韓國市民講座, n. 18, special issue, 1996. We should 
also mention the official proceedings of the NikKan rekishi kyōdō kenkyū iinkai 
日韓歴史共同研究委員会 (Japan-Korea commission for common historical research) about 
the pre-1945 period (2005-2009, unpublished). See below for more on Keijō Imperial 
University and related disciplines. 
4 Payson J. Treat, The Far East: A Political and Diplomatic History, Harper & Brothers, New 
York and London 1928; Paul H. Clyde, A History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East, 
Prentice Hall, New York 1937. 
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朴殷植 (1859-1925) famous 1920 work.5 In other words, there was a 
historiography of the contemporary and therefore colonial period a long time 
before decolonization and synchronously with the “general” history of 
Korea. 
We will limit ourselves to clarifying temporalities, drawing on an 
institutional overview and recalling a few important characters. Firstly, 
we will see the links between history and colonialism—the discourses 
supporting colonization—at the beginning of the twentieth century. Then, 
colonial history during the years 1905 to 1921 will be introduced, as well as 
the various operative networks from Korea and from the metropole. Lastly, 
we will examine the links between the institutions of colonial Korea and the 
Imperial University and some of the greatest figures of the 1930s. In 
conclusion, we shall give an overview of post-colonial studies and their 
timeline. 
 
 
Historiography and colonialism: Korea as seen from Japan  
at the turn of the century 
 
Historical works on the Korean peninsula published around the middle and 
the end of the Meiji era (1868-1912), well before annexation, have been 
analyzed by Japanese, American and French historians.6 Those writings, 
derived directly from Japan, were particular in that their authors were not 
specialists on the peninsula: they emanated either from specialists on Asia, 
or historians focused on other projects but with an opinion on Korea. 
Stefan Tanaka studied the development of the Tōyōshi 東洋史 which is to 
say, as he explained, the history of the Orient (in particular of North-East 
Asia), as opposed to Western or European history. 
The specialists on Asia were mostly sinologists, such as famous 
philologist Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥庫吉 (1865-1942) from the Tōkyō 
Imperial University. He provides a perfect example of the early discourses 
that we mentioned. Stefan Tanaka writes about him: 
 
                                            
5 A journalist and member of the Provisional Government, in exile in Shanghai (one of the 
two main branches of the resistance), Pak initiated the beginnings of Korean historiography 
on colonization, which remained for a long time centred on resistance movements. Pak 
Ǔn-sik, Han’guk tongnip undong ji hyǒlsa 韓國獨立運動之血史 (The bloody history of 
Korean independence movements), originally in Chinese (Shanghai 1920), many translations 
and reprints both in Korean and in Japanese.  
6 Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient, California University Press, Berkeley 1993; Oguma Eiji 
小熊英二, Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen 単一民族神話の起源 (The myth of the 
homogeneous nation), Shin’yōsha, Tōkyō 1995; Lionel Babicz, Le Japon face à la Corée à 
l’ère Meiji, Maisonneuve & Larose, Paris 2002. 
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According to Shiratori, Japan’s activities were not imperialistic, for the past 
shows that Korea ‘has returned [kaeru] to our protection’ […] History 
provided the precedent for this return: protohistoric Japan, after all, had been 
asked for aid from the ancient Korean kingdoms of Paekche, Kaya, and Silla 
in their fight against Koguryǒ. It was only thanks to this request, Shiratori 
continued, that Japan established its rule in Kaya, turned Paekche into a 
protectorate, and made a tributary state of Silla. Moreover, he expressed no 
doubt that he considered the Sei-kan [conquer Korea] movement of the early 
Meiji period to ‘open Korea’ and impose Japanese ‘aid’ during the twentieth 
century in a similar vein.7 
  
However, those discourses, expounded by the annexation of Korea, did not 
simply fall under a straight “legitimization of imperialism”. Equally 
academic research as constitutive of a wider discourse on Korea, these 
discourses that supported colonization were also reflected in newspapers and 
by popular images stimulated by the discovery of the Kwanggaet’o daewang 
廣開土大王 stone in 1883. This stone was said to have proven the historical 
truth of military victories on Korea by Empress Jingū 神功皇后 (r. 201-269), 
as told in the Nihon shoki 日本書紀, the Japanese annals dating back from 
720.  
These works and discourses show how the historical narrative on Korea, 
and human sciences in general, were shaped during the twenty years before 
the August 22nd, 1910 annexation. The weight of the Past and the study of 
the Past should therefore not be underestimated. Their primary goal was not 
to be “exploited”, but rather, they acted as a powerful motivator by having, 
at the time, a legitimizing effect. In other words, this period saw Japanese 
historians, without necessarily being conscious of it, taking part in the 
colonial effort by initially supporting the discourse of ethnic, racial or 
cultural proximity between Japanese and Koreans (NisSen dōsoron 
日鮮同祖論); then, in a second phase, by constituting the concepts (which 
were relatively commonplace at the time of colonial empires)8 of “stagnation” 
and “dependency on the outside world”. Those ideas were expressed in the 
Japanese case by the words teitai 停滞 and jidai 事大9 or taritsusei 他律性. 
These concepts would then be brought back to colonial Korea, further 
completed by that of “dualism” (nijū kōzō shakai 二重構造社会) which 
                                            
7 S. Tanaka, Japan’s Orient, p. 244. 
8 Daniel Rivet, Le Maghreb à l’épreuve de la colonisation, Hachette, Paris 2002; 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, New York and London 1991, chapter 10 
(Census, Map, Museum); Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London 1975, particularly chapter 7 (Losers) and chapter 8 (Winners). 
9 From the Korean sadae 사대 事大, referring to deference towards powerful countries. 
THE JAPANESE COLONIAL HISTORIOGRAPHY IN KOREA (1905-1945) 
 
87 
emphasized the “incomplete” character of the “spirit” of the colonized; here 
again was an idea that was very common in modern colonialism.10 
The idea of ethnic proximity between the conquerors and the conquered 
was actually widely present in the discourses of colonialism, that is to say 
amongst non-historians. It is mostly typical of the years around the time of 
annexation. In the 1920, a less defined discourse, emphasizing miscegenation, 
would follow this idea of common origins.11 However, the idea of Korean 
history as being without dynamic, of “a long, level history” after the tenth 
century, during the period from 1910 to 1920, would remain impressed on 
colonial historiography for a long time. This finding confirms Saïd’s analysis 
of Anglo-French orientalism towards North Africa and the Middle East.12 
The de facto involvement of historians at the time of the annexation 
appeared, for example, in a themed edition of the publication Rekishi chiri 
歷史地理 (History and geography), of the Nippon rekishi chiri gakkai 
(Japanese society of history and geography), in October 1910.13 This issue, 
devoted to Korea, which followed the publication in September of the text of 
the August 22nd Rescript, included around twenty articles legitimizing 
annexation.14 At that time, when the idea of climate determinism maintained 
a strong influence on the discourses of compared geography as well as the 
discourses of colonialism (such as the similarities found between Provence 
and Algeria), history gave scientific support to the ideological discourses on 
proximity between Japan and Korea, as did the press and other media, 
complicit as ever.15 
That same November 1910, Kita Sadakichi 喜田貞吉 (1871-1939), the 
famous historian from Kyōtō Imperial University, published Kankoku no 
heigō to kokushi 韓國之併合と國史 (The annexation of Korea and our 
national history).16 That work, which was emblematic of the discourses 
                                            
10 Emmanuelle Sibeud, Une science impériale pour l’Afrique? La construction des savoirs 
africanistes en France. 1870-1930, EHESS, Paris 2002; D. Rivet, Le Maghreb.  
11 Oguma E., Tan’itsu minzoku; Arnaud Nanta, “Kiyono Kenji (1885-1955): archeologia 
preistorica, razziologia ed etnogenesi. Percorsi di un antropologo fisico nel Giappone 
imperiale”, Contemporanea. Rivista di storia di storia dell’800 e del 900, vol. XI, n. 2, aprile 
2008, pp. 173-194. 
12 Edward Saïd, Orientalism, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1995. 
13 This society, founded at the end of the nineteenth century, was one of the most important 
ones in Japan, with the Shigakkai 史學會, the oldest historical society in Japan. 
14 Unno Fukuju 海野福寿, Kankoku heigō 韓国併合 (The Annexation of Korea), Iwanami 
Shoten, Tōkyō 1995, particularly pp. 227-230. 
15 Oguma E., Tan’itsu minzoku; Id., “Nihonjin” no kyōkai ＜日本人＞の境界 (The 
boundaries of the “Japanese”) Shin’yōsha, Tōkyō 1998; Kang Tongjin 姜東鎮, Nihon 
genronkai to Chōsen, 1910-1945 日本言論界と朝鮮 (Japanese media and Korea, 1910-
1945), Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku 法政大学出版局, Tōkyō 1984; L. Babicz, Le Japon 
face à la Corée. 
16 This work, published by Sanseidō, was reprinted in a facsimile edition within a series of 
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emanating from Japan during this period, combined conferences made 
during the month of August at that same society around the theme: 
“Kankoku heigō to kokushi no kyōiku” 韓國併合と國史の教育 (The 
annexation of Korea and teaching our national history). Kita emphasized the 
idea of assimilation (dōka 同化). He brought the two countries closer 
through an ancient history imagined to be “shared”, and wrote, in a similar 
way evoking what Shiratori had earlier:  
 
That Korea and Japan are one sole entity is a fact; this can in no way be seen 
as a discourse dictated by circumstances. This annexation has therefore not 
destroyed Korea, but instead has restored the situation to what it was during 
the ancient period.17  
 
Kita continued in that direction for the following years. This therefore makes 
it clear that Tōkyō and Kyōto’s positions were in accordance with respect to 
Korea. It hence is possible here to see a discourse close to annexationism as 
defined by Hannah Arendt.18 
Kita, who was present as a historian during all the great debates of the 
1900-1930, is considered today as “the greatest ideologist of the pluri-ethnic 
Japanese empire”.19 But this observation may be too cursory: this ideology, 
far from being limited to a few figures, emanated from the whole range of 
scholarship, in a context where history, archaeology and linguistics, amongst 
others, concurred in the opinion that the Japanese had continental origins. 
Torii Ryūzō 鳥居龍蔵 (1870-1953) from the Tōkyō Imperial University, an 
anthropologist, archaeologist and philologist of the greatest renown, who 
studied Korea amongst other fields as mandated by the Tōkyō Imperial 
University after 1909, defended this discourse of “common origins” during 
the events of the First March 1919.20 We should however emphasize the 
ambiguous nature of those positions: Kita supported colonization in Korea in 
return for a future equality of rights. At the very beginning of the 
colonization period, Torii himself was very close to the Government-General 
of Korea, which allowed him to carry on his research until 1916. As for 
linguists, they were fascinated by the closeness, of historical nature rather 
than dating back to origins, between the Korean and the Japanese. In any 
                                                                                                       
documents and archives on the annexation of Korea, in forty-four volumes. Kankoku heigōshi 
kenkyū shiryō 韓国併合史研究資料 (Archives on the history of the annexation of Korea), 
Ryūkei Shosha, Tōkyō 1995, vol. 3. Kita at the time sat on the Ministry of Education’s 
Commission for the Redaction of School Manuals, created in 1903. 
17 Kankoku heigōshi, pp. 72-73. 
18 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New Edition, Hartcourt Brace & Company, 
New York and London 1973, vol. II (Imperialism). 
19 Oguma E., Tan’itsu minzoku, p. 119. 
20 A. Nanta, “Torii Ryūzō”, p. 29. 
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case, anti-colonialism was virtually non existent, there just as anywhere 
else.21 
For these reasons, the political discourses we have just described, dictated 
by circumstances having to do with the annexation, must be distinguished 
from colonial historical scholarship that we will now present. 
 
 
The beginnings of colonial historiography: archaeological surveys  
and the preservation of sites and documents, 1905-1921 
 
Researchers specializing in Korea began before the Colonial State was 
instituted, particularly in history and archaeology, but also in linguistics and 
anthropology. These four disciplines are linked for logical and practical 
reasons. The first historical studies, during the years 1905-1921, were 
characterized by a desire for the conservation of ancient texts. It was the 
same for colonial archaeology, which cannot be distinguished from history 
since it was essentially concerned with ancient Korea, notably the era of the 
Three Kingdoms (Samguk sidae 三國時代, from the fourth to the seventh 
century) and in particular the Kingdoms of Silla 新羅 (356-935), in the 
South, and of Koguryǒ 高句麗 (37-668) in the North—it is therefore 
necessary to make a clear distinction between prehistoric archaeology on the 
one hand and ancient archaeology (which has to do with historical eras), on 
the other. 
Scholars at the time of the protectorate (1905-1910)22 and during the first 
years under Governor-General Terauchi Masatake 寺内正毅 (1852-1919), in 
post from 1910 to 1916,23 were still mandated from the metropole, in 
particular for extensive archaeological surveys, or were living in Korea but 
not attached to the Government-General at Keijō (Seoul). After 1915-1916, 
specialists of Korea per se started to work within institutions, first those 
created by Terauchi, who was passionate about Ancient Korea,24 then later, 
within institutions created between the years 1922 and 1924 (see below). 
                                            
21 Kita opened the field of social history and studies on discrimination as early as 1910. Pierre 
F. Souyri, “Critiquer le colonialisme dans le Japon d’avant 1945”, Cipango, n. 18, 2013, 
forthcoming. 
22 The protectorate of 1905, organised around the Resident (Tōkan, Tōkanfu 統監府) was 
followed by the Government-General of Korea (Chōsen sōtokufu 朝鮮総督府) in 1910. 
23 The first research institutions founded by the colonial power are the Museum of the Royal 
House of Yi, the Botanical Garden, and the Zoological Garden in 1909, inside the 
Ch’anggyǒng palace 昌慶宮. 
24 Nishikawa Hiroshi 西川宏, “Nihon teikokushugika ni okeru Chōsen kōkogaku no keisei" 
日本帝国主義下における朝鮮考古学の形成 (The formation of the archaeology of Korea 
under Japanese imperialism), Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū, n. 7, 1970, pp. 94-116. 
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Unlike what was happening on the metropole, those institutions founded 
during the decade from 1915 to 1924 constituted clusters wherein each 
individual was linked to others and organizations largely interpenetrated. As 
a result, it is difficult to draw a clear historical picture of a colonial research 
that, in fact, worked organically. In other words, from a research point of 
view, these were not institutions as understood in the metropole. The only 
distinction worth making would be between individuals: those from Korea 
and those of the Kyōto “network”, discussed below. Rather, we should 
identify the different tasks or objectives, and not the institutions with the full 
autonomy that this word usually implies. 
The art historian Sekino Tadashi 関野貞 (1867-1935) or the archaeologist 
and historian Imanishi Ryū 今西龍 (1875-1932), as well as Torii in the case 
of prehistory, played central roles between around 1905 and 1916, and 
remained present afterwards. These researchers laid the foundation of 
historic-archaeological knowledge on Korea, a work that was further carried 
out by later institutions, as well as, critically, by Korean research after 1945-
1948. The case of Imanishi, who deconstructed the Korean founding myth of 
Tan’gun 檀君 in his famous article of 1937, is particularly well-known. In 
contrast to other colonial situations, corpus and written documents, as well 
as all historical or ancient sites, were very numerous in colonial Korea—just 
as in Indochina, whose historical configuration is similar to that of Korea. 
 Archaeological work, which seems to have preceded historical work, was 
in reality permanently entwined with the latter. Indeed, proto-historical 
archaeology was concerned with the “great historical cities” in works that 
mixed philological history (due to the inflated weight of written documents) 
and an archaeology that aimed to confirm the truth of texts taken to be 
entirely true, as Schliemann (1822-1890) had done in Mycenae and Troy,25 
through most notably the Samguk sagi 三國史記 and the Samguk yusa 
三國遺事, Korean chronicles of the Three Kingdoms period dating from the 
twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, or the Wei Chronicle (Wei zhi 魏志). The 
region of Hwanghaedo 黄海道, for the sites of Koguryǒ, was the locus of 
intense exploration, in particular on the Command Post of Lelang 楽郎, an 
important Chinese colony-city founded during the Han dynasty, close to the 
outskirts of P’yǒng’yang. Whereas the myth of origin around legendary ruler 
                                            
25 As for prehistoric archaeology, which is less prominent, Torii led an extensive study 
between 1911 and 1916 to determine the repartition and the type of sites present. This study 
led notably to the “Research report on the ancient sites of P’yǒng’an Namdo and 
Hwanghaedo” in 1916. Torii Ryūzō, “Heian nandō, Kōkaidō koseki chōsa hōkokusho” 
平安南道及び黄海道古蹟調査報告書 (Research report on the ancient sites of P’yǒng’an 
Namdo and Hwanghaedo), in Chōsen sōtokufu (Government-General of Korea), Taishō 
gonendo koseki chōsa hōkokusho 大正5年度古蹟調査報告書 (Research report on ancient 
sites for the fifth year of Taishō), Keijō, Seoul 1916, pp. 767-859. 
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Tan’gun was being deconstructed, the time of the Chinese presence in the 
North of the peninsula became perceived as an archaeological period in 
itself: the true beginning of History in Korea, thus reduced to exterior 
influences.  
Moreover, those historians-archaeologists associated, as early as that 
period, Korea with Manchuria—then an ill-defined and disputed region, 
where Japan substituted itself to Russia after 1905. Japanese scholars posited 
a “Korea-Manchuria cultural sphere” (ManSen bunka 満鮮文化) read as a 
whole, by relating Koguryǒ to Korea—a point of debate still today, between 
Korea and China. This conception was not purely “ideological”, but rather 
reflected the complexity of the era of the Three Kingdoms, which led those 
historians and archaeologists to associate the north of the peninsula to the 
south of Manchuria as early as 1905. Koguryǒ encompassed the northern 
half of Korea and the south of the Manchuria of the time (today, the three 
Chinese provinces of the North-East). Its definition in relation to modern 
nation-states is problematic. 
 From a purely philological standpoint, the scholars of the years 1905-
1916 worked along two different planes: the analysis of Korean texts, and 
the reprinting of many Korean texts that were considered to be essential. The 
work was first lead by “private agents” outside colonial power. The case of 
historian Oda Shōgo 小田省吾 (1871-1953) is particularly illuminating: in 
1909, he founded, along with the historian Ayukai Fusanoshin 鮎貝房之進 
(1864-1946), the Chōsen kosho kankōkai 朝鮮古書刊行會, a private 
institution, which reprinted in a few years dozens of texts from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. They created a work edition of the 
Samguk yusa and Samguk sagi, and compiled a Chōsen gunsho taikei 
朝鮮群書大系 (Historical Anthology of Korean literature).26 This work, 
which simultaneously involved conservation, reprinting, and analysis, drew 
on language, literature and history. It would then be continued by scholarly 
institutions put in place by the colonial powers.  
At the same time, colonial power, as early as the Protectorate era, ordered 
the famous Kyūkan chōsa 旧慣調査 (Inquest on customs and mores of 
Korea). This event, in which ethnologists as well as historians took part, lead 
                                            
26 See Choi Kyong-rak (Ch’oe Kyǒngnak), “Compilation and publication of Korean historical 
materials under Japanese rule (1910-1945)”, The developing economies, vol. VII, n. 3, 1969, 
pp. 380-391; Sahoe kwahak sasǒ kanheng-hoe 社會科學辭書刊行會 (ed.), Hanguk-sa sajǒn 
韓國史辭典 (Dictionary of Korean history), Sahoe kwahak sasǒ kanheng-hoe, Seoul 1959; 
see for example entries “Chosǒn-sa p’yǒnsuhoe” 朝鮮史編修會 (p. 345) and “Han’guk 
yǒngu-sa” 韓國研究史, part 4 (pp. 399-401). South-Korean historiography of the period of 
the pro-American government of Yi Sǔngman 李承晩 (1948-1961) or of the military 
dictatorship (1961-1987) had a very positive appreciation of historical and archaeological 
studies effected during the colonial period despite being critical of colonization in general. 
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to a report as early as 1910, while linguistics was gaining in power. In 1920, 
Ogura Shinpei 小倉進平 (1882-1944), author of Korean grammar books and 
who lived in Korea starting in 1911, was already publishing a Chōsen 
gogakushi 朝鮮語學史 (History of Korean linguistics) in Japan.27 
The institutional integration of researchers “outside of the power” and 
their work would also be encouraged by the acquisition in 1907 by the 
Gakumuka 學務課 (Social affairs and education bureau) of Tōkanfu of 
Korean archives, in particular the Royal Library of Kyujanggak 奎章閣 in 
Ch’angdǒk Palace 昌徳宮 in Keijō. Conversely, it must be noted that these 
archives were mostly kept in Keijō, in prevision of future research 
institutions.28 Most, but not all of them, were written in classical Chinese, 
and were convenient for Japanese sinologists to use. 
From the point of view of institutions, the end of Terauchi’s mandate was 
the first important milestone. The Chōsen sōtokufu hakubutsukan 
朝鮮総督府博物館 (Museum of the Government-General of Korea) was 
founded in 1915; Ayukai came in the following year. Then, consequently, the 
Chōsen koseki chōsa iinkai 朝鮮古蹟調査委員會 (Commission for the 
study of ancient sites in Korea; later renamed Chōsen koseki kenkyūkai 
朝鮮古蹟研究會),29 was created in 1916, while at the same time the Koseki 
oyobi ibutsu hozon kisoku 古蹟及ビ遺物保存規則 (Rules for the 
preservation of ancient sites and artifacts from Korea) were being drawn.30 
Those rules, later revised in 1933, preceded the 1919 law in the metropole. 
  
                                            
27 On the Japanese colonial empire and particularly Korea see Yasuda Toshiaki 安田敏朗, 
Shokuminchi no naka no “kokugogaku” 植民地のなかの「国語学」(The “national language” 
in colonial context), Sangensha, Tōkyō 1998; Id., “Gengo” no kōchiku 「言語」の構築  (The 
construction of  “the language”), Sangensha, Tōkyō 1999. 
28 Unlike the archive of the Kyujanggak annex in Kanghwa, which was pillaged by a French 
expeditionary corps in 1866, those documents were still archived at the Bibliothèque 
Nationale in France until 2011. Part of the Kyujanggak archives was however moved to the 
Tōkyō Imperial University, where it disappeared during the 1923 earthquake. Apart from this 
library, the Chosǒn royal family had stores of archives and documents, called Sago 史庫. Four 
of them fell under the control of the Kyujanggak in 1908, one of which would be later moved 
to Tōkyō. The books and documents that were taken by Japan were given back to Korea in 
three times: in 1965, then above all in 2006 and in 2011 (the restitution is still ongoing, in 
particular for the documents taken by Itō Hirobumi). 
29 Both should be translated as “commission”; the organisation still fell under the authority of 
the Government-General. The same goes for the 1922 commission (see below).  
30 These regulations were essential in the preservation of sites anterior to the Chosǒn period 
(1392-1897). Inada Takashi 稲田孝, “Iseki no hogo” 遺跡の保護 (The protection of 
archaeological sites), in Kondō Yoshirō 近藤義郎 (ed.), Nihon no kōkogaku 日本の考古学 
(Archaeology of Japan), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1986, vol. 7,  pp. 71-132; Jean-Paul Demoule 
and Pierre F. Souyri, Archéologie et patrimoine au Japon, MSH, Paris 2008. 
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The question of the preservation of sites was not a purely colonial 
concern. This is evident by the various accounts of clashes between Japanese 
archaeologists and Japanese residents who engaged in illicit excavations.31 
Through its objectives, it is clear that this historical work was focused on 
ancient Korea. This commission, which involved Torii, Hamada Kōsaku 
濱田耕作 (1881-1938), director of the Archeology Department of the Kyōto 
Imperial University since 1916, and Korean researchers, is the equivalent in 
Korea of EFEO for French Indochina.32 The reports it produced are still 
considered significant in the study of proto-historic and ancient Korea.33 
This ensemble of institutions, including organizations founded between 
the years 1922 and 1924, was constructed in an integrated way. These 
institutions followed the dynamic driven by Terauchi and built an edifying 
colonial knowledge, which fell within archiving and complied by a similar 
logic to that demonstrated by Benedict Anderson in the case of British India 
and for Indochina.34 This work did not limit itself to official reports or 
publications, but was comprised of masses of articles and publications that 
were always published through the Government-General if in Korea, or 
through various publishing houses in Kyōto or Tōkyō. 
A work that can be seen as emblematic of this scholarship is the imposing 
series Chōsen koseki zufu 朝鮮古蹟圖譜 (Description of the ancient sites of 
Korea). This series was published both in Japanese and English (in the case of 
the first five volumes) between the years 1915 and 193535 in a luxurious 
binding, with a vast amount of photographs, however it lacked any historical 
questioning. The work had a definite influence36 on many Western institutions 
(such as the Musée Guimet in Paris) as well as in Japan. However, it belonged 
more to the “photo safari” genre and supported a contradictory logic of 
enhancement of the Korean national past (therefore supporting nationalism) 
                                            
31 Umehara Sueji 梅原末治, Kōkogaku rokujūnen 考古学60年 (Sixty years of archaeology), 
Heibonsha, Tōkyō 1973. 
32 The Mission Archéologique Permanente was founded in 1898, and later was turned into the 
EFEO (École française d’Extrême-Orient) in January 1900 by Paul Doumer (1857-1932), and 
moved to Hanoi in 1901. Trinh Van Thao, “École française d’Extrême-Orient”, in Claude 
Liauzu (ed.), Le dictionnaire de la colonisation française, Larousse, Paris 2007, pp. 263-264. 
33 A. Nanta, “Savoirs et colonies”; Pai H., Constructing “Korean” Origins, pp. 23-35 (Japanese 
Archaeology and Ethnography in the Age of Imperialism). 
34 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, chapter 10 (Census, Map, Museum). 
35 On the differences, some of which were chronological as well, between research on ancient 
Korea and that on modern Korea: of the fifteen volumes published, six dealt with the Chosǒn 
period—volumes 10 to 15, published between 1930 and 1935. They dealt mostly with 
architectural and art history. 
36 See for example: Jean Buhot, “L’art de la Corée”, in Pierre Devambez (ed.), Histoire de 
l’art 1. Le Monde non-chrétien, Gallimard, La Pléiade, Paris 1961, pp. 1442-1458. 
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and a strengthening of colonial paternalism (reinforcing the position of the 
colonizer).37 
Taken globally, this historical work would give a fresh, modern view on 
that ancient past and the antiquity, which up until then was not considered 
“central”, and which would later be reassessed by independence movements 
as being part of “Korean national culture”.  
 
 
Specialized Studies and contemporary Korea: around the Keijō 
Imperial University and the Historical Commission 
 
Historical studies from the end of the 1920s to the 1940s showed much 
better understanding of geopolitics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
as well as a finer analysis of Korean history. Japanese researchers gradually 
moved away from the deterministic or ideological discourses of the 
beginning of the century and began producing historical studies that were in 
the same line as those produced after decolonization. The context of these 
new discourses differed as well. One reason for  this was the accumulation of 
Koreanist scholarship over several decades. This change was also due to the 
“cultural politics” (bunka seiji 文化政治) of the 1920s: Korean newspapers 
were allowed back after the First March 1919, and the Government-General, 
led by Governor Saitō Makoto 斎藤實 (1858-1936), in power from 1919 to 
1927, then from 1929 to 1931, under Prime Minister Hara Takashi 原敬 
(1856-1921), pursued a policy of support of Korean culture. Once more, this 
might seem to contradict the a priori objective of the colonial state. It was 
mostly a question of splitting the opposition in order to isolate the advocates 
of armed resistance on the one hand, and on the other, the proponents (rallied 
to the colonial government) of nationalism and gradualism.38 
The 1920s saw a reinforcement of “local” research, with researchers that 
worked solely within the institutions of the colony, following the Museum in 
1915. In December 1922, the Chōsenshi hensan iinkai 朝鮮史編纂委員會 
(Commission for the redaction of the history of Korea; later renamed 
Chōsenshi henshūkai 朝鮮史編修會 in June 1925)39 was founded. Following 
                                            
37 On this point as well, a comparison with French Indochina would be illuminating. 
B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, chapter 10 (Census, Map, Museum); Pierre Brocheux 
and Daniel Hémery, Indochina, an ambiguous colonization, 1858-1954, University of 
California Press, Berkeley 2009. And see also the works of Gwendolyn Wright on the French 
colonial empire. 
38 Which is to say the notion that the “evolution” of Korea required it to undergo colonization. 
This policy was a success at the time, but ended up in the middle term being counter-
productive for the colonial power. 
39 See footnote 30. 
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the commission, in 1924 (1926) the Keijō Imperial University (Keijō Teikoku 
Daigaku 京城帝國大學), which was integrated within the metropole higher 
education system40 was created. This university differed from previous 
institutions in its function, which was principally education,41 and by the 
great variety of research themes it developed that went beyond Korea. Once 
again, all historians and archaeologists went there. In 1930, the University 
received the stacks of the Kyujanggak (cf. supra). Finally, recent Korean 
research has shed some light on the scholarly societies that revolved around 
those great institutions. Societies brought together and federated characters 
from both commissions, the museum and the university. This shows once 
more the difficulty of attempting, in a colonial context, to isolate a particular 
field along the logic of clearly separated institutions. In addition, those 
societies were more or less official organisms: in the case of history, whereas 
the Seikyū gakkai 青丘學會 (1929) would seem to have been autonomous, 
in fact its president was Fujita; the imposing Chōsenshi gakkai 朝鮮史學會 
was created in 1923 by the seimu tōkan 政務統監 (Civilian governor), who 
assisted the Governor-General. Finally, although those gakkai were in 
majority comprised of Japanese, Koreans were also present.42 
Amongst these, historians were thus divided between the Faculty of Law 
and Humanities of the University,43 the Historical Commission and the 
Archaeological Commission, the Museum and the scholarly societies. Their 
work led to articles and various publications (to be detailed further later). 
Oda Shōgo, already mentioned, once becoming director of the Social Affairs 
and Education Bureau, sat at the Historical Commission from the very 
beginning. Similarly, famous historian and archaeologist Kuroita Katsumi 
黒板勝美 (1874-1946), who worked on Korean corpus, was part of the 
commission, alongside sinologist Naitō Konan 内藤湖南 (1866-1934).44 
                                            
40 The whole of the university opened in 1926. Chǒng Sǒn-I 정선이 (丁仙伊), Kyǒngsǒng 
cheguk taehak yǒn’gu 경성제국대학 연구 (Keijō Imperial University), Mun’ǔm-sa tosǒ 
ch’ulp’an 문음사 도서 출판, Seoul 2008. This was one of the nine (and not seven) Imperial 
Universities, with that of Taipei (1928). These two universities were founded before those of 
Ōsaka and Nagoya. 
41 Unlike Taiwan, the Keijō Imperial University incorporated one third of “indigenous” 
students (i.e. Koreans), which is a high percentage. 
42 As shown by the list of conferences given. “Seikyū” comes from the Korean place name 
Ch’ǒnggu, which was where the society was located. On these scholarly societies, see Pak K., 
Singminji sigi, pp. 100-102. 
43 Korean studies were split between the Chōsen shigakka 朝鮮史学科 (Korean history 
section), the Chōsen bungakka 朝鮮文学科 (Korean Literature section) and the Chōsen 
gogakka 朝鮮語学科 (Korean language section) which is where Ogura was affected in 1926. 
The study of history can naturally not be separated from that of language. 
44 See Kuroita Katsumi sensei seitan hyakunen kinenkai 黒板勝美先生生誕百年記念会 
(ed.), Kuroita Katsumi sensei ibun 黒板勝美先生遺文 (The literary legacy of professor 
ARNAUD NANTA 96 
Some of the objectives of the historical commission were the reprinting en 
masse and the conservation of documents, as well as the completion of the 
Sillok 實録, the royal chronicles of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910). Their 
writing, interrupted by emperor Kojong 高宗 (1852-1919) after 1897, was 
started once again by the Government-General, who had the last two 
volumes written (“Kojong”, “Sunjong” 純宗). 
The main objective of the Historical Commission was to write an official 
history of Korea. Since its publication, however, this history has been widely 
criticized. This work led to two series: first, the Chōsenshi kōza 朝鮮史講座 
(Lectures on the history of Korea), in three volumes, published in 1924 by 
the Chōsenshi gakkai, which cannot be considered separate from the 
commission; then, between 1932 and 1938, the series of books Chōsenshi 
朝鮮史 (History of Korea), in thirty-five volumes (24.000 pages).45 These 
works varied from the dynamic from the 1910s in that they dealt much more 
with the modern, even colonial, period. Korean “professors” were involved 
in the entire work.46 Some chapters of the Chōsenshi kōza were even 
published in original Korean (with kana), such as those penned by historian 
Yi Nǔng-hwa 李能和 (1869-1943), rallied to the colonial regime. 
Let us now turn to a few emblematic figures of the archaeological and 
historian milieu of Korea. Fujita Ryōsaku 藤田亮策 (1892-1960) was a 
central character in the archaeological world of the peninsula between 1922, 
the date in which he was appointed director of the Museum, and 1945; he 
also became professor of history at the Imperial University and member of 
the Historical Commission. His theories on the formation of the Korean state 
influenced Korean archaeology after independence, in particular his 1948 
synthesis Chōsen kōkogaku kenkyū 朝鮮考古學研究.47 In this work, Fujita 
clearly recognized a “Lelang cultural sphere”, and moreover as the 
beginning of History in the Korean peninsula. However, at the same time, he 
gave an important place to the prehistory of the peninsula—that is to say the 
period before the first century A.D. Chinese colonization. 
In fact, it is difficult to consider Fujita as one of the supporters of the idea 
that Korea was always a subject of outside forces. He felt, in 1948, that the 
peninsula (and Japan) had enjoyed the benefits of “the advanced culture of 
China” or of southern influences, while at the same time adding that “Korea 
[was] not only a bridge allowing cultural exchanges but [had] developed its 
                                                                                                       
Kuroita Katsumi), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 1974.  
45 An index was published in 1940, which makes a total 37 of volumes. 
46 See the memoirs Keijō Teikoku Daigaku sōritsu gojisshūnen kinenshi iinkai 
京城帝国大学創立五十周年記念誌編集委員会 (ed.), Konpeki haruka ni 紺碧遥かに (An 
inaccessible blue), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 1974. 
47 Fujita Ryōsaku, Chōsen kōkogaku kenkyū (A study on Korean archeology), Kōdō Shoten, 
Kyōto 1948. Fujita later had an important career in Japan. 
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own, specific culture (koyū no tokushu bunka 固有の特殊文化)”.48 His 
importance remains considerable—although he is controversial—as does 
Imanishi’s influence. Imanishi was part of the archaeological commission 
since 1916, and later professor at the Keijō Imperial University after 1926, 
while at the same time teaching at the Kyōto Imperial University.49 
The implementation of the Kyōto “network” must also be emphasized. It 
should further be described throughout the colonial period (and in China 
through the Beijing University) in the fields of ancient history and 
archaeology from the 1916 work led by Hamada to those of his disciple and 
later colleague Umehara Sueji 梅原末治 (1893-1983) in the 1920s and the 
1930s. What characterized the Kyōto “network” in the Korean case was a 
specific discourse that differed from the one held in Keijō. Hamada or 
Umehara, who were focussed on protohistory, compared the Korean tumuli 
(kofun 古墳) to the ones in mainland Japan and showed their similarities, 
following the idea that they constitute a continuum.50 This discourse, which 
is older and more colonialist (see above), thus reappeared amongst the Kyōto 
archaeologists around 1935. An example of this is found in the collective 
work Nihon minzoku 日本民族 (The Japanese people) published by the 
Anthropological Society in 1935, a Tōkyō publication, or in a special issue 
of the metropole journal Dolmen ドルメン around the theme “Nippon sekki 
jidai” 日本石器時代 (Japan stone-age) of June 1935, which covered a large 
part of Northeast Asia. In other words, the discourse in the metropole was 
more “colonialist” than that of researchers in Korea.51 
The publications of the University itself, in addition to that of its 
researchers, had various forms, which should be further detailed, extending 
from series of various names to investigative reports or books, and including, 
here as well, reissues of ancient documents or archives.52 As for ancient 
periods, the work of Suematsu Yasukazu 末松保和 (1904-1992), author of 
major bibliographies, emphasized interest in the period of the Three 
Kingdoms and relative neglect for the political and social history of the 
                                            
48 Ibidem, pp. 43-44. 
49 Pai H., Constructing “Korean” Origins. 
50 It has been established that the funerary urns (Yayoi era) are common to the westernmost 
part of the islands (Kyūshū) and the south of Korea, and it is possible to effect a comparison 
between the tumuli in Korea and in Japan. 
51 Umehara also noted, in the collective work by the Anthropology Society, that what could 
not have been studied in mainland Japan was studied in Korea. His article is well known for 
its criticism of the 1874 law, which forbids any systematic search of metropole kofun. 
52 More clarification is needed as to the immense census of the Kyujanggak archive in Seoul. 
The reprints were primarily concerned with this archives, but they also involved private 
collections. Prefaces on Korean history, language, and literature were added, which show the 
extent of the philological work accomplished. See Keijō Teikoku Daigaku sōritsu gojisshūnen 
kinenshi iinkai (ed.), Konpeki haruka ni, pp. 138-139. 
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following dynasties, Koryǒ 高麗 (962-1392) and Chosǒn 朝鮮 (1392-
1897).53 As it was pointed out by Japanese researchers in the 1970s,54 this 
over-focalization on antiquity had the effect, although unconscious, of 
strengthening the ideas of stagnation and dependency of the later dynasties. 
However, some historians concentrated precisely on the modern and 
contemporary periods, from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. 
Tabohashi Kiyoshi 田保橋潔 (1897-1945), a historian of international 
relations in East Asia, appointed to the University in 1924, Professor in 
1928, looked into detail at the process leading to the 1910 annexation. 
Nakamura Hidetaka 中村栄孝 (1902-1984),55 first at the historical 
commission and then at the University, specialized in the middle of the 
Chosǒn era and on Hideyoshi’s wars. Those two authors, although outdated, 
left their mark on research with erudite works. Tabohashi participated after 
March 1933 in the historical commission, and directed the sixth part of the 
History of Korea. In 1940 he published the monumental Kindai NisSen 
kankei no kenkyū 近代日鮮関係の研究 (A study of Japanese-Korean 
relations during the modern period), then in 1944 the first history, focused on 
institutions of Japanese colonization in Korea.56 Tabohashi, just as Fujita, is 
a bridge and a link to post-colonial research, as are Jacques Berque in France 
or Jean Jengers in Belgium.57 Drawing an absolute cut-off point here would 
be difficult. 
Finally, in addition to Pak Ǔn-sik (mentioned above), an overview of 
historical studies in colonial Korea of the 1920s and 1930s would be most 
incomplete without mentioning the works published by Korean historians 
which can only be mentioned here, inside or outside of colonial institutions. 
Their position was somewhat ambiguous: occasionally insiders, occasionally 
outsiders, sometimes “against” like Sin Ch’aeho 申采浩 (1880-1936) who 
died in prison in 1936, sometimes “rallied” to colonialism like Ch’oe 
Namsǒn, to name two famous examples. It seems impossible (except in the 
                                            
53 Suematsu Yasukazu 末松保和, Suematsu Yasukazu Chōsenshi chosakushū 末松保和 
朝鮮史著作集 (Selected Works by Suematsu Yasukazu on Korean history), Yoshikawa 
Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 1995-1997. 
54 Nishikawa H., “Nihon teikokushugi”. 
55 Seconded to the historical commission in 1927, Imanishi received a definite position at the 
University in 1937, and became chair of History in 1945. He got a position at Nagoya 
University in 1948. 
56 Tabohashi Kiyoshi 田保橋潔, Kindai NisSen kankei no kenkyū 近代日鮮関係の研究 
(A study of Japanese-Korean relations during the modern period), Chōsen Sōtokufu Chūsūin, 
Seoul 1940, re-edited in 1964 and in 1973; Id., Chōsen tōchishi ronkō 朝鮮統治史論稿 (On 
the history of Japanese rule in Korea), Chōsen Sōtokufu Chūsūin, Seoul 1944. 
57 Etiennes Deschamps, “La présence belge au Congo (1885-1960). Une historiographie en 
chantier”, in Olivier Dard and Daniel Lefeuvre (eds.), L’Europe face à son passé colonial, 
Riveneuve, Paris 2008.  
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case of members of the resistance like Pak) to make a clear distinction 
between a “Japanese” and a “Korean” group of researchers, even though, 
naturally, those two groups are not identical. Ch’oe Namsǒn 崔南善 (1890-
1957), one of the inevitable Korean historians of that time, wrote in response 
to colonization, and elaborated, around 1927, the idea of an immense cultural 
sphere around Korea, Pulham 불함. The case of Ch’oe is emblematic: after 
having taken part in the resistance in its broadest sense, he entered the 
historical commission in 1928, wrote in Japanese and became a professor at 
the University Kenkoku (Kenkoku Daigaku 建國大學) in Manchukuo in 
1939. In 1949, he appeared in front of the Tribunal for anti-national crimes, 
where he was acquitted. Although Ch’oe achieved some importance during 
the 1950s, Sin Ch’ae-ho, however, who explained the history of Korea by 
following a dichotomy between dependence (sadae 事大, which he also 
called sadae-juǔi 事大主義) and independence (chuch’e 主體), had much 
more impact on current Korean historiography. 
 
 
In conclusion: the history of colonization after independence 
 
Between 1905 and 1945, Japanese humanities in the colonial context in 
Japanese Korea experienced at least two “Schools” and several distinct 
periods regarding their work and the questions they addressed. This is the 
same case for protohistory and antiquity, as well as for the analysis of the 
contemporary period, in which geopolitical discourses coexisted with 
annexationist discourses—especially in the beginning of colonization. The 
difference between researchers in Korea and in mainland Japan cannot, 
however, be explained merely by the institutions present in the colony. As 
noted above, these very institutions saw both networks coexist. 
 Once Japan was defeated in World War II, its colonial empire was 
dismantled by the United States and the USSR between 1945 and 1949. 
After decolonization, the study of Korea and the study of colonization—
which were superimposed through colonial knowledges—became 
autonomous. They nonetheless retained a close relationship: it were the 
specialists of Korean history that laid the foundations of the historiography 
of Japanese colonization in Korea, supported by economic historians. 
Separate historical research on colonization was developed beginning in 
the mid 1960s, which gave rise to an inventory as early as the 1980s.58 First, 
                                            
58 Arnaud Nanta, “Le Japon face à son passé colonial”, in O. Dard and D. Lefeuvre (eds.), 
L’Europe face, pp. 129-146. See for example: Ramon Myers, “Post World War II Japanese 
Historiography of Japan’s Formal Empire”, in R.H. Myers and M.R. Peattie (eds.), The 
Japanese colonial empire,  pp. 465-477; Kobayashi Hideo 小林英夫, “Senkanki no higashi 
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the research was about Korea and Manchuria, after a novelistic literature, 
many memoirs and notes by repatriates, and of hagiographical but well-
documented reports published by the State between 1947 and 1949.59 These 
works, specifically those on Korea, can be explained by the number of 
Japanese specialists that had been trained during the colonial period. 
Although this new historiography developed against the colonial fact, it is no 
less situated in continuity with the old historiography. Moreover, as in the 
case of France towards Algeria,60 some of these first researchers started 
studying Korea because they were born there. The historian Hatada Takashi 
旗田巍 (1908-1994),61 who was the first historian to study the Japanese 
outlook on Korea, participated on this theme to the Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai 
([Japanese] Society of Korean History), founded in 1959. Since its inception, 
this society devoted a substantial place to colonization in its bulletins and 
meetings.62 
Yamabe Kentarō 山辺健太郎 (1905-1977), militant writer, published in 
1966 NikKan heigō shōshi 日韓併合小史 (A Short History of the annexation 
of Korea by Japan), followed in 1971 by Nihon tōchika no Chōsen 
日本統治下の朝鮮 (Korea under Japanese rule).63 At the same time, in 
1968, Inoue Kiyoshi 井上清, historian of the war and imperial system, 
published Nihon teikokushugi no keisei 日本帝国主義の形成 (The 
formation of Japanese imperialism), which included the colonial question. 
Twenty years later,64 the historiography of colonization already constituted a 
massive corpus. In 1984, this caused one of its historians, Kobayashi Hideo 
                                                                                                       
Ajia―Shokuminchi kenkyū o chūshin ni” 戦間期の東アジア– 植民地研究を中心に (Eastern 
Asia between the wars. Centred on studies of colonization), in Rekishigaku kenkyūkai 
歴史学研究会 (ed.), Gendai rekishigaku no seika to kadai II 現代歴史学の成果と課題 
(Questions and results in contemporary historiography II), Aoki Shoten, Tōkyō 1982, vol. III, 
pp. 99-117. 
59 On these governmental reports and sources, see: Arnaud Nanta, “Le démontage de l’empire 
colonial japonais, 1945-1949”, in Daniel Lefeuvre and Jacques Frémeaux (eds.), Le démontage 
des empires coloniaux, Riveneuve, Paris 2012, forthcoming. 
60 On the French example Claude Liauzu, “Entre mémoires et histoire: controverses sur les 
enjeux du passé colonial”, Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, n. 85, 2007, pp. 27-32. 
61 Pai Hyung-il noted the importance of Hatada in his review Constructing “Korean” Origins, 
p. 425, note 22. 
62 Publications in Japanese on the history of Korea are very numerous: the bulletin counted 
around a hundred books and a thousand scientific papers a year on Korean history during the 
1970s. 
63 Yamabe Kentarō, NikKan heigō shōshi (A short history of the annexation of Korea by 
Japan), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1966; Id., Nihon tōchika no Chōsen (Korea under Japanese 
rule), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1971. 
64 A. Nanta, “Le Japon face à son passé colonial”; Id., “Pour réintégrer le Japon au sein de 
l’histoire mondiale: histoire de la colonisation et guerres de mémoire”, Cipango, n. 15, 2008, 
pp. 35-64; Nagahara Keiji 永原慶二, Nijisseiki Nihon no rekishigaku 20世紀日本の歴史学 
(Japanese historiography in the twentieth century), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 2003. 
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小林英夫, to propose a second inventory. Large-scale syntheses would be 
created at the beginning of the 1990s.65 Historians then turned to new issues 
(colonial modernity, long-scale movement of imperialisms, imperial circulations), 
while maintaining an open debate with their Korean colleagues via a very 
active translation process between the two countries.66 
What remains today in this post-colonial historiography (in the temporal 
sense) of the Koreanist historiography of the colonial period? Certainly the 
erudite scholarly work and the bibliographical censuses that were undertaken 
at the time. Thus, even today we find, although cited critically, many of the 
authors that have been presented here. This includes Korea, where it is 
necessary to question the role of these colonial human sciences in the 
construction of Korean historiography concerning all periods.67 Perhaps, 
there may also be a link between the weight of those colonial works at the 
time, and that of the criticism of these works in modern South Korea. But 
rather than a simple “continuity” (or “rupture”) between pre-1945 and post-
1965, the recognition of this pervasiveness serves as reminder that research 
works cumulatively, and that erudite, large-scale works based on a thorough 
knowledge of primary documents survive longer than literary history, which 
gets forgotten with time.68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
65 Ōe S. (ed.), Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi, evoked between others urbanization, the culture 
of empire and industrialization. 
66 Notably, Hatada was translated into Korean in 1987, in the first issue of the journal 
Han’guk-sa simin kangjwa, already mentioned, founded by famous historian Yi Ki-baek 
李基白 (1924-2004). 
67 See for example the introduction to Moriyama Shigenori 森山茂徳, NikKan heigō 
日韓併合 (Japan’s annexation of Korea), Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, Tōkyō 1992, or L. Babicz, 
Le Japon face à la Corée. 
68 Paul Veyne, Comment on écrit l’histoire, Seuil, Paris 1971, 1996, pp. 304-307.  
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MEMORIES FROM BEYOND THE PAST. 
 GRASPING PREHISTORIC TIMES IN JAPAN: THE BIRTH AND 
EVOLUTION OF AN “ARCHAEOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS” 
(SEVENTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES)  
 
Laurent Nespoulous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first course in archaeology was created at the Imperial University of 
Kyōto in 1917. However, Japanese archaeology, and conception of times 
“before history”, came to its first scientific maturity a bit later, by the 1920-
1930s. This implies that before this point, there was no real methodological 
inscription, no real unity in a disciplinary matter of speaking. Nevertheless, 
towards the end of the nineteenth century archaeologists did exist in Japan, 
however they defined themselves as anthropologists more than archaeolo-
gists, and their methodological approaches varied greatly from one person to 
another. Those archaeologists worked on a very narrow set of epochs, which 
can be roughly chronologically summarised in studies on the imperial 
institution and the times before the imperial institution. This way of grasping 
the past was not so different than from what it came to be during the Edo 
period, from the seventeenth century on. 
We shall see that before archaeology became an admitted investigatory 
field, it was more of a reformulation in a new language—the scientific 
language—of ancient conceptions in the past. In the same way, the idea of 
“prehistory” was not yet clearly defined. In the present contribution, we would 
like to emphasize some important events in the construction and evolution of 
Japan, of the idea of times before textual memory. This travel into historical 
consciousness, which never ends, “originated” during the Edo period, and 
continued to evolve into new forms and meanings up until the present time. 
 
 
 Rediscovering ancient Japan and discovering prehistory in Edo period 
(XVII-XX century) 
 
Both “ancient Japan” and “prehistory” are, of course, terminological 
anachronisms when considering the Edo period, just as it would also be for 
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“middle age Japan” or “pre-modern Japan”.1 The point, here, is to see if one 
can perceive, in the common conception of times during Edo, other ways of 
rendering the past, including moments going back beyond the memory and 
records of mankind. 
Edo period, in its new way of thinking political legitimacy, tended to 
retrocede to the ancient Japan of Heian—jōdai 上代 literally the high 
epoch—a high value, notably as the former bearer of Chinese Confucianism 
orthodoxy. This increased importance of Confucianism in the making of the 
ideology of the Edo period’s political elite, created the conditions necessary 
for the emergence of a mind that was willing to scrutinize the distant past 
and hold the past in great esteem. The aptitude for keeping records and 
tracks of the former rulers was considered a decisive condition in order to 
guarantee the legitimacy of the regime, then in the shape of the Tokugawa 
clan’s shogunate. Altogether with the rediscovery of classical texts2 of the 
ancient capitals, this interest quickly grew into a very large and diffused 
preoccupation regarding “anything ancient”.3 
Prehistory (whatever it is called), be it in Europe or in Japan, is at first an 
apparition of elements that do not fit with known times. The “high epoch”, 
and the figure of the tennō (the so called “emperor”), became the 
chronological and cultural gradient of the beginnings of times, very likely 
the deluge in Europe. With this background, an encounter with artefacts still 
older than the oldest textual memory of ancient Japan was just a matter of 
time. This happened in 1623 with the discovery in Kamegaoka in the north 
of Honshū, of potteries which were clearly “out of this world”, irrelative to 
the historical and cultural continuum from ancient capitals of the eighth-
eleventh centuries through pre-modern times. This pottery, then called 
“pottery of Kamegaoka”,4 began what is now well known as “Jōmon 
pottery”. A hundred years later, it was the turn of the first obsidian tools to 
                                            
1 The terminological background of the chronology used nowadays in Japan is constructed 
between the beginning of Meiji era and the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
2 Kojiki 古事記 (Record of ancient matters), Nihonshoki 日本書紀 (Chronicles of Japan), 
both from the eight century, but also the Shoku nihongi 続日本紀 (Continuation of the 
Chronicles of Japan), are among the official chronicles that retain special attention to Edo’s 
scholars. On the tracks of ancient chronicles, with the will to renew ancient practices (Edo 
will be the time of a vast rehabilitation of ancient practices and rites regarding the political 
economy), a project of a new history of Japan will be launched, for the first time in centuries 
since the end of the ancient period (twelfth century), by Tokugawa Mitsukuni 徳川光圀, in 
1762: the Dai Nihonshi 大日本史 (History of Great Japan). This project in itself shows this 
renewed preoccupation concerning the past. 
3 Laurent Nespoulous, “Des Empereurs et des tombes, Une archéologie de l’archéologie 
protohistorique japonaise à l’époque d’Edo”, Ebisu, Études japonaises, n. 30, 2003, pp. 87-122. 
4 An entry in the Eiroku nikki 永祿日記 (a chronicle from the powerful governing family of 
the province of Mutsu, the Namioka-Kitabatakeshi 浪岡北畠氏, in the north of Honshū), in 
1623, is the first source clearly mentioning Kamegaoka and its pottery. 
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be identified.5 These artefacts, which were not related to anything known up 
until then, were considered valuable antiquities of the times before the tennō, 
as remains of the so-called jindai 神代 (age of gods) of ancient chronicles. 
Hence, Japan had its “antediluvian times”, and one could consider that 
“prehistory” did exist in the Edo mind6 and it was apprehended as an age of 
gods, the age before the beginnings of history, before the first “emperors” of 
early Japan (Yamato). 
During the eighteenth an nineteenth centuries, the burial mounds supposedly 
related to the ancient political elite, according to classical records, and the 
tennō were also part of this broad interest in the past. They turned out to be 
considered the oldest steps leading to the oldest times of the high epoch: 
before there was the age of gods (jindai 神代), then came the age of the 
tennō and Yamato. In the progressive recovery of legitimacy of the ancient 
culture, those tombs even became, in the last years of the 1850s and the 
1860s, the sacralised symbols of the political power itself, and remained so 
after the Meiji restoration. The work of intellectuals on pre-modern Japan 
contributed to a situation where ancient times and their concrete remains 
were associated with the imperial institution. With Meiji period, this 
cleavage between ancient times and the age of gods evolved in a Japanese 
versus pre-Japanese split. This was relayed by the modern intellectual class, 
using the same logic, but with the brand new terminology of the time: the 
terminology of nation-state building.  
 
 
Pre-scientific archaeology in the modern period: Japanese, pre-Japanese 
and proto-Japanese, all based on pottery 
 
During the Edo period, pottery constituted a key element in the opening of 
the gates to the times before recorded history. It remained so, with an 
increased complexity of its interpretation with the rise of the Japanese 
nation-state during the Meiji era (1868-1912). 
                                            
5 Referred to as jindai seki 神代石 (stones from the age of gods) or raifu 雷斧 (likely, in 
Europe, the “thunderstone axe”, “pierre de foudre”; literally in Japanese “lightning stone 
axe”). Actually, first references to lithic artefacts, raifu, are from 1686 and the Kokon 
hyakumonogatari hyōban 古今百物語評判 (a collection of ghost stories in 4 volumes). 
However, it is in the 1773 writings of Kinouchi Sekitei 木内石亭 (1725-1808), in his 
Unkonshi 雲根志 (a collection, in 3 volumes, of various antiquities ranging very wildly 
chronologically, published between 1773 and 1801), that one can perceive the first main 
classification attempt (prior attempts existed nonetheless from the middle of the eighteenth 
century). 
6 Prehistory holds nowadays in Europe quite a strict disciplinary inscription, but it was not so 
for a long period (until late nineteenth century), when “antediluvian times” or “antediluvian 
antiquities” were used prior to, then, time passing, equally to “prehistory”. 
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With Meiji, Edo scholars changed their language and became anthropo-
logists and historians. European scholars, mastering excavation techniques 
of the time, were responsible for the first “archaeological campaigns” in 
Japan. However, measuring their real impact is not as easy as the Japanese 
post-war archaeology claimed it to be.7 From the Edo period scholars to 
modern human sciences, the change was, at first, more a matter of language, 
terminological reformulation rather than method, and the approach regarding 
the past remained the same: pottery was a vector to distant times, times 
before the tennō, thus times before the Japanese. The difference between 
Edo and Meiji is rather epistemological than structural, and actually relied 
on the same kind of cleavage. However, observation techniques did change 
and therefore allowed for an understanding of the concept of layers of time 
“before history”. On the contrary and in the meantime, sacralisation and 
institutionalisation of the new imperial figure tended to fossilize what was 
possibly debatable and questioned during Edo: the times nearing the 
formation of the imperial institution in ancient times.8 Consequently, what is 
now defined as the burial mounds of the end of protohistory, the kofun, 
became almost unreachable for the scholars of Meiji. This continues until the 
end of the Pacific War, as they were supposed to be the tombs of the early 
beginnings of ancient Japan history.9 The only field of study in which it was 
possible to deploy an archaeological reflexion in Japan became the times 
neatly before history. This was the case because they were before the 
imperial institution and before the Japanese, hence not subversive in regards 
to the reformulation in modern terms of the ancient chronology. This ancient 
chronology, claiming an uninterrupted imperial dynasty from 660 B.C. 
through present time, will be the official chronology of the history of Japan 
and the Japanese until, here again, the end of the Pacific War. In this context, 
let us say that prehistory, the history of times well before the existence of 
Japan, was kind of a “safe” area in order to freely deploy an analytic and 
discursive approach of the past. Which leads us, as an example, to the role of 
the pottery in that matter. 
Since 1622, the Japanese were progressively more aware of the existence 
of a “pre-human culture” (related to the “age of gods”), which, in Meiji, will 
get the meaning of “pre-Japanese” culture in the new scientific language. 
                                            
7 The excavation on the shell mound of Ōmori, near Yokohama, held by the American 
naturalist Edward Sylvester Morse in 1877, is often presented by Japanese archaeologists of 
the post war era as the first real archaeological excavation of Japan. However, it is difficult to 
track down the real influence of this event on the formation of Japanese archaeology, a 
formation that tends to follow its own pace through the 1930s. 
8 L. Nespoulous, “Des Empereurs et des tombes”. 
9 Laurent Nespoulous, “Mémoire, symbole, tradition et archéologie impériale. Évolution de 
l’archéologie des tertres protohistoriques, de la Restauration impériale à la fin des années 
1930”, Ebisu, Études japonaises, n. 32, 2004, pp. 3-24. 
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This was mainly due to the pottery of Kamegaoka. In 1877, the United 
States’ citizen Edward Morse conducted excavations at the shell mound of 
Ōmori, near Yokohama, and found, among other things, a pottery that he 
called “cord-marked pottery”. This will be literally translated into Japanese 
and become Jōmon 縄文, in place of the appellation of Kamegaoka pottery. 
The first real archaeological campaign conducted by Japanese scholars does 
not start before the 1880s.10 
So, let’s say that the first “archaeological culture” of Japan, in its 
historiography, is represented by the Jōmon pottery, and is considered to be 
the culture of former inhabitants of the archipelago before the rise of Japan 
and the Japanese. This is why anthropologists in the north will link it to what 
was left of the ainu culture. A “poor” material culture—compared back then 
to the ancient culture of the capitals—of times before history, of the former 
inhabitants of Japan, linked to the very poor situation of the ainu of 
Hokkaidō in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Japanese anthropology had its “inner alterity” to study, in history as well as 
in actuality, in the shape of the Jōmon and ainu, apprehended in an 
evolutionary way of thinking cultural decadence.11 
The situation became more complex when other pottery was found in the 
quarter of Yayoi, in Tōkyō, in 1884. It was then interpreted as a sort of 
Jōmon pottery, but in 1896, further analysis of these artefacts revealed that 
they belonged to a “higher level” of production technology, thus a different 
culture than the Jōmon culture. This is how the Yayoi pottery quickly 
became the Yayoi pottery culture12 between “prehistory” and “history”. As a 
more technologically advanced culture, Yayoi will be qualified as the 
furnace of the Japanese people and culture, and will be apprehended as a 
“proto-Japanese” level, very different from the pre-Japanese/non-Japanese 
level of a “backward Jōmon culture”.13 As a matter of discourse back then, 
Japanese people had their ancestor anchored to a higher level of culture than 
                                            
10 However, actual field investigations did exist before, without any disciplinary inscription. 
The most famous (and the closest to an archaeological excavation) example is the attempt to 
determine the name of the first ancient governor of Nasu province, leading to serious 
investigations on the burial mounds of Kurumazuka (in the hope of the discovery of a 
funerary tablet) in Mito, and ordered by Tokugawa Mitsukuni in 1692. 
11 It will be necessary to wait for the 1980s for the Jōmon period to get a more flatterous 
image. With the discovery of settlement sites in the north, speaking in favour of higher degree 
of complexity, and not the “poor and primitive culture” it was long considered to be in the 
first half of the twentieth century. 
12 Makita Sōjirō 蒔田鎗次郎, “Yayoishiki doki hakken ni tsuite kaizuka doki ni nite usude no 
mono” 弥生式土器発見ニ付テ貝塚土器ニ似テ薄手ノモノ (Thin objects similar to shell 
mound earthenware in the discovery of Yayoi-style earthenware), Tōkyō jinrui gakkai zasshi 
東京人類学會雑誌 (Tōkyō Anthropological Society Journal), vol. 11, n. 122, 1896. 
13 Arnaud Nanta, “Koropokrus, Aïnous, Japonais, Aux Origines du peuplement de l’archipel”, 
Ebisu, Études japonaises, n. 30, 2003, pp. 123-154. 
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the supposed ancestors of the barbarians of the north, the ainu people, 
descending from the Jōmon culture. 
This is how archaeology proceeds in Japan until the 1920s; having no 
investigation protocol, no real method of analysis compared to what it was 
about to become, and constituting a convenient way to grab extremely old 
data and constructing a sort of theoretical discourse formulated in a scientific 
language, but not based on grounds other than those of the academic 
authority of the scholars. This is going to “quickly change” with the 
foundation of the first School of Archaeology at Kyōto Imperial University, 
in 1917.14 
 
 
Birth of Japanese archaeology: the sound of silence 
 
The School of Formation in Archaeology emerged as a new exigency, urging 
for a methodological inscription in order to give archaeology its scientific 
status. It is done with the introduction of the typo-chronological approach in 
the early 1920s. Archaeology then became what it tended to be in Europe: a 
way to grasp distant times and to give them back their chronological 
perspective on scientific grounds. Archaeology, basically, is a science of 
observation which tends to construct chronologies based on the analysis of 
evolutionary characters of archaeological artefacts. This is how archaeology 
as a discipline started out in Europe, and how it equally began in Japan. This 
implies mastering some of the classification tools that were not so familiar to 
the theorists of Meiji. 
With the use of the typo-chronological approach, Japanese scholars were 
able to build the chronology of Japanese prehistory and protohistory. The 
problem then, is that an official chronology, which can not be publicly 
criticised nor changed too harshly by scholars, already exists. It touches the 
integrity of the imperial figure, which is sacralised. The main chronological 
frame must remain untouched, and all attempts to revise it may fall under 
anti “lese-majesty” measures. Ironically, escaping from this yoke heads 
towards the newly acquired colonial field of Korea. Umehara Sueji, one of 
the main figures at the Imperial University of Kyōto in the 1930s, returning 
from a period of survey (the 1920s) on the peninsula, expressed this reality. 
He mentions that Korea, not submitting to the same regulation enforced in 
the archipelago, allows excavations on burial mounds, something that would 
not be tolerated, for ideological reasons, on the kofun of mainland Japan. The 
proximity of Korea (there are actual kofun in the south parts of the 
                                            
14 Many social and human sciences, such as sociology, reach their maturity nearly at the same 
period. Hamada Kōsaku is at the origin of the School of Archaeology of Kyōto, and will 
pioneer the typo-chronological method in Japan and on colonial fields such as Korea. 
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peninsula), from an archaeological point of view, tended to stimulate the 
curiosity of Japanese archaeologists.15 
So, the new maturity of inland Japanese archaeology encouraged it to 
remain silent on the very matter it specialised on: the chronology surrounding 
the state formation during ancient times and the chronology of times 
surrounding the rise of the sacred figure of the tennō. The official chronology 
being based on classical texts, its scientific validity concerning the oldest steps 
of Japanese history is rather reduced, except when looking for the invention of 
tradition. This ideological background of Japan implies that archaeologists 
may be at work, and in fact, they are, but they won’t be able to talk so much 
about their results until a change of regime, a change that will take place after 
1945 and the defeat of imperial Japan. 
 
 
Post-imperial Japan and the choices of archaeology 
 
Before the 1920s, archaeology in mainland Japan was a convenient way to 
build theories on the alterity or on the origins of the elite. We often 
designated this background as “imperial”, but “monarchist” would fit it best, 
as imperialism is actually another side of the regime in itself: an imperialist 
monarchy. As it remained discreet, archaeology and anthropology (closely 
entangled from the very beginning of Meiji) never really constituted a 
menace to the monarchist historical orthodoxy. In fact, in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century (before its disciplinary maturity), it tended 
to help when it came to emphasizing the common “origins” between 
Koreans and Japanese.16 After the 1920s, it became impossible, from a 
scientific point of view, to demonstrate the validity of the official, “tennō-
centred” position on the origins of Japan and its chronology, and so, the 
archaeologists were confined in the theoretical role which existed before, or 
worked in silence waiting for better times to come. 
                                            
15 In the 1920s and 1930s, for the archaeologists of the Kyōto University, Korea was an 
extension of mainland Japan, but freed from the blocking characters of the imperial paradigm. 
As such, one can note that Korea is not a “colonial archaeological field” as it is actually the 
place where Japanese archaeology can be itself. Umehara Sueji 梅原末治, “Jōdai kofun no 
kenkyū ni tsuite” 上代古墳の研究に就いて (On the ancient burial mounds [kofun] of the 
ancient time), in Tōkyō Jinrui gakkai 東京人類學會, Nihon minzoku 日本民族 (The 
Japanese People), Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō 1935. 
16 See Oguma Eiji 小熊英二, Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen. “Nihonjin” no jigazō no 
keifu 単一民族神話の起源 ‒日本人の自画像の系譜 (Origins of the myth of an homogeneous 
people. A genealogy of Japanese self-image), Shin’yōsha, Tōkyō 1995. 
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After the war, the official chronology will remain intact, but will no 
longer be imposed on scholars. And as soon as the 1950s, archaeologists 
published the first works on protohistory on the grounds of solid data. 
The Kofun period does not claim to be considered strictly as a part of 
imperial history, but as part of protohistory. The Yayoi period, long before 
the formation of the ancient Japan, is considered the matrix of Japanese 
culture, defined not by the existence of the tennō, but by the rise of rice 
growing. Archaeology, by setting new chronology, provided really new 
perspectives of the origins of Japan and the Japanese, very different than 
what had been claimed under the imperial paradigm. 
Before the war, there was very little place to deploy a scientific discourse 
on the origins of the Japanese as a people. The people, “subject” of a 
sovereign, did not really matter in terms of cultural identity in the pre-war 
paradigm. After the war, Japan will follow new tracks in the narration of 
identity. Archaeology will also be caught up in this new nation building, and 
will participate in the process of giving a new self-identity to the people, in 
which the tennō does not play the central role anymore. In this new 
narrative, archaeology proves very efficient: with very concrete evidence, it 
disrupts the official chronology and gives a past to the Japanese as a people. 
Archaeology becomes an efficient provider of “Japanese insularity”, in 
absence of the figure of the tennō or other elites. Archaeology, in post-war 
Japan, specialised in societies’ material culture. The role of protohistory is 
thus very important, as the idea of Yayoi being the real matrix of Japan, 
before the imperial construction of ancient times becomes a mainstream 
idea. 
The claim could be summarized this way: there is a history of the people 
before the state formation of the ancient times, ancient times which are too 
related to the imperial institution. Up until the 1980s, all the works of 
Japanese archaeology can be schematized this way. 
Based on a now very important amount of data collected during decades 
in the long forbidden burial mounds of old, the next step is, by the end of the 
1970s,17 the emergence of new discourses aiming at the origin of political 
power, then, by the end of the 1980s,18 the state itself. Then, while post war 
archaeology emphasized the existence of a history before the tennō, now it 
began to claim that there was also a political history before the tennō, and 
even an untold state history before the emergence of the tennō. These times 
are the times that we are living in now: archaeology that investigates the 
origin of state formation long before the emergence of the ancient imperial 
                                            
17 In this respect, see the works of Kondō Yoshirō 近藤義郎 (1925-2009). 
18 Ōsaka University released some decisive contributions towards the shaping of this 
discourse, through the works of the founder of its Laboratory of Archaeology, Tsude Hiroshi 
都出比呂志 (1942), from the end of the 1980s until now. 
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system. In a way, we could say that after helping to construct the Japanese 
nation’s identity, it tends to dilute the importance of antiquity and its system 
among a broader political and social history of the archipelago. The 
emergence of a broad chrono-cultural field of archaeological investigation 
(protohistory, ancient Japan, medieval and Edo period’s archaeology) in the 
decades following the war embodies this conversion to an insular/national 
narration of the past. 
Another important step is the return of real “prehistory” at about the same 
time in the 1980s: protohistory involved nation building and deconstruction 
of the imperial state, for its proximity with historical times. But for a long 
time, prehistory kept its image as a discipline essentially considering either 
the first humans of the archipelago, or the societies of the Jōmon period. The 
increased field activity of the archaeologists and the enormous amount of 
data concerning these times before the rice growing eventually provided a 
new image of “respectability” to, for example, Jōmon, which became part of 
the narration of Japanese origins, Japanese then considered as a mixed 
“product” of Jōmon and Yayoi.19 
What is very clear is that if the paradigm before the war was imperial and 
sterilizing for archaeologists, after the war, the paradigm became “the 
nation” and its origins, then state formation and its origins, and 
archaeologists were heavily supportive and active in facing on these 
challenges. 
 
 
Japanese archaeology of the twenty-first century 
 
Since the year 2000, it is difficult to know exactly where archaeology is 
heading, both because we still lack sufficient distance, historically speaking, 
to have a grasp on its present trajectories and because recent major 
institutional changes will probably alter its shape in ways in which we can 
only try to predict. From Meiji through the end of the twentieth century, 
Japanese politics used to be of a very strong centralistic nature, culture was 
not an exception. Whether constructing an imperial model in the first half of 
the last century, or a more national-insular model after the war, the role of 
                                            
19 On deeper layers of time concerning a human presence in the archipelago, the chase of 
“super-homo erectus”, conducing on and on extravagant discoveries (that nevertheless made it 
into school books, illustrating the deep hunger from the “collective mind” in grasping—even 
too—deeply with the insular past), ending in the unveiling, in 2000, of a multi decades fraud 
from the archaeologist Fujimura Shin’ichi 藤村新一, brought a great deal of discredit to 
paleolithic studies as a whole, even though it does not—and did not—lack many very high 
quality researchers and achievements. 
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the state was a central one in the act of redistributing chosen cultural 
characteristics throughout the whole country. Very early, just like in France, 
there were strict regulations on the cultural patrimony, culminating in 1950 
with the Cultural Properties Protection Law. Consequently, with the cultural 
matter tending to become more and more connected to the people, a higher 
degree of institutionalization in the matter of excavating, and the 
presentation of archaeological research results to the public was achieved by 
and under strict direction of the Cultural Agency. At the very beginning of 
the twenty-first century, changes in governance paradigm planned a 
reduction in the scale of the Japanese state and started a vast decentralization 
program of, until then, numerous state prerogatives. Among them was the 
management of cultural patrimony. Cultural politics always had a firm 
regional basis in the past, but depended on the directives of the Cultural 
Agency. By the end of the 1990s and the onset of 2000s, this regional 
anchorage tended to have more and more “autonomy”. This meant that the 
regional cultural related institutions now had to fund themselves, and that the 
regional authority gained vast power of decision on the cultural matter (not 
only education but also protection of cultural properties). The Cultural 
Agency’s role evolved into a more “consulting” one, losing power in cultural 
protection enforcement. Hence, let us say that archaeology and its visibility 
seems to be characterized now by a change in scale: from the nation to the 
region, following new restrictions in its institutional organisation due to the 
desertion of the state from cultural politics. What about the foreseeable 
consequences? This is really not an easy matter to stretch.  
First, the financial burden of cultural politics that was transferred to the 
regional, departmental scale will probably create unbalanced relations 
between regions of different wealth. The “retirement” of the state from part 
of its redistribution role will have, does have, an impact on how a locality is 
able to protect and how it can take advantage of its cultural patrimony. 
Second, Japan is a country of strong and ancient regionalism, which 
disparity—“freed” from a unifying discourse—may very well go further now 
on. Of course, beyond—and before—economics, these differences have 
implications in identity building. For now, there is still a strong inertia in the 
trajectory of the collective mind. People who deal with regional identity and 
the new regionalized functioning of the country were raised in the pre-2000s 
context. The potential issue relies on the way that the upcoming generations 
will grasp their cultural identity, in a context where the scale will be more 
and more regional and narrower. Tuning down the national scale, tuning up 
regional/local scale, is a phenomenon strongly related to the present 
globalization which tends to connect many places in the world, but in the 
meantime tends to isolate them as well as the fact that the global framework 
is not in itself as protective as the classical national entity. However, in the 
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case of Japan, regarding identity, regionalization has a particularity we can’t 
find in western continental Europe: the nation building “software” is still 
very active, except it tends to re-localize in the regional frame. Kyūshū is the 
land of Yayoi, the north-east of Japan is the land of Jōmon: resurrection of 
the past in discourses on the origins of the Japanese are getting more and 
more related to preoccupations on regional origins and heritages, and are no 
longer automatically the grounds for constructing an insular identity at large, 
but rather a mosaic. 
 
 
Final words 
 
It is an understatement that there is no great coherence within a panorama 
spanning from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century. However, it does 
allow us to grasp how the relationship between times before history emerged 
then evolved. 
The Edo period was a time of diffused curiosity among intellectuals 
towards the past, mainly for philosophical reasons. It permitted the past to be 
“present” in the discourses, as well as making it possible to grasp the idea of 
times before written records. The figure of the tennō greatly benefited from 
this new intellectual frame as it became one of the elements “unearthed” by 
the Edo mind. Together with very ancient artefacts, it renewed the start of 
the history of Japan, which also enabled the grasping of times before this 
history; pre-tennō and tennō times, held for prehistory and history.  
With Meiji era and the construction of a monarchy based on—and dearly 
protecting—this cleavage, came the project of a national unification 
(conscription, education, language). In the construction of “the Japanese”, 
archaeology and anthropology made a link between pre-tennō/tennō and a 
pre-Japanese/Japanese cleavage. The national construction of Japan, at first, 
was not necessarily of the imperialist nature and insisted on the centrality of 
the tennō as the main reference for grasping time and Japan. With the 
success of Japan in the first wars against foreign powers (China in 1894-
1895, Russia in 1904-1905) and the upcoming colonial expansion, identity 
tends to be formulated, for half a century, according to an imperial paradigm. 
This identity englobed the whole empire and was defined by the subjection 
to the tennō. In this paradigm, archaeology in itself had a very weak 
influence on identity, literally speaking. Of greater importance, was its 
ability to “validate” the legendary nature of the most ancient part of the 
chronology.  
The year 1945 marks a radical shift in the narration of History, as the 
matter of origins of Japan and the Japanese became central. Western Europe 
and Japan were both involved in the construction of a new identity 
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framework. However, where in western Europe France and Germany tended 
to the deconstruction of national rhetoric and national identity, Japan, on the 
contrary, aimed at a the construction of a national narrative. Clashes of 
nationalism of all kinds led Europe to its ruin over more than half a century; 
imperialist monarchy led Japan to its ruin. In Japan, constructing a new 
model based on the people and not on the monarchy and its symbolic 
framework, then setting this new national identity strictly inside the limits of 
insularity after losing the empire, was probably a “logical” way of “embracing 
defeat”, hence the birth and the success of a “national archaeology” in Japan. 
Concerning “origins” of both Japanese culture and people, national 
archaeology gave the collective mind greater perspective on itself, deeper 
and broader “roots” in time and nature than those of the tennō’s legend and 
origins. The same applied to the birth of political power when setting it way 
before classical Japan. 
Did the evolution begin from the rise of a monarchy and the setting of an 
empire, then to the construction of an insular nation and, finally, to the 
generation of regional identities? Archaeology plays the score of its context. 
For half a century it brought to the public the coordinates in time and space it 
demanded. Will the lack of a strong conductor at a national level lead to a 
more fragmented identity in Japan? This is not yet history, and there stops 
the panorama. 
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Premise 
 
The 2011-2012 biennium is particularly relevant with regards to the historical 
memory of China: we commemorate the centenary of the Revolution of 
1911—which put an end to the Qing Dynasty and the existence of the ancient 
Chinese imperial system—and the birth of the Republic of China, the fruit of 
the revolutionary process but also of those elements of randomness that often 
recur throughout  the history of mankind. 
At the time this present work takes form and definition (late 2011), many 
international conferences, debates and discussions have already been held in 
China, but others are planned for 2012. Among those already organized, we 
should remember those held in October (the month in which the anti-
Manchu revolution broke out) in the city of Wuhan (where the fire of the 
revolution originated) and Nanjing (where the first provisional republican 
government was located before the capital of the new republic was moved to 
Beijing, in the north). 
The conferences and debates over the 1911-1912 centenary occur in a 
general context characterized by a steady growth of Chinese historiography. 
This reflects a process that took shape in the 1980s and that over the past two 
decades has seen enormous progress, even though certain themes and areas 
of research still remain insufficiently developed. 
This contribution proposes, in the first part, to highlight certain recent 
trends in historiographical thinking in China on the periodization of Chinese 
history and, in the second part, to more specifically shine light on the new 
analyses that emerged during the recent debate on the Revolution of 1911 
and on the birth of the Republic of China.1 
                                           
1 For a general, important overview on Chinese history and historiography (and more broadly 
on Asia), see the section “Themes in Asian History” in Ainslie T. Embree and Carol Gluck 
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Modern history, contemporary history, republican history:  
some general considerations 
 
In Chinese historiography, the periodization of national history tends to 
identify a “modern” period, which marks the division between the “ancient” 
that precedes it and the “contemporary” period that follows it. Ancient 
history is defined as a discipline that studies the period of feudal society and 
the one prior to that (and therefore, according to the Marxist approach, the 
primitive and slaver phases of society). The modern period covers semi-
colonial and semi-feudal society (1840-1949) and lastly, contemporary 
history is decidedly interwoven with the phase of socialism and marked by 
the foundation and development of the People’s Republic of China (1949 to 
date). So, the beginning of modern history in China takes place towards the 
mid-nineteenth century, in close correlation with the beginning of Western 
penetration (especially English) marked by the first Opium War. Within the 
“modern” period we place the  “Republican” phase, which covers the period 
from 1912, the year of birth of the Republic of China, to 1949, the year of 
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China 
In recent years, the question of the relationship and the “border line” 
between modern and contemporary history has been one of the main focuses 
of historiographical debate in China. A broad convergence on two aspects 
has emerged: the first, that the modern period is essentially confined, albeit 
with its own stages and phases, within the historical framework represented 
by the experience of  semi-feudal and semi-colonial society; the second, that 
the year 1949—and thus the birth of the People’s Republic of China and the 
initiation of the socialist experience—is the key moment in the passage from 
the modern phase to the contemporary, effectively focusing on elements of 
discontinuity, strongly present, and marginalising those—undeniable—of 
continuity between pre-1949 and post 1949.2  
In the numerous papers published in leading Chinese academic and 
historical journals, and in the course of many organised national and 
international conferences, another of the main issues raised and debated was 
over of how much weight to attribute to the revolutionary process and how 
much to the modernization trends within the period 1840-1949. Emphasis on 
the first argument has been challenged in part in recent decades, asserting a 
need to address the “paradigm of modernisation” in a new way; in some 
                                                                                                   
(eds.), Asia in Western and World History. A Guide for Teaching, M.E. Sharpe, New York 
1997, and in particular contributions by Madeleine Zelin, “Themes in Chinese History”, 
pp. 690-709 and Cho-yun Hsu, “Some misconceptions about Chinese history”, pp. 718-722. 
In Italian language, see Laura De Giorgi and Guido Samarani, La Cina e la storia. Dal tardo 
impero ad oggi, Carocci, Roma 2005.  
2 See the symposium organized in 2007 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in 
www.cish.org (hereafter CASS 2007). 
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cases there have even been proposals to substitute the “revolution paradigm” 
with that of “modernisation”. Although these latest views appear to be on the 
fringe, there is no doubt that the notion is firmly established in the Chinese 
historiographical concept (or at least a major part of it) according to the way 
in which the process of modernisation may have, to some extent, accounted 
for actual trends within the semi-feudal and semi-colonial period as well.  
In his turn, Wang Hui, a brilliant exponent of the anti-conformist Chinese 
intelligentsia, highlighted how the socialist experience in China under Mao 
Zedong can, at the same time, be defined as “an ideology of modernization 
and a critique of Euro-American capitalist modernization”. In his view, 
however, such an ideology is rooted in the history of the development of 
modern Chinese thought since the eighteenth-nineteenth century: i.e. that it 
was “more specifically due to the fact that the discourse on the Chinese 
driven towards modernity was born in the historical context of the 
imperialist expansion”. Therefore, “those intellectuals and State officials 
who promoted the modernisation of China had to necessarily think about 
how it was possible for Chinese modernisation to avoid the multiple abuses 
that characterised Western capitalist modernity”.3 
The position of Chinese historians in general (even if it is not without its 
internal differentiations) seems very clear regarding the importance of 1949 
as the watershed between “modernity” and “contemporaneity”. It particularly 
emphasises the specificity of the history of China from 1949 onwards, 
marked by the novelty of the building of socialism and the people’s 
democratic dictatorship. It also highlights how historical materialism, which, 
since 1949, became the compass of historiographical work, has to continue 
to guide historical studies in China in the future as well, even if then, there 
appears to be common and widespread awareness that the initiation and 
development of the process of reform in the last thirty years has brought 
about a strong ideological diversification in the country. 
As it is well known, similar approaches are primarily the result of a 
narrative that has been developing in Chinese Marxist historiography 
following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China: a narrative 
that has set the year 1949 as the dividing line between before and after (pre-
liberation and post-liberation). 
In the West, and particularly in the United States, where historians have 
long played a dominant role in the analysis of modern and contemporary 
Chinese history, the idea of 1949 as a more or less rigid dividing line has 
raised concerns and criticism, but also agreement, even if for reasons very 
different from those expressed by Chinese Marxist historiography. 
                                           
3 See Wang Hui, Il nuovo ordine cinese. Società, politica ed economia in transizione, 
Manifestolibri, Roma 2006, in particular p. 243.  
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From the outset of the Cold War, many American scholars, for example, 
were impelled to view the “rupture” of 1949 as a clear moment of separation 
between the “communist world” and the “free world”. Over the last few 
decades, however, there has been increasing tendency to leave behind such a 
strongly dichotomous vision of the development process of China’s twentieth 
century history.4 
In recent years, Zhang Haipeng, one of the most authoritative Chinese 
historians, whose opinion is largely—although not unanimously—shared, 
has edited a monumental history of modern China in 10 volumes offering, 
broken down by volume, an articulation of the history of modern China as 
follows (the first volume is introductory):5  
1)  1840-1864: The Beginnings of Modern China  
2)  1864-1895: Early Attempts of Modernization 
3)  1895-1900: The 100 Days Reforms and the Boxer Uprising  
4)  1901-1912: The Establishment of the Constitution and the 1911 
Revolution 
5)  1912-1923: The Establishment of the Republic 
6)  1924-1927: The First United Front and Nationalist Revolution 
7)  1927-1937: The Civil War and National Crisis 
8)  1937-1945: The War of Resistance against Japan 
9)  1945-1949: The Battle for the Fate of China 
 
According to Zhang Haipeng, the classic identification of the May Fourth 
Movement in 1919 as a watershed between modern and contemporary 
history no longer makes sense, in that “it does not correspond to a periodization 
based on social and economic formations as principle of distinguishing 
historical stages”.6  
In other words, the May Fourth Movement breaks a single period that is 
constituted by the Chinese semi-feudal and semi-colonial phase and 
therefore contemporary history begins only with the end of that period and 
with the beginning of a completely new phase marked by the birth of 
socialist China. 
If we look more specifically at the history of the People’s Republic of 
China, in the opinion of Zhang Xingxing—from the Institute of Contemporary 
China Studies at CASS—in the past, its specific and autonomous role has been 
                                           
4 See in particular Paul A. Cohen, China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese 
Past, Routledge-Curzon, New York and London 2003; see also Arif Dirlik, “The 
historiography of colonial modernity. Chinese history between Eurocentric hegemony and 
nationalism”, Journal of Chinese Modern History, vol. 1, n. 1, August 2007, pp. 97-115. 
5 See Zhang Haipeng (ed.), Jindai Zhongguo tongshi (A comprehensive history of modern 
China), Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, Nanjing 2006-, 10 vols.   
6 See the lecture by Prof. Zhang on “Contemporary Historiography in China” at the 
International Symposium on The Present and Future of Chinese Historiography, held in 
Beijing in September 2007, in CASS 2007. 
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largely neglected, being generally considered as “part of the modern history of 
China or part of the history of the Chinese Communist Party”.7 This situation, 
Zhang underlines, means that the history of the PRC has been long absent “in 
the national catalogue of disciplines and majors of postgraduate training”.8 
On the level of periodization of the history of the PRC, essentially three 
proposals have emerged from the historiographical debate in recent years:9  
a) division into four phases, which rest substantially on what is indicated 
in the Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the Sixth Plenary 
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
(June 1981):10 1949-1956 (the period of largely accomplishing socialist 
transformation); 1956-1966 (the period of starting to build a socialist society 
in an all-round way); 1966-1976 (the Cultural Revolution); 1976-on;  
b) division into three periods: 1949-1956 (the transition from New 
Democracy to socialism); 1957-1978 (the tortuous path of exploring the way 
to build the socialist society); 1987-on (the New Period of constructing 
socialist modernization); 
c) division into two periods: 1949-1978 (the establishment of socialist 
system in China and the exploration of the way to build a socialist society); 
1978-on (the New Period of building a socialist society with Chinese 
characteristics). 
According to another of the most respected Chinese scholars, Yu Heping 
(also from the Institute of Modern History at CASS),11 one of the most 
important changes that has occurred in recent years has been the broadening 
of historiographical analysis from an approach heavily based on “political 
history” to one of historiographical specialisation, on the heavy enrichment 
of themes and issues, on the emergence of areas of study such as social 
history, intellectual history, the history of scientific and technological 
development, etc., that were hitherto largely nonexistent. In fact, recalls Yu, 
in the past one also discussed and wrote about “non-political” themes 
(economic history, cultural, etc.), however, these issues were always 
considered secondary and marginal: “They were merely regarded as minor 
issues that were dependant on political developments, or were simply 
introduced as ornaments”.12 
                                           
7 See Zhang Xingxing’s lecture on “Current Status of the PRC History Studies”, in CASS 
2007. 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Ibidem. 
10 See http://marxist.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history. See also “Remarks on Successive 
Drafts of the ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the founding 
of the People’s Republic of China’”, in http://english.peopledaily.com.cn.  
11 See Yu Heping, “Innovations of modern Chinese history studies since reform and opening-
up”, Journal of Modern Chinese History, vol. 3, n. 1, June 2009, pp. 95-100. 
12  Ibidem, p. 103. 
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Further, the past emphasis on political history was based on the centrality 
that had assumed the so-called “tides and incidents history”.13 Yu Heping 
underscores that it often led to the production of a reading of history 
excessively centred on a few “periods” and “key incidents”, while now 
“historians not only conduct research on the key incidents themselves during 
the period, but also research the political, economic, social, and cultural 
situations in general during the time of the incidents”.14 
Finally, in regard to “Republican history”, it took off in China in the late 
1970s and early 1980s: in particular, in 1978 the Department of  Republican 
Chinese History in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was established, 
heir of the Republican Chinese History Research Group created in 1972, 
which is generally considered the first official research unit in China 
specialising on the period. According to Wang Chaoguang, from the Institute 
of Modern History at CASS,15 there are two main periods dividing the study 
of the republican history of China: a) the period of  the Beijing Government; 
b) the period of the Nanjing Government, the second becoming the focus of 
research in recent years. Despite such important advances, there are still—in 
Wang’s opinion—some glaring deficiencies: amongst these, “the era of the 
Beijing Government, the parliamentary system, the occupied areas”, 
moreover, “research on the republican period is generally restricted to the 
activities of the ruling class”.16 
 
 
A hundred years later: historiographical notes on the recent debate  
on the 1911 Revolution  
 
The 1911 Revolution represents one of the “three high tides” in the modern 
history of China, along with the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Rebellion. 
In the following pages I will try to offer a summary of considerations 
concerning recent historiographic trends emerging in China, with particular 
reference to the debate that has developed on the occasion of the centenary 
of the 1911 Revolution, on the revolutionary process and its links with the 
late Qing period and the birth of the Republic in 1912.   
                                           
13 For instance, “high tides” like those represented by the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer 
Rebellion, and “incidents” like the Opium War, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the 
Hundred Days Reform of 1898, etc. 
14 See Yu H., “Innovations of modern Chinese history”, p. 102. 
15 See Wang Chaoguang’s lecture on “The research on Republican Chinese history in recent 
years”, in CASS 2007 and his article on “Recent research on Chinese republican history”, 
Journal of Modern Chinese History, vol. 2, n. 1, June 2008, pp. 89-100. 
16 Ibidem, p. 97. 
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A few years ago, reflecting on the historical significance of the 1911 
Revolution, Peter Zarrow observed17 that Chinese Marxist Historiography 
traditionally regarded the 1911 Revolution as “a bourgeois phase of rebellion 
against a backward and feudal monarchical despotism”. With the initiation 
of the process of reform towards the end of the 1970s, and in particular since 
the early 1990s, such a narrative, however, has been largely disputed and 
revised, also following the maturation of new socio-political conditions in 
Taiwan.18 In this regard Zarrow observes:  
 
A number of Chinese historians have even suggested that the revolution may 
have been a mistake from the beginning: if the new social forces of the period 
had not yet matured enough to carry through a revolution, then the revolution 
was premature and therefore a mistake. 
 
And again: “Even more controversially, it is now claimed that the Qing’s 
own reform efforts were bearing fruit and would have eventually modernized 
the nation”.19 
Today, we can assert that many of the trends brought to light by Peter 
Zarrow appear to have been developed and articulated in an even broader 
manner, touching on many cases, issues and problems previously neglected 
or little considered. 
In a series of recent publications,20 Zhang Xianwen—one of the most 
respected scholars on the history of Republican China and Director of the 
eponymous research centre at Nanjing University—has highlighted some 
key issues to a deeper understanding of the historical importance of the 1911 
Revolution.  
In the first place,21 the Revolution of 1911 laid the foundation for the 
construction of  “a modern independent State, free, democratic, united and 
prosperous”; which was considered a “national and democratic revolution”, 
which successively paved the way for a period marked by the “social 
revolution” and the “struggle between new and old, progress and 
conservatism”. According to Zhang, “the Revolution of 1911 was fully 
successful, having reached its two principal objectives: to overthrow the 
Qing Dynasty and the dominant despotism, and build a democratic, 
republican system”.22 
                                           
17 See Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution 1895-1949, Routledge, London and New 
York 2005. 
18 We refer here to the birth and growth, during the last decades, of a “civil society” in 
Taiwan, which laid the base for the development of a multi-party political system. 
19 P. Zarrow, China in War, p. 40. 
20 See in particular Zhang Xianwen et al., Gonghe zhaoshi (The start of the Republic), 
Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe, Nanjing 2011. 
21 References are drawn from Zhang Xianwen’s “Introduction” in ibidem, pp. 1-11. 
22 Ibidem, p. 11. 
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In the aforementioned book some particular issues are raised that 
represent  a common thread between various aspects of the historiographical 
debate in China over the past months, and are worth dwelling on:  
a) The importance of the Provisional Government at Nanjing. Established 
on January 1, 1912, its role—as pointed out by Zhang Xianwen23—has in the 
past been  “underrated or denied” by historiography. In reality, it represented 
“the first Democratic, republican historical experience in Asia”24 as well as 
an event of great importance for the future of China.25 
b) The role of Yuan Shikai within the revolutionary process and the 
relationship with Sun Yat-sen. In the past, the historical analysis on Yuan 
was totally negative, but now it has become more complex, underlining how 
the political action of Yuan Shikai was in a first phase—one that goes from 
the outbreak of the Revolution in October 1911 to his assumption of the 
office of provisional President of the Republic—a median in respect to the 
contraposition between the revolutionary and conservative forces and how, 
in a second phase—that which precedes the attempt at imperial restoration—
he, to some extent, also acted in defence of the republican system, in 
particular strengthening the central authority, an essential task in that 
historical phase.26  
As for the Yuan-Sun relationship, historiographical analysis substantially 
tends to confirm the established image of a radical alternative between two 
personalities, one (Yuan) anchored to a conservative vision of politics and 
society, the other (Sun) aimed at reinforcing the democratic-revolutionary 
options;27 
c) Regional development of the revolutionary process. This is a subject 
to which increasing attention has been paid in recent years, as evidenced by 
more than a few papers on the situation in various provinces presented at the 
aforementioned International Conference in Nanjing. Of particular interest 
are a series of recent publications that focus on the Province of Jiangsu, a 
key area given the presence of the cities of Nanjing and Shanghai;28 
                                           
23 Ibidem, pp. 6-7; see also chapters 6 and 7 of the same volume. 
24 Ibidem, chapter 4. 
25 See among others the papers presented by Ceng Bihong, Wang Hansi and Zhao Libing at 
the International Conference on “The Xinhai Revolution and the Nanjing Provisional 
Government”, held in Nanjing in October 2011 (see the Preprints of the Conference, 
vol. I). 
26 See in particular Zhang X. et al., Gonghe zhaoshi, pp. 305-329; see also the paper 
presented by Li Xuezhi, in Preprints of the Conference, vol. I.   
27 See Zhang X. et al., Gonghe zhaoshi,  pp. 323-330; see also Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall 
(ed.), Datong daolu. Sun Zhongshan yanjiu (The road to the Great Harmony. Studies on Sun 
Yat-sen), Nanjing Chubanshe, Nanjing 2010, in particular the paper by Qian Jing,  pp. 413-420.  
28 See among others: Qi Longwei and Zhou Xinguo (eds.), Xinhai geming Jiangsu diqu 
shiliao heji (A collection of historical materials on the Xinhai Revolution in the Jiangsu area), 
Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, Nanjing 2011; Zhou Xinguo et al., Jiangsu Xinhai geming shi 
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d) The international context in which the Revolution of 1911 developed. 
This is an aspect still largely neglected by Chinese historiography, and on 
which the analysis still mainly tends to dwell on the relationship between the 
revolutionary process and imperialist domination, usually omitting the overall 
historical significance of the period marked by the effects in Asia and in the 
world of the Japanese victory over Czarist Russia, the Mexican Revolution of 
1910, the Italo-Turkish War in Libya, amongst others.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Some decades ago, Chinese historiography’s contribution to the analysis and 
understanding of the 1911 Revolution, its significance and impact, was 
absolutely marginal, especially if compared to the most innovative areas of 
international historiography. Those were the years (the end of the 1970s and 
the beginning of the 1980s) in which the Cambridge History of China, even 
with the limitations and shortcomings that were later identified, dedicated 
two volumes to the historical transition from the nineteenth century (late 
Qing Empire) and the beginning of the twentieth century. In the second 
volume, the chapters edited by Michael Gasster and Marius Jansen brought 
to light, respectively, the origins of the republican revolutionary movement 
and the Japanese influence on the revolutionary process.29  
In the decades since, as Zarrow again points out, three general interpreta-
tions of the 1911 Revolution emerged within international historiography: 
the first, largely dominated by Taiwan, stresses that “the 1911 Revolution 
was a prologue to the national revolution of the 1920s” and emphasizes that 
“the revolution was essentially a product of revolutionary men who saw that 
the era of empire was over and did not believe the Manchus were fit to rule 
over the Chinese”; the second, the Chinese Marxist understanding of the 
revolution, accepted most of the story as recounted by the first interpretation 
but puts the events in a larger social framework: essentially, the revolution 
was “a bourgeois phase of rebellion against a backward and feudal 
monarchic despotism […] and was a progressive step toward the next phase 
of socialist revolution”; the third interpretation, largely dominated by 
Western historians, puts a strong emphasis on the role of local elites and 
maintains that  
 
                                                                                                   
(A history of the Xinhai Revolution in Jiangsu), Shehuikexueyuan Wenxian Chubanshe, 
Beijing 2011.  
29 See John K. Fairbank and Liu Kwang-Ching (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, 
volume II: Late Ch’ing 1800-1911, Part 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne 1980 (the first volume was published in 1978). 
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the revolution appears not to be a step toward making China stronger so 
much as part of an ongoing collapse; the revolution resulted in the further 
militarization of Chinese society, culminating in the warlord era between 
1916 and 1927.30 
 
Actually, we can say that all three schools have contributed, albeit in 
different ways, to our knowledge of  the 1911 Revolution.  
At the same time, we can affirm that during the last decades, and 
especially during the last 10-15 years, the contribution by the Chinese 
historians has been more and more important and we expect that such a 
contribution will be more and more fundamental in the future. 
According to Professor Jin Chongji, another of the most authoritative 
scholars on the 1911 Revolution, the Wuchang uprising, which gave birth to 
the revolutionary process, generated tremendous echoes and was born 
naturally, while the reform generated by the Qing government only enhanced 
the expectation for change but failed to satisfy it.31 
In fact—as professor Jin stresses—“historical development is a live fluid: 
it will break through once the timing is ripe, accelerating along the way, and 
bring forth new elements that were once absent”.32 
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OVERCOMING THE FRAME  
OF NATIONAL HISTORY IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
 
Samuel Guex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After liberation from Japanese colonialism, nationalism played an important 
role in legitimizing the successive authoritarian regimes that ruled over 
South Korea, especially during the decades dominated by Rhee Syngman 
and Park Chung Hee. The latter, in particular, was responsible for 
introducing the state-issued textbook system in the 1970s, a system that 
allowed the government to exert total control over the teaching of Korean 
history. These textbooks diffused highly nationalistic narratives, and 
contributed to the definition of Korea’s national identity as a homogenous 
race and unified state whose origins could be traced back to prehistory. With 
the democratization process beginning towards the end of the 1980s, the 
state monopoly faced increasing challenges. The controversies sparked by 
Japanese revisionist textbooks in 2000 accelerated the end of the 
government’s grip over national history: criticisms implanted in Japanese 
textbooks prompted reactions from the Japanese side, which in turn 
highlighted the flaws of South Korea’s own textbook system. Thereafter, 
various reforms gradually loosened state control over history teaching. 
History textbooks published in 2011 under the new government approval 
system marked the end of more than thirty years of state monopoly. We will 
examine how these textbooks handle ancient history, a contested field where 
Korean nationalism has to compete with Chinese nationalism, in order to 
assess to what extent these newly published textbooks have succeeded in 
overcoming the frame of national history. 
 
As mentioned by Nishikawa Nagao, world maps are a strong visual symbol 
of our perception of a world centered around our country. They illustrate a 
globe made up of states with clearly marked boundaries, an impression 
reinforced by the use of different colors, suggesting that each country 
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represents a political entity sharing a common culture radically different than 
its neighbors.1 
This idea of nations as homogenous entities is particularly strong in 
South Korea. Korean history provides some explanation for reasoning 
behind this characteristic. The people that entered the peninsula in antiquity 
gradually merged into a single ethnicity sharing the same language. Before 
the partition by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1945, Korea had 
been, except for some brief periods, a continuously unified state since the 
seventh century. The political unity and the cultural homogeneity that took 
shape progressively over the centuries has become an important part of the 
Korean identity. In modern times there have been no significant ethnic 
minorities, nothing compared to the ainu in Japan or the fifty-five minorities 
in China. 
For Koreans who, at the beginning of the twentieth century, shared a 
common language, culture and history, but who had no nation-state of their 
own, nationalism, especially in its ethnic dimension, provided a powerful 
ideology of resistance against colonialism. A neologism for the ethnic nation, 
minjok 民族, a term which first appeared in Japan (minzoku), offered Korean 
historians a powerful tool to rewrite the past. Their histories were no longer 
centered on the king. The new subject of their national narratives was the 
minjok defined through bloodline, whose genealogy could be traced back to 
the single figure of Tan’gun 檀君, the progenitor of the ethnic nation. 
Shifting away from the royal court with a description of the nation in 
historical terms that made no reference to China and argues that minjok 
superseded state boundaries, historians like Sin Ch’aeho were instrumental 
in “decentering the Middle Kingdom” and providing existence to the nation 
even without a supporting state structure. This was a vision particularly 
appealing in a period when Korea was under Japanese domination.2 
After the liberation, nationalism was used by both Rhee Syngman and 
Park Chung Hee to legitimize their respective regimes. Confronted with the 
task of national recovery, Rhee faced political cleavage and had to deal with 
the continuity of the colonial legacy, especially issues of Japanese 
collaborators in his government that were a potential threat to his legitimacy. 
Instead of “cleaning the elements of Japanese imperialism” (ilche chanjae 
ch’ŏngsan 日帝殘滓淸算), the Rhee government brought the compromised 
colonial elite back into power with the help of American political 
acquiescence, reinstating the state apparatus—bureaucracy and police—built 
                                                 
1 Nishikawa Nagao 西川長夫, Zōho kokkyō no koekata. Kokumin kokkaron josetsu 増補国境
の越え方―国民国家論序説 (The way to overcome borders. Introduction to the theory of 
nation-state), Heibonsha, Tōkyō 2001, p. 17. 
2 Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires 1895-1919, Columbia University Press, New York 
2002, p. 190. 
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by the Japanese. Park, on his part, needed to legitimize his forceful seizure 
of power in 1961 and his extralegal exercise of authority. He substantiated 
his authoritarian politics with the need to enhance national security and 
economic development, a task he viewed as a patriotic mission. In identifying 
nationalism with anti-Communism, Park justified his anti-Communism on 
the grounds that Communists broke the long history of a unitary nation, 
skillfully presenting authoritarianism as the only possible alternative to 
Communism.3    
These regimes chose to support highly nationalistic master narratives 
based on the premise of ethnic homogeneity, and aimed to diffuse them, 
among other means, through history textbooks. They were supported by 
nationalist historiography, which dominated the field of Korean studies and 
greatly contributed to define this notion of Korea’s national identity as a 
homogenous race and unified state whose origins could be traced back to 
prehistory. But with the democratization of South Korea at the end of the 
1980s, this widely held notion of the formation of a pure Korean race and a 
Korean national consciousness with the founding of Old Chosŏn by Tan’gun 
has been challenged by historians who openly advocate the need to 
“overcome the myth of national history”.4 
Despite persistent claims of authenticity, Korean national identity is 
deeply indebted to Chinese civilization. This has of course profound implications 
for nationalist claims regarding originality, ideological legitimacy and 
territorial hegemony. The question is particularly sensitive when it comes to 
the origins of the first Korean states. Old Chosŏn and Koguryŏ, which 
remain at the core of the Korean national identity problem, developed into a 
region, the Northeast Asian borderlands, where the borders have been fluid 
and permeable. It is no wonder then that some nationalist Korean scholars 
have come so far as to argue that the question of the historical identity of 
the ancient kingdoms is far more important than contemporary territorial 
rights. 
In this paper we will try to assess some of the results achieved by this 
ongoing process of overcoming the frame of national history through the 
analysis of recent development in the system and content of history 
textbooks.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Shin Gi-Wook, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, Stanford 
University Press, Palo Alto 2006, p. 109. 
4 Im Chiyŏn 임지연 and Yi Sŏngsi 이성시 (eds.), Kuksa ŭi sinhwa rŭl nŏmŏsŏ 국사의 
신화를 넘어서 (Overcome the myth of national history), Hyumŏnist’ŭ, Seoul 2004. 
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Debate over the history textbook system 
 
During the three decades of authoritarian rule that followed the restoration of 
national sovereignty, successive governments exerted a more or less tight 
control over the content of history textbooks. In 1973, with the new Yusin 
Constitution that endowed the president with absolute power, Park Chung 
Hee decided to strengthen the teaching of national history in order to 
reinforce the identity of the Korean nation. He was the one who replaced the 
government-approval system (kŏmjŏng 檢定) by the government-compiled 
(state-issued system) system (kukjŏng 國定) that allowed only one textbook 
in the teaching of “National history” (Kuksa 國史). 
Supporters of this measure argued that the content of the textbooks 
approved by the government at that time was almost identical and that the 
“nationalization” (kukjŏnghwa 國定化) or “standardization” (tan’ilhwa 單一化) 
of textbooks would bring many advantages, like facilitating the reediting of 
their content, sparing time and paper, and enabling common evaluation for 
achievement tests. Opponents contended that the plurality of textbooks was 
necessary to guarantee the quality of teaching materials. They believed that 
the use of a single textbook would limit students’ understanding of history, 
which would eventually preclude them to exert any critical judgment on the 
knowledge they gained.5 
With the blossoming of the pro-democracy movement during the 1980s, 
criticisms grew against the government-compiled textbook. It was accused 
of diffusing the anti-communist ideology of the government and as such, 
being a tool for the legitimization of the military dictatorship. The debate 
among supporters and opponents of this kukjŏng system took on a new 
meaning with the controversies sparked by Japanese history textbooks, 
particularly since the publication of the Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho 新しい歴
史教科書 (New history textbook) in 2000, edited by a group of revisionist 
historians called Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho wo tsukurukai 新しい歴史 
教科書をつくる会 (The Japanese society for history textbook reform). This 
textbook, which was accused of downplaying Japanese war crimes during 
World War II, was approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (MEXT) in 2001, causing a huge controversy in 
Japan and in neighboring countries, and prompting governments of both the 
People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to 
address a list of demands for modifications. 
The list of South Korea was by far the most impressive. It addressed 
thirty-five issues ranging from ancient to contemporary history. Moreover, 
                                                 
5  Kim Hanjong 김한종, Yŏksa kyoyuk kwajŏng kwa kyogwasŏ yŏngu 역사교육과정과 
교과서연구 (Process of history teaching and textbook studies), Sŏn’in, Seoul 2005, pp. 41-43. 
OVERCOMING THE FRAME OF NATIONAL HISTORY IN SOUTH KOREA 135 
South Korea did not limit its complaints to the Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho: it 
also thoroughly examined and criticized all seven other middle school 
textbooks. By comparison, China addressed only eight issues limited to the 
“New history textbook”, lodging absolutely no complaint about the other 
textbooks. Unlike its Chinese counterpart, whose concern seemed to focus 
on revisionist attempts by Japan to play down its responsibility for its 
aggression during the Sino-Japanese War, South Korea’s government was 
seeing the revisionist Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho as the tip of the iceberg of a 
broader and deeper problem of history consciousness widely affecting all 
Japanese textbooks. 
The reactions in Korea were not limited to official protests. The media 
but also scholars and teachers rallied to analyze and rebuff the so-called 
“distortions” of Japanese textbooks, leading to the publication of various 
studies dealing with that issue. There were even educational manga that were 
published aimed at denouncing Japanese lies and teaching children “correct” 
history, 6  a strong indication of Korea’s mobilization against Japanese 
revisionism in the aftermath of the Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho crisis. 
If the criticism from the Korean side was mainly leveled at the content of 
Japanese textbooks, many scholars were also prone to point out the flaws of 
the Japanese textbook authorization system (kentei 検定). The current system 
allows private companies to write and publish textbooks. The drafts are 
submitted to the Ministry of Education and go through a screening process to 
ensure that the content is in accordance with the educational curriculum 
guidelines (gakushū shidō yōryō 学習指導要領 ). During that process, 
companies may be asked to revise the draft in order to receive the approval 
of the Ministry. From a legal point of view, the government has no direct 
authority over the written content and its influence over the Ministry of 
Education is less important than what neighboring countries may believe. 
However, the fact that textbooks are approved by the state gives them a 
“quasi-official character”.7 It explains why some Korean scholars have not 
hesitated to dismiss such a system as “censorship” (kŏmyŏl 檢閲).8 
 
 
                                                 
6  Song Yŏngsim 송영심 and Pak Chongguan 박종관, Ŏngt’ŏri Ilbon yŏksa kyogwasŏ 
parojapki 엉터리 일본 역사 교과서 바로잡기 (Rectify foolish Japanese history textbooks), 
Mungongsa, Seoul 2001. 
7 Claudia Schneider, “The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective”, 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 617, n. 1, 2008, 
p. 113. 
8  Chang Sin 장신, “Ilbon ŭi kyogwasŏ chedo wa munjechŏm” 일본의 교과서 제도와 
문제점 (Problems of the textbook system in Japan), in Mundap ŭro ingnŭn Ilbon kyogwasŏ 
yŏksa waegok 문답으로 읽는 일본 교과서 역사왜곡 (Japanese textbooks distortion of 
history read as a dialogue), Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, Seoul 2001, p. 33. 
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The demand for revisions fell on deaf ears, the Japanese government 
arguing that it had no legal authority over the content of the textbooks. But 
the diplomatic protests added to the appropriation of these historical issues 
by Korea’s “civil society” in a country where condemnation of Japan’s 
perceived revisionism was exacerbated by a deep-rooted victim complex.9 
This quickly prompted a counteraction from Japanese conservative scholars, 
especially among members of the Tsukurukai. One of their first criticism 
concerned South Korea’s textbook system, at that time obviously less 
democratic and pluralistic than its Japanese counterpart. 10  In turn, the 
reaction of the Japanese provided ammunition for Korean opponents to the 
Korean state-issued textbook system. In other words, Korean criticism 
against Japanese textbooks also fostered introspection towards Korean 
textbooks; even members of the Comity for the compilation of the Kuksa 
pyŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe (National history textbook), the editor of the official 
textbook published by Kyohaksa came to recognize the need to abandon the 
state-issued textbook system in order to allow more diversity in the teaching 
of Korean history.11 
In spite of fears that the abandonment of the state-issued textbook system 
would be like surrendering in front of Japanese revisionism, the first signs of 
relaxation of the Korean governments firm grip on history textbooks 
appeared with the implementation of the seventh curriculum in 2003. As a 
consequence, textbooks for world history in middle school, and Korean 
modern and contemporary history in high school were published under the 
official approval system (kŏmjŏng). The content of these textbooks also tried 
to shift from a sheer political history centered on heroic figures of the nation, 
to a more social history centered on ordinary people. The territorial frame 
covered by these new textbooks also expanded beyond South Korea and 
included sections on North Korea or the Diaspora, categories which were 
overlooked by the official textbooks of “national history”.12 These changes 
were important signs of the efforts made in South Korea to allow the 
teaching of different narratives of history, but they were mainly limited to 
                                                 
9 Soh Sarah Chunghee, “Politics of the victim/victor complex: Interpreting South Korea’s 
national furor over Japanese history textbooks”, American Asian Review, vol. 21, n. 4, 2003, 
p. 149. 
10 Katsuoka Kanji 勝岡寛次, Kankoku, Chūgoku “rekishi kyōkasho” wo tettei hihan suru. 
Waikyoku sareta tainichi kankeishi 韓国・中国「歴史教科書」を徹底批判する―歪曲 
された対日関係史 (Radical criticism of Chinese and Korean history textbooks. A distorted 
history of relations with Japan), Shōgakukan, Tōkyō 2001. 
11 Park Chindong 박진동, “Haebanghu yŏksa kyogwasŏ parhaeng chedo ŭi ch’ui” 해방후 
역사교과서 발행 제도의 추이 (The evolution of the history textbooks publishing system 
since the liberation), Yŏksa kyoyuk, n. 37, 2004, pp. 43-44. 
12 Alain Delissen, “Carrefour historique, carrefours historiographiques: les nouveaux passés 
de la Corée du Sud”, Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, n. 88, 2007, pp. 20-25. 
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supplementary textbooks or to modern and contemporary history. Compulsory 
courses of “national history” were still taught with state-issued textbooks. 
A major change occurred in 2011 with the publication of new history 
textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. 
These new teaching materials were intended to replace the state-issued 
middle school and high school textbooks, and therefore incurred a more 
symbolic modification. The old Kuksa (National history) title gave way to 
more neutral titles reflecting the current tendency to tone down nationalist 
rhetoric, respectively Yŏksa13 (History) for middle school and Hanguksa14 
(Korean history) for high school. 
South Korea is joining Japan and China in discarding the state-issued 
textbooks and adopting government-approved textbooks system, suggesting 
efforts to exceed the rigid frame of national history. Therefore the question is, 
if such a radical move is accompanied by radical changes in the content. In 
order to assess that point, we will examine how current history textbooks 
deal with ancient history. It is during that period, with the formation of Old 
Chosŏn (Kochosŏn), that Korea’s national identity as a homogenous race and 
indigenous culture was supposedly forged out.  
 
 
Tan’gun 
 
According to the dictionary of Korean ancient and medieval history, the 
earliest Korean state is called Kochosŏn. The original name was Chosŏn but 
it was changed to Kochosŏn (Old Chosŏn) in order to avoid confusion with 
the Yi dynasty also known as Chosŏn dynasty.15 During the first half of the 
twentieth century, the period covered by Kochosŏn was commonly divided 
in the following “dynastic” sequence: Tan’gun Chosŏn, Kija Chosŏn and 
Wiman Chosŏn. 
Three different founding myths are associated with Old Chosŏn. The first 
is about Tan’gun, the son of a union between a heavenly prince and a bear 
turned woman. According to the thirteenth century Korean work Samguk 
yusa 三國遺事 (Tales of the Three Kingdoms), Tan’gun established Chosŏn 
in 2333 B.C. He is said to have been succeeded by Kija 箕子 (c. Jizi), who 
                                                 
13 Eight middle school textbooks have received the approval of the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology: Mirae kyoyuk 미래교육, Pisang kyoyuk 비상교육, Ch’ŏnjae kyoyuk 
천재교육, Kyohaksa 교학사, Taegyo 대교, Chihaksa 지학사, Tusan tong’a 두산동아. 
14 Six high school textbooks have received the approval of the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology: Ch’ŏnjae kyoyuk 천재교육, Mirae enk’ŏlch’ŏ 미래엔컬처, Pisang kyoyuk 
비상교육, Samhwa ch’ulp’ansa 삼화출판사, Chihaksa 지학사, Pŏmmunsa 법문사. 
15  Hanguksa Sajŏn P’yŏnch’anhoe 한국사전 편찬회, Hanguk kojungsesa sajŏn 
한국고중세사사전 (Dictionnary of Korean ancient and medieval history), Karam Kihoek, 
Seoul 1995, p. 49. 
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allegedly fled to Korea during the fall of the Shang to the Zhou dynasty. Kija 
is mentioned in the Shiji 史記 (Records of the Grand Historian), but there is 
no clear connection with Korea since Sima Qian does not state if the place 
where Kija went to was Chosŏn or not. The third myth concerns Wiman 
衛滿, a military officer of the Zhou state of Yan, who is said to have fled to 
the northern Korean peninsula around 195 B.C. and have taken over the 
kingship of the state of Chosŏn from a king named Chun. 
Until the 1970s, the legend of Tang’un was portrayed in South Korea as a 
state formation myth, but Tan’gun was then progressively transformed into a 
historical figure in textbooks. The elevation of Tan’gun to historical status 
has been accompanied by the denial of the existence of Kija as a historical 
individual.16 Wiman for his part, after being rejected as an usurper and a 
barbarian by “Sirhak” 實學 historians such as Yi Ik 李瀷 (1681-1763), has 
been reinterpreted to an ancestrally ethnic “Korean”. In reality, it is very 
difficult to distinguish facts from fiction in the study of ancient Korean 
histories, especially when it comes to theories about Korean state-formation. 
How do Korean history textbooks approach this period of Korean state-
formation? The National history textbook used in middle school from 2002 
to 2010, reads as follows: 
 
With the establishment of bronze culture many tribes appeared in the Manchu 
region of Liaoning and in the Northwestern part of the peninsula. Tan’gun 
united these tribes and founded Old Chosŏn. The foundation of Old Chosŏn 
by Tan’gun tells us that the history of our country is very long.17 
The textbook provides an excerpt from the story of Tan’gun, as it appears in 
the Samguk yusa, but without specifying that it is a legend. The textbook for 
high school provides more or less the same account for the founding of Old 
Chosŏn: 
In the society of tribes, Old Chosŏn was the first to develop into a state. 
According to the records of the Samguk yusa and the Tongguk t’onggam 
[東國通鑑] (15th century), [it is said that] Old Chosŏn was founded by 
Tan’gun wanggeom [檀君王儉] (2333 B.C.).18 
 
                                                 
16  Hanguksa t’ŭkkang p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 하국사 특강 편찬 위원회 (ed.), Kaejŏng 
sinp’an Hanguksa t’ŭkkang 개정 신판 한국사 특강 (Special lecture on Korean history), 
Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, Seoul 2008, p. 8. 
17 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사 편찬 위원회 (ed.), Chunghakkyo Kuksa 중학교 국사 
(Middle school national history), Kyohaksa, Seoul 2006, p. 18. 
18 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사 편찬 위원회 (ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Kuksa 고등학교 
국사 (High school national history), Kyohaksa, Seoul 2006, p. 32. 
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In both textbooks, the line between myth and history is blurred. In the junior 
high school textbook, there is no mention of the term “myth” in relation to 
Tan’gun, whereas the high school textbook goes one step further in 
presenting the foundation of Old Chosŏn by Tan’gun as a historical event 
that took place in 2333 B.C. 
What about the new textbooks? Apparently, the change from a system of 
state-issued textbooks to a system of government approved textbooks has not 
brought about much change to the content itself. The narrative of the 
founding of the first Korean state still mixes historical facts with fiction: 
 
With the development of bronze culture many tribes appeared in the Manchu 
region of Liaoning and the North-Western part of the Korean peninsula. It is 
in such a social context that Old Chosŏn, the first Korean [uri nara] state was 
formed. According to the Samguk yusa, Old Chosŏn was a state founded by 
Tan’gun wanggŏm (2333 B.C.).19 
 
The narrative regarding the founding of Old Chosŏn by Tan’gun is not 
simply an invented story; it carries a historical signification. Through the 
story of the state-founding by Tan’gun, we can know that the Hwanung tribe 
considered itself heir of the heaven and that it unified neighboring tribes. 
Moreover, the fact that there were ministers of the rain, wind and clouds 
suggests that it was a society which attached importance to agriculture.20  
Some textbooks leave no doubt to why Koreans remain so attached to the 
date of 2333 B.C.: 
 
In the myth of Tan’gun, it is written that Tan’gun wanggŏm founded the state 
of Old Chosŏn in 2333 B.C., stressing the fact that our country’s history is as 
long as China’s history. The fact that Tan’gun wanggŏm founded the state of 
Old Chosŏn and the ideal of the state founding called “Hong’ik ingan” [弘益
人間], which means “broadly do good to men” are driving force whenever 
our country faces difficult times.21 
 
Tan’gun’s myth does not only contribute to define Korea’s national identity 
as distinctly separate from China and Japan, it also enhances Korea’s cultural 
prestige by endowing Koreans with a long history and allowing them to 
compete with their Chinese neighbors. This long history is a source of pride 
and also an inspiration in the face of difficulties. 
 
                                                 
19 Kim Hyŭnt’ae 김현태 et al. (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa (sang) 중학교 역사 (상) (Middle 
school history), Tusan Tong’a, Seoul 2011, p. 31. 
20 Yang Hohwan 야호환 (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa (sang) 중학교 역사 (상) (Middle school 
history), Kyohaksa, Seoul 2011, p. 35. 
21 Chu Chin’o 주진오 (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa (sang) 중학교 역사 (상) (Middle school 
history), Ch’ŏnjae Kyoyuk, Seoul 2011, p. 36. 
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According to the Samguk yusa, Old Chosŏn was founded by Tan’gun 
wanggŏm in 2333 B.C. Tan’gun wanggŏm was the denomination of the 
leaders during that period. Tan’gun means “priest” and wanggŏm means 
“political sovereign”. We can know through this fact that Old Chosŏn was a 
society where political and religious powers were united. The story of the 
founding of the nation by Tan’gun teaches us the nation’s founding ideal of 
“benefiting mankind” [hong’ik ingan] and shows us that our nation has a long 
history. So whenever our nation faces difficult times it is a driving force that 
brings us solidarity and pride.22 
 
High school textbooks present more or less the same picture: 
 
According to the story of Tan’gun, Hwanung, the son of the god of heaven 
Hwanin leading the ministers of rain, clouds and wind and three thousand 
followers descended under a tree by the Holy Altar atop Mount T’aebaek and 
founded the City of God. He then married a bear turned woman and begot 
Tan’gun who founded Old Chosŏn (2333 B.C.).23 
 
The reality of the founding of Old Chosŏn can be known thanks to the story 
of Tan’gun. The people of Old Chosŏn lived on hills and cultivated the soil. 
The ruling class assumed leadership for social life such as administering 
agriculture and justice.24  
 
Some textbooks seem to distinguish between mythology and historical facts: 
 
Among the patriarchal society, Old Chosŏn was the first to develop into a 
state. The main forces which founded Old Chosŏn were the Hwanung tribe 
and the Bear tribe. The two tribes united and their leader Tan’gun wanggŏm 
represented both religious and political authority.25 
 
The myth of Tan’gun reflects historical facts such as the union of the 
Hwanung tribe with the Bear totem tribe, the appearance of a political leader 
and the formation of classes, a society where religious and political power 
were united and where agriculture was valued.26  
 
Thus, the narratives of textbooks provide contradictory information about 
                                                 
22 Chŏng Chaejŏng 정재정 (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa (sang) 중학교 역사 (상) (Middle 
school history), Ch’ihaksa, Seoul 2011, p. 33. 
23  Chu Chin’o 주진오 (ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Hanguksa 고등학교 한국사 (High school 
Korean history), Ch’ŏnjae Kyoyuk, Seoul 2011, p. 17. 
24 Chŏng Chaejŏng 정재정 (ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Yŏksa (sang) 고등학교 역사 (상) (High 
school history), Ch’ihaksa, Seoul 2011, p. 20. 
25 Yi Insŏk 이인석 (ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Hanguksa 고등학교 한국사 (High school Korean 
history), Samhwa Ch’ulp’ansa, Seoul 2011, p. 18. 
26  Han Ch’ŏlho 한철호 (ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Hanguksa 고등학교 한국사 (High school 
Korean history), Miraeen K’ŏlch’ŏ Kŭrup, Seoul 2011, p. 16. 
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Tang’un. It is difficult to know if he was a historical figure, or if Tan’gun 
was a proper name or a title. This confusion is reflected by a recent survey 
carried out by the television network KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) 
showing that 58.7% of Korean people believe that Tan’gun really existed 
(silchon 實存). But the same survey also reveals that 65.7% admit that 
Tan’gun’s story is a myth27. 
As suggested by the KBS survey, only a minority of Koreans actually 
believe that Tan’gun was indeed the son of a bear turned woman. But when 
it comes to the meaning of Tan’gun’s myth, some historians like Han Young 
Woo, emeritus professor at the University of Seoul, offer quite surprising 
interpretations: 
 
The above-mentioned Dangun mythology includes many mysterious stories 
that cannot be explained by modern science. However, a closer analysis of 
this story reveals several important historical facts. (First, it suggests that 
while the Hwanin and Hwanung tribe, which called themselves the tribe of 
heavenly descendants, produced kings, the tribe that worshipped the bear as 
its totem was the one which produced queens). It also shows that, according 
to the dates recorded, the original year of the founding of Dangun Joseon 
would have been 2333 B.C. […] Third, the Dangun myth helps to shed some 
light on the worldview of those behind the establishment of the country. For 
instance, the Dangun myth makes evident the pride of the Korean people who 
thought of themselves as the descendants of Heaven, and believed that their 
nation was founded at roughly the same time as China itself. Put differently, 
the strong sense of independence that animated the people of Joseon is 
clearly reflected in this tale […] It is necessary for us to remember that the 
self-reliance, morality, and optimism contained in the Dangun mythology 
were not only the worldview of the ancient Korean people, but also became, 
through thousands of years, the cultural genes that still flow in the veins of 
modern Koreans.28 
 
Like history textbooks, this history of Korea is mixing historical and 
mythological elements. For instance, Tan’gun’s story is supposed to reveal 
important historical facts, like the union of the Hwanin and Hwanung tribes 
and the role of the bear as a totem. The problem with such interpretation is 
that it refers to the idea of “Korean bear worshippers”, a theory that 
unfortunately lacks archeological or ethnographic evidence. 29  Moreover, 
while these textbooks and histories underline the mythical nature of 
                                                 
27 “10 myŏng chung 6 myŏng, Tan’gun silch’on inmul” 10명중 6명, 단군실존 인물 (For 6 
out of 10 Koreans did Tan’gun really lived), KBS News (September 30, 2011), retrieved from 
http://news.kbs.co.kr/culture/2011/09/30/2364751.html 
28 Han Young Woo, A Review of Korean History, Kyǒngsaewǒn, P’aju 2010, p. 89. 
29  Pai Hyung Il, Constructing “Korean” Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, 
Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London 2000, p. 71. 
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Tan’gun’s story, they still provide mythical elements such as the founding 
date of Old Chosŏn in 2333 B.C. 
 
 
Kija, Wiman and the Han commanderies 
 
The mention of this date is all the more paradoxical considering the fact that 
its calculation relies partly on mythical elements related to the controversial 
figure of Kija. Kija supposedly arrived in Korea after the fall of the Shang 
dynasty, unwilling to serve the Zhou dynasty. According to the Samguk yusa, 
he succeeded to Tan’gun who had already reigned for more than a thousand 
years. Based on the date of Kija's arrival on the Korean peninsula and the 
age of Tan’gun at that time, Korean nationalist historians determined the 
year 2333 B.C. In other words, this dating relies on the assumption that 
Tan’gun really lived for more than a thousand years, and that Kija actually 
came to Korea. If the mythical nature of the former has been increasingly 
acknowledged recently, as shown by the KBS survey, the latter has long been 
dismissed as a legendary character. 
During many centuries, Confucian scholars considered Kija to be Koreas 
most important ancestor. Koryŏ King T’aejo (r. 918-943) was the first to 
promote the cult of Kija in order to legitimate himself. With the Yi dynasty 
and Confucianism elevated to the status of state ideology, Kija became a key 
ancestral link to ancient China: Yi Songgye, the founder of the Yi dynasty, 
declared himself Kija’s successor. Kija was revered for more than five 
centuries as the first king of Chosŏn who brought civilization to Korea. This 
point of view was challenged with the rise of national consciousness at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Nationalist historians like Shin Ch’aeho came 
to favor Tan’gun, elevated to the rank of progenitor of the nation over Kija 
whose “Chineseness” didn’t fit in the new nationalist discourse. 
History textbooks, both ancient and new editions, take the same stance. 
Tan’gun and his role in the founding of the so-called first Korean state are 
underlined at the expense of Kija who gets no mention at all. The excerpts 
from the Tan’gun myth cited in Korean textbooks are obvious signs of 
efforts made by Korea to erase Kija from national memory. Accounts of the 
Samguk yusa all end with the birth of Tan’gun without mentioning the rest of 
the myth that continues as follows: 
 
In the fiftieth year of the reign of Emperor Yao, Tan’gun made the walled city 
of P’yŏngyang the capital and called his country Chosŏn. He then moved his 
capital to Asadal on Mount Paegak, also named Mount Kunghol, or 
Kŭnmidal, whence he ruled for fifteen hundred years. When, in the year 
kimyo [1122 B.C.], King Wu of Chou enfeoffed Chi Tzu (Kija) to Chosŏn, 
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Tangun moved to Changdanggyŏng, but later he returned and hid in Asadal as 
a mountain god at the age of one thousand nine hundred and eight.30  
 
The narrative differs when it comes to Wiman Chosŏn. As we have seen, 
Wiman is said to have come to Old Chosŏn and taken the power from King 
Chun in 194 B.C. Here is an excerpt from the account provided by Sima 
Qian in his Records of a Grand Historian: 
 
Wiman, the king of Chosŏn (Ch’ao-hsien), came originally from the state of 
Yen. When Yen was at the height of its power, it invaded and conquered the 
regions of Chen-p’an and Chosŏn, appointing officials to rule the area and 
setting up fortifications along the frontier. After the Ch’in dynasty destroyed 
the state of Yen, the area fell under Ch’in control, bordering as it did the 
province of Liao-tung. When the Han arose, however, it regarded the region 
as too far away and difficult to guard, and rebuilt the fortifications at the old 
border of Liao-tung, leaving the area beyond, as fa as the P’ae (Yalu) River, 
to be administered by the king of Yen. When Lu Wan, the king of Yen, 
revolted and crossed over into the territory of the Hsiung-nu, Wiman fled into 
hiding. He gathered together a band of a thousand or more followers and, 
adopting the mallet-shaped hairdo and dress of the Eastern Barbarians, 
escaped over the eastern border. After crossing the P’ae River, he settled 
down in the region formerly administered by the Ch’in, moving back and 
forth along the old border. Little by little he brought under his control the 
barbarians and Chinese refugees from Yen and Ch’i who were living in the 
regions of Chen-p’an and Chosŏn and made himself their king, establishing 
his capital at Wanggŏm (P’yŏngyang).31 
 
The former edition of the Korean high school textbook provided a somewhat 
different explanation: 
 
When Wiman came to Old Chosŏn, he used to tie a topknot and was wearing 
Korean clothes. After becoming king he kept Chosŏn as the name of the state, 
and under his rule many indigenous people obtained high ranking positions. 
That is the reason why we can consider that Wiman’s Old Chosŏn was the 
successor of Tangun’s Old Chosŏn.32 
 
Newly published textbooks offer a similar picture, some of them going even 
further in the “Koreanization” of Wiman: 
 
When Wiman entered Old Chosŏn, it is said that he tied a topknot and was 
wearing Old Chosŏn clothes. Moreover, after he became king, he kept 
                                                 
30 Peter H. Lee (ed.), Sourcebook of Korean Civilization, vol. I (From Early Times to the 
Sixteenth Century), Columbia University Press, New York 1993, p. 6. 
31 Ibidem, p. 9. 
32 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe (ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Kuksa, p. 34. 
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Chosŏn as the name of the country and many indigenous people were part of 
his government. Consequently, we can say that Wiman Chosŏn succeeded to 
Old Chosŏn.33 
 
When he entered Old Chosŏn, he had Korean clothes [hanbok] on and tied a 
topknot suggesting that he was a member of the Tongyi group who lived in 
China. After becoming king Wiman kept Old Chosŏn as the name of the 
state.34 
 
Contrary to Kija, who is dismissed as a “foreigner” and rejected outside the 
frame of national history, Wiman is fully integrated as a Korean ruler and 
presented as a legitimate successor to Old Chosŏn, that is, Tan’gun Chosŏn. 
Such a claim remains problematic since the Records of a Grand Historian 
only describe Wiman as wearing “barbarian clothes”. There is no mention at 
all of “Korean clothes”. Even the Samguk yusa, which is abundantly quoted 
when it comes to Tan’gun, does not seem to acknowledge the “ethnic” 
origins of Wiman: 
 
When Lu Wan, the king of Yen, revolted against the Han and crossed over 
into the territory of the Hsiung-nu, Wiman, who originally came from Yen, 
fled into hiding. He gathered together a band of a thousand or more followers 
and escaped over the eastern border. After crossing the P’ae River, he settled 
down in the region formerly administered by the Ch’in, moving back and 
forth along the old border. Little by little he brought under his control the 
barbarians and Chinese refugees from Yen and Ch’i who were living in the 
regions of Chen-p’an and Chosŏn and made himself their king, establishing 
his capital at Wanggŏm.35 
 
It is interesting to note how the Samguk yusa references the account by Sima 
Qian, but with a slight difference: the sentence “adopting the mallet-shaped 
hairdo and dress of the Eastern Barbarians” which serves as the basis of the 
thesis of an ethnically Korean Wiman, has been omitted. The efforts made by 
textbooks to present Wiman as the successor of Tan’gun clearly show the 
will to draw a continuity amongst the Korean nation. If it wasn’t for the idea 
of Korean ethnic homogeneity, there would be no need to “Koreanize” 
Wiman Old Chosŏn. Whatever the origins of Wiman, he was just one of 
many actors, if indeed he really existed, who contributed to the formation of 
the Korean nation over the centuries. 
                                                 
33 Kim H. (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa, p. 32. 
34 Chu C. (ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Hanguksa, p. 17. 
35 Ch’oe Namsŏn 최남선 (ed.), Samguk yusa 삼국유사 (Tales of the Three Kingdoms), 
Sŏmun Munhwasa, Seoul 2003, p. 34. 
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The omission of Kija as well as the “Koreanization” of Wiman both 
reflect the intent of Korean textbooks to emphasize the longevity and the 
homogeneity of the Korean nation while minimizing influences exerted by 
China on Korean history. Obviously, this pattern also applies to the Han 
commanderies, which were established by the Han dynasty following the 
victorious military campaign led by Han Wudi against Wiman Chosŏn in 108 
B.C. In the former edition of the middle school textbook, the authors did not 
even bother to mention the commanderies. In the high school version, a 
minimalist account is provided. Besides a paragraph explaining that, in order 
to avoid repression and plundering after the establishment of the Han 
commanderies, indigenous people either fled or joined forces to resist, the 
text concerning the Han commanderies reads as follows: 
 
After destroying Old Chosŏn, the Han tried to establish commanderies on 
parts of the ancient territory of Old Chosŏn and to control them, but they 
faced strong resistance from the indigenous peoples. Its power weakened 
progressively and eventually it was destroyed by Koguryŏ.36 
 
This account fails to state clearly if the Han actually established comman-
deries or not. Admittedly, students can assume from the last sentence that the 
commanderies were indeed established since they were destroyed by 
Koguryŏ. But the text does not provide the name or the number of these 
commanderies. Without mentioning that Lelang was destroyed in 313, it is 
difficult to fully grasp the important role that these commanderies, especially 
Lelang, played during the more than four centuries on the history of the 
peninsula. 
This tendency to minimize the influence of the Han commanderies is still 
perceptible among newly published textbooks: 
 
After [destroying Old Chosŏn], the Han established commanderies on the 
ancient territory of Old Chosŏn and tried to control them. But because of the 
fierce opposition from indigenous people, sudden change occurred and they 
were soon abolished or relocated.37 
 
The Han established Lelang and other commanderies on part of the territories 
of Old Chosŏn. However, Han commanderies faced violent resistance from 
local people and their influence weakened.38 
 
 
                                                 
36 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe 국사 편찬 위원회(ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Kuksa 고등학교 
국사 (High school national history), Kyohaksa, Seoul 2006, p. 34. 
37 Kim H. (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa, p. 32. 
38 Yi I. (ed.), Kodŭnghakkyo Hanguksa, p. 19. 
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Koguryŏ 
 
Like Old Chosŏn, Koguryŏ is one of the topics where Korean nationalism 
has to compete against its Chinese counterpart. While somewhat less known 
than the disputes over Japanese history textbooks, there is an ongoing and 
fierce debate between China and South Korea over which country “owns” 
the historical heritage of Koguryŏ/Gaogouli, often referred to as one of the 
ancient Three Kingdoms of Korea, along with Paekche and Silla. 
The academic debate began in 1993 at an international conference on 
Koguryŏ history, when a North Korean historian challenged the Chinese 
view of Koguryŏ as a Chinese state. The Chinese position is based on two 
main arguments: firstly, Koguryŏ state grew out of the Han Chinese 
commandery of Xuantu, thus Koguryŏ, but also Parhae/Bohai (A.D. 698-926) 
are considered to have been founded by Malgal/Mohe ethnic people; 
secondly, Koguryŏ kings acknowledged their status as one of China’s 
“minority nationalities” by accepting investiture from Chinese emperors.39 
On the Korean side, historians assume that the Three Kingdoms, despite 
their differences, were not founded by Malgal, but by Yemaek, an ethnic group 
that supposedly entered Korea from Manchuria in about 1000 B.C. Korean 
nationalist historians and archaeologists consider Yemaek as a representation 
of the origins of Korean nationality.40 Koreans regard Koguryŏ as a major 
power in East Asia that pursued territorial expansion through military 
conquests and that was frequently in a state of warfare with neighboring 
Chinese states. We can find an example of such a representation in Korean 
history textbooks which stressed and still stress Koguryŏ’s expansionist policy 
conquests and territorial expansion that led to the formation of a powerful 
empire rivaling China’s Sui and Tang dynasties: 
 
At the end of the fifth century, mighty Koguryŏ wielded power over East 
Asia occupying the center part of the Korean peninsula and Manchuria, 
including the Liaodong peninsula. At that time, the Chinese dynasty of the 
Northern Wei gave preferential treatment to Koguryŏ’s envoys compared to 
other countries’ embassies. We can infer from it how high Koguryŏ’s status 
was in East Asia then.41 
 
The Great King Kwanggaet’o who ascended the throne at the age of eighteen 
launched vigorous conquests. In the north, he occupied much of Manchuria, 
                                                 
39 Mark E. Byington, “The War of Words Between South Korea and China Over An Ancient 
Kingdom: Why Both Sides Are Misguided”, retrieved from George Mason University's 
History News Network, June 2004 (accessed September 15, 2010). 
40 Yi Inchŏl 이인철, “Koguryŏ nŭn Chungguk kwa taedŭng han chŏngbuk kukka” 고구려는 
중국과 대등한 정북 국가 (Koguryǒ, a conqueror equal to China), in Tae Koguryŏ yŏksa 
Chungguk enŭn ŏpta 대고구려 역사 중국에는 업사, Yemundang, Seoul 2004, pp. 12-16. 
41 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe (ed.), Chunghakkyo Kuksa, p. 49. 
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comprising the area of Liaodong. In the south, he sent an expedition against 
Paekche and occupied the territories north of the Han river […] Thus, 
Koguryŏ built up a great empire from the center of the Korean peninsula to 
Manchuria, including the Liaodong peninsula. Moreover, Koguryŏ 
considered itself the center of the world, the equivalent to China.42  
 
This scholarly debate escalated to a new level of historiography warfare 
between the two countries with the Chinese government’s launch of a 
“Northeast Project” in 2002. The aim of the project was to conduct research on 
ancient Chinese territories, mostly in Manchuria. It included numerous topics 
regarding ethnic groups in the Northeast region, the history of Korean-Chinese 
relations, Old Chosŏn, Koguryŏ and Parhae, and revived claims that historical 
development of Koguryŏ and Parhae, among others, took place in the 
borderlands of the Chinese nation and that consequently, they occurred as part 
of Chinese national history. The conclusion is that there is almost no link 
between the people of the Korean peninsula and the people of Koguryŏ and 
Parhae, who cannot be considered part of the Korean nation.43 
These contrasting views of Koguryŏ’s position in history between Korea 
and China share nonetheless a common point: they presume a clearly 
delineated geographical and national border between “Korea” and “China” 
in ancient times, and a linear national history to the present. In other words, 
they project the modern nation-state onto ancient times, reconstructing 
ancient history within the framework of their respective national history: as 
Andrei Lankov noted, “Koguryoans would have been surprised or even 
offended to learn that, in the future, they would be perceived by Koreans as 
members of the same community as their bitter enemies from Silla”.44 The 
main cause of the disagreement is that while China is defining its history and 
culture from the perspective of its present-day territories and borders, 
Korean national history is defined by the area where “Koreans” settled. 
Bloodline and not territory is the ultimate criteria used to distinguish 
Koreans from non-Koreans. 
For China the objective is clearly to construct a unitary national history 
and identity through positing a common history, even if it means imposing 
on the past the way ethnic minorities are conceived today as forming part of 
a “Greater Chinese Nation”. For Koreans, Koguryŏ but also Puyo and Parhae 
have been thought of as spiritual motherlands nourishing Korean culture. 
The “loss” of Koguryŏ to China could result in reducing the span of Korean 
                                                 
42 Kim H. (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa, p. 49. 
43 Yoon Hwy-Tak, “China’s Northeast Project and Korean History”, Korea Journal, Spring 
2005, p. 150. 
44 Andrei Lankov, “The Legacy of Long-Gone States: China, Korea and the Koguryo Wars”, 
retrieved from http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrei-Lankov/2233 (accessed September 7, 
2010). 
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history, erasing seven hundred years of a proud chapter of its resistance 
against China, and losing a historical pillar of Korean identity.45 
No wonder the protests against claims to the “Chineseness” of Koguryŏ 
have been fierce. The Chinese claims to Koguryŏ have also resulted in 
promoting cooperation between North and South Koreans and the Korean 
Diaspora. The nation is perceived as one surrounded by others trying to steal 
Korea’s history and territory. Whereas studies of ancient history in South 
Korea had been focused on Silla, due mainly to the fact that Silla was 
located in the South, the crisis with China resulted in a Koguryŏ studies 
boom in South Korea. 
It should be noted that on both sides dissonant voices can be heard. Not 
all Chinese historians agree with the official position of Koguryŏ as a 
Chinese state, some even said it publicly, conceding that Koguryŏ belonged 
to Korean history. On the Korean side too, a few historians see Koguryŏ as a 
separate site from both Korea and China. The majority of Western scholars 
have shown little support for the Chinese case. For instance, the main 
arguments defended by the proponents of the Chinese Koguryŏ view, namely 
that Koguryŏ developed out of the Han Chinese military prefecture of 
Xuantu, and that Koguryŏ kings accepted investiture from Chinese emperors, 
could also be applied to Paekche, a kingdom that no Chinese scholar claims 
to be a Chinese state.46 
Despite the apparent flaws of the Chinese position and the existence of 
dissonant voices on both sides, the chances of a rapid settlement are slim. 
The main reasons for this are territorial concerns. While South Korea 
assumes that the Chinese attempt to take Koguryŏ’s heritage away from 
Korea is a preemptive territorial claim in the case of a North Korean collapse, 
China does not fear that ethnic Koreans in China’s Northeast might want to 
break away. Any admission that Koreans might have a valid historical claim 
to some Chinese territories may incite unrest among other border groups, 
particularly in the Southwest and Northwest. This would explain why the 
Chinese have been so unwilling to back down on the academic position.47    
Koguryŏ, but also Old Chosŏn, are good examples of the inadequacy of 
sticking to the frame of national history to understand historical reality of 
border regions. For centuries, borders between China, Manchuria, and Korea 
have been fluid and permeable, which led to the cultural and historical 
hybridity of multiple states and peoples occupying the Northeast Asian 
borderlands. By emphasizing the role of Yemaek, who supposedly form with 
                                                 
45 Yonson Ahn, “Competing Nationalisms: The Mobilization of History and Archaeology in 
the Korea-China Wars over Koguryo/Gaogouli”, retrieved from http://www.japanfocus.org/-
Yonson-Ahn/1837 (accessed September 3, 2010). 
46 Mark E. Byington, “Koguryŏ, Part of China?”, retrieved from http://koreaweb.ws/pipermail/ 
koreanstudies_koreaweb.ws/2004-January/004054.html (accessed September 3, 2010). 
47 M.E. Byington, “The War of Words Between South Korea and China”. 
OVERCOMING THE FRAME OF NATIONAL HISTORY IN SOUTH KOREA 149 
Han people in the southern part of the peninsula the ancestors of Korean 
people, Korean national history neglects the role of Malgal, and other tribes 
which were absorbed later into China as part of ethnic minorities. The 
question of whose national history Koguryŏ belongs to can only foster, 
whatever the answer might be, disregard for minorities, and of heterogeneity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the way Korean textbooks deal with ancient history suggests 
that peoples from Old Chosŏn and Koguryŏ were all members, along with 
the Three Han in the southern part of the peninsula, of the unique Korean 
nation. In other words, instead of trying to understand how Koreans came to 
share a common conscience of belonging to the same nation, Korean 
textbooks show how the Korean nation supposedly evolved through the 
centuries. It is as if that nation had appeared with the founding of Old 
Chosŏn by Tan’gun. They seem to assume, a priori, that the Korean nation 
existed since ancient times, and that the identity of the nation has remained 
the same. That is exactly what was written in the introduction of the state-
issued middle school textbook: 
 
Our history is the record and the course followed by our nation [minjok] […] 
National history is the trace of our lives and the root of our identity.48 
 
The pronoun “we”, which appeared more than twenty times in the 
introduction of this middle school textbook, had timeless qualities that 
fostered the relationship between the identity of the students and the object 
of their study. The lack of distance between the subject and the object of 
study can result in strong emotional reactions when someone else claims to 
own that object. The controversy about Koguryŏ provides a good example of 
such an attitude. 
True, recent efforts made to overcome the frame of national history in 
South Korea are obvious. Middle school and high school textbooks have 
abandoned their old “kuksa” title; their content has gone beyond the 
“national” borders of South Korea and integrates the Diaspora and North 
Korea. The newly published government-approved middle school textbooks 
are also keen to highlight exchanges with neighboring countries and to 
embed Korean history in world history: 
 
In the textbook, we paid particular attention to the following points. Firstly, 
we strived to give more weight to accounts of world history in order to grasp 
Korean history together with the evolution of world history. This will help 
                                                 
48 Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe (ed.), Chunghakkyo Kuksa. 
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build a historical consciousness adapted to this era of globalization […] 
Sixthly, while valuing Koreans’ identity, we tried to avoid falling into 
excessively nationalistic interpretation, a problem that tends to be overlooked. 
Nationalism is necessary for a country like Korea, which went through so 
much hardship, but we consider that open-mindedness and flexible thinking 
are indispensable in the twenty-first century.49  
 
Korean scholars and teachers have also taken part in efforts to narrow the 
gap between China, Japan and Korea’s respective visions of history. 
Alongside their Chinese and Japanese counterparts, they have worked 
together in joint committees, both government sponsored and not, either in a 
bilateral frame, Japan-South Korea, or more rarely, in a trilateral structure, as 
with the common history textbook published simultaneously in 2005 in all 
three languages.50 
Unfortunately, the historically recovered ancient past, invested with 
narratives that are defining contemporary Korean national identity, is stuck 
in an ever more rigid frame of national history. In other words, while the 
contents of textbooks have gone beyond the “national” borders of South 
Korea, they still remain focused on the ethnic nation. In that sense, the frame 
of national history, that is the history of the “minjok,” has yet to be overcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Chu C. (ed.), Chunghakkyo Yŏksa. 
50 Nic-Chū-Kan sangoku kyōtsū rekishi kyōzai iinkai 日中韓三国共通歴史教材委員会 (ed.), 
Mirai wo hiraku rekishi: Higashi Ajia sangoku no kin-gendaishi 未来を開く歴史―東アジ
ア三国の近現代史 (History opening the future. Modern and contemporary history of the 
Three countries in East Asia), Kōbunken, Tōkyō 2005. Dongya sanguo de jinxiandaishi 
gongtong bianxie weiyuanhui (ed.), Dongya sanguo de jinxiandaishi: yi shi wei jian 
mianxiang weilai, gongtong jianshe heping yu youhao de Dongya xin geju 东亚三国的近现
代史: 以史为鉴面向未来共同建设和平与友好的东亚新格局 (Modern and contemporary 
history of the Three Countries in East Asia: History as a mirror, towards the future, establish 
together a new setup of peace and friendship in East Asia), Shehui Kexue Wenxian 
Chubanshe, Beijing 2006. Han-Chung-Il samguk kongdong yŏksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏhoe 
한중일 삼국 공동 역사 펀찬위원회 (ed.), Mirae rŭl yŏnŭn yŏksa: Han-Chung-Il hamkke 
mandŭn Tongasia samguk ŭi kŭnhyŏndaesa 미래를 여는 역사 : 한중일 함께 만든 
동아시아의 근현대사 (History opening the future: modern and contemporary history of the 
Three Countries of East Asia written together by Korea, China, and Japan), Hangyŏre 
Sinmunsa, Seoul 2005. 
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In the last few years, the impact of reforms and globalization on history 
education in China has increasingly attracted scholarly attention.1 Academic 
research has been particularly significant in the investigation of the 
relationship between history education, ideology and nationalism. The way 
in which events of the past are narrated and taught to youth could mirror the 
relevance of nationalism as a legitimizing factor to the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Furthermore, these narratives may even represent an obstacle 
to peaceful relations in an international context.  
Due to their special place in school education, textbooks have represented 
one of the main objects of analysis.2 Actually, if history textbooks are an 
important instrument in building national identity in any country, in East 
Asia their importance is even greater. There they are considered the official 
interpretation of history. Not by chance, history textbooks have been at the 
core of international controversies between Japan and China, and China and 
South Korea.3 Moreover, the content of history textbooks has raised 
                                                 
1 For a general overview of the changes in history education in China, see Aliza Jones, 
“Changing the Past to Build the Present. History Education in Post-Mao China”, PhD diss., 
University of Leeds, 2007; Aliza Jones, “Revising the Past, Contesting the Future: Reforming 
History Education in Post-Mao China”, in Steffi Richter (ed.), Contested Views of a Common 
Past. Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia, Campus, Frankfurt am Main and New 
York 2008. 
2 For contemporary perspectives see Edward Vickers and Aliza Jones (eds.), History 
Education and National Identity in East Asia, Routledge, New York and London 2005; 
Gotelind Müller (ed.), Designing History in East Asian textbooks: Identity Politics and 
Transnational Anspirations, Routledge, London and New York 2011.  
 3 Controversies between China, Korea and Japan about Japanese history textbooks are too 
commonly known to be discussed here; for a recent overview see Claudia Schneider, “The 
Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective”, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, n. 1, 2008, pp. 107-122; Id., “National 
Fortresses Besieged: History Textbooks in Contemporary China, Taiwan, and Japan”, in 
S. Richter, Contested Views of a Common Past, pp. 237-262; for the recent developments 
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intellectual and political debates in the domestic context, as briefly discussed 
in this paper.  
In China, the need to modernize history education—and consequently to 
revise textbooks—has been openly recognized since the 1990s. In the 
context of social and economic reforms and cultural globalization, Chinese 
authorities issued new guidelines for middle and high schools’ history 
education and thus new textbooks were published according to the new 
standards. From an official point of view, this process can be described more 
as a consequence of changing social, economical and cultural context, than a 
response to the need to take into account new historiographic research. As 
described by an author of the People’s Education Press (PEP), the main 
Chinese publishing press in the field of education, globalization “demands a 
much higher intellectual standard of people in a country”. This is because 
 
the trend toward pluralistic cultures in many countries has lessened 
confrontation among peoples of different ideologies; [...] the peoples of the 
world have made more efforts to pursue peace, oppose wars, reach a common 
understanding, and strengthen cooperation. Both geographically and 
culturally the information age has broken down the boundaries between 
nations. Communication within the ‘global village’ is both readily available 
and convenient.4  
 
Actually, he seems to suggest that globalization implies a change in history 
education on two levels. First, students are increasingly required to interact 
with people and cultures different from their own and they must deal with 
global issues. Secondly, students are exposed to several different sources of 
information about the past and the present and consequently, education 
should also take this flow of data into account.  
In this context, history education should assist pupils in handling change 
and motivating them to become modern and cosmopolitan citizens in the 
new globalizing China. This ambitious goal is consistent with the will to 
develop “quality education” (suzhi jiaoyu 素质教育). Since the last decade 
of the twentieth century, the need to promote “quality” has developed as a 
slogan for country policies and has become a keyword in contemporary 
Chinese discourses on society.5 In the field of education, this word 
                                                                                                                   
about the project to produce a joint textbook in cooperation among China, Japan and Korea 
see G. Müller, Designing History in East Asian textbooks; Zheng Wang, “Old Wounds, New 
Narratives: Joint History Textbook Writing and Peacebuilding in East Asia”, History and 
Memory, vol. 21, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-126.  
4 Qi Chen, “Curriculum Reform and the Writing of High School History Textbooks in China”, 
Social Education, vol. 74, n. 1, 2004, pp. 42-44. 
5 For analysis of suzhi discourse and practice in different contexts see the articles collected in 
“Quality and Citizenship in China”, Positions, vol. 17, n. 3, 2009, pp. 523-642 (contributions 
of Tamara Jacka, Gary Sigley, Terry E. Woronov, Luigi Tomba, Wanning Sun).  
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encompasses several meanings. It is relevant in both moral and ideological 
proprieties and emphasizes the need to develop creativity and critical 
thinking. As Spakowski has argued, suzhi in historical education is, above 
all, focused on the centrality of moral values and patriotism.6  
Moreover, attention given to quality education should also be intended as 
an acknowledgement of the need to modernize teaching methodology. For 
instance, in China, schools emphasize the facilitation of student involvement 
in class work.7 Since international competition is based mainly on the 
capacity to innovate (chuangxin 创新), education needs to promote the 
development of individual talents. It must give value to youth’s original 
thinking and encourage a critical approach to society starting from true facts 
(zhen shi 真实). Teachers are required to stimulate and guide critical debates 
in classrooms, utilizing new sources and media facilities to personally and 
emotionally engage the students.  
History textbooks edited in the recent years reflect this attempt to institute 
both correct content and a new methodological approach to historical 
learning. However, these textbooks also reveal the many contradictions in 
history education in contemporary China. Their goal is to offer an integrated 
approach in the understanding of the past, giving space for a more global 
perspective in order to nourish students’ cultural openness and world 
consciousness; however, the priority given to patriotism contradicts this 
objective. It is this aspect that allows cultural nationalism and political 
conformism to remain at the core of historical teaching in schools.  
This paper offers an overview of a set of textbooks widely used in 
classrooms. The textbooks are edited by the People’s Education Press and 
have been published for high school students since the mid-2000s. The 
considered textbooks are addressed to students ages 15 to 18 years old who 
are attending high-school and possibly studying with the intention of 
pursuing a college education. This group embodies an important 
constituency of the Chinese public opinion. Their learned nationalistic 
feelings are also a relevant factor in domestic politics, especially in urban 
areas.8 With the revision of history education, schools aim to train students 
to simultaneously become good “Chinese citizens” and good “world 
citizens”. My attention will focus on textbooks’ attempt to integrate Chinese 
                                                 
6 See Nicola Spakowski, “Between Normative and Individualizing Didactics: Suzhi jiaoyu as 
a New Term in Chinese Theories of History Teaching”, in Hellwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Achim 
Mittag and Jörn Rüsen (eds.), Historical Truth, Historical Criticism, and Ideology. Chinese 
Historiography and Historical Culture from a New Comparative Perspective, Brill, Leiden 
and Boston 2005, pp. 465-481. 
7 See Tanja Sargent, “Revolutionizing Ritual Interaction in the Classroom: Constructing the 
Chinese Renaissance of the 21st Century”, Modern China, vol. 35, n. 6, November 2009, 
pp. 662-691. 
8 For middle-class nationalism, see Xu Wu, Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, 
Characteristics and Implications, Lexinton Books, Lanham 2007.  
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history and foreign history into a singular narrative, utilizing the perspective 
of Chinese political and ideological atmosphere and omitting issues 
concerning historiographical conceptualizations.9  
 
 
The official framework for history education: the experimental  
new guidelines 
  
Although post-Mao reforms have increased decentralization and strengthened 
the autonomy of local governments and institutions in designing schools' 
curricula, in China, the Ministry of Education obviously plays a pivotal role 
in determining the content of educational activities. Consequently, the 
general outline of history education is set by the central government. Here, 
the Ministry issues detailed guidelines dictating the standards for textbooks 
and requirements for teachers.  
In the last decade, several new official documents have been issued 
concerning history teaching in Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biaozhun—
shiyan 普通高中历史课程标准—试验 (History curriculum standards—
experimental—for normal senior secondary schools). This document was 
issued in 2003 as a result of the Decision made in 1999 by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council on 
Deepening Educational Refom and Promoting Quality. After the Decision of 
1999, a technical group worked on the revision of the history curriculum in 
compulsory education and in higher education as well. They studied foreign 
experiences in East Asia (Japan and Korea) and the West (United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia). In 2000, new standards for 
compulsory education were ready, and three years later the guidelines for 
high-school history curriculum were issued.10  
The innovative aspect of the new program for high-school students was 
the integrated approach to human past centered on the idea of civilization. 
The program aimed to overcome the gap between Chinese history and world 
history, still present in middle school education. According to this new trend, 
                                                 
9 For the conceptualization of world history in relation to Chinese history in current academic 
research and the historiographical debates in China, see Nicola Spakowski, “National 
aspirations on a global stage. Concepts of world/global history in contemporary China”, The 
Journal of Global History, n. 4, 2009, pp. 275-295. For the developments in world history 
research in post-Mao China, see Leif Littrup, “World history with Chinese characteristics”, 
Culture and History, vol. 5, n. 1, 1989, pp. 39-64; Ralph Croizier, “World history in the 
People’s Republic of China”, The Journal of World History, vol. 1, n. 2, 1990, pp. 151-160; 
Luo Xu, “Reconstructing world history in the People’s Republic of China since 1980”, The 
Journal of World History, vol. 18, n. 3, 2007, pp. 325-350. 
10 Qi C., “Curriculum Reform”; Fan Li, “New curriculum reform and history textbook 
compilation in contemporary China”, in G. Müller, Designing History in East Asian 
textbooks, pp. 138-146. 
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Chinese history and the history of foreign civilizations should be studied in a 
single course, combining both comparative perspective as well as 
highlighting the connections among different cultures. This organization of 
learning is believed to fulfill the necessity to educate students on not only 
diverse historical experiences, but also increase awareness of the 
interconnectedness of historical and cultural processes in the modern world.  
As a premise, the new standards identify the goal of history teaching as 
the need to develop students’ historical conscience, cultural quality and 
scholarly attainment in humanities: students are expected to analyze the 
evolution of societies from different perspectives, while teachers should 
guide their students to nurture their attitude of “taking the reality as a 
criterion for the truth” (shishi qiushi 事实求实), to improve their sense of 
innovation and ability to “scientifically” debate historical problems.11 
However, patriotic emotions, feelings and values are also considered as a 
relevant part of history education.12 
One of the most relevant innovations of the program is the division of 
historical narratives into topical modules. These modules provide a thorough 
comprehension of the relationships between the past and contemporary age 
(gujin 古今) and the relationships between China and the world (zhongwai 
中外). 
In high schools, the study of history is distributed over three years. Each 
year students are required to focus on one aspect of human history; the first 
is dedicated to historical analysis of political systems, the second depicts the 
economy and society and the third regards science, philosophy, ideology and 
culture. While schools may offer more optional modules on specific topics, 
this course of study represents the compulsory curriculum.  
Topics dedicated to political history are listed as follows: the origin and 
development of ancient Chinese political system, the imperialist invasion 
and the nationalist fight of the Chinese people, the Chinese national 
revolution in modern age, the political construction of contemporary China 
and the unity of the motherland, the foreign relations of contemporary China, 
ancient Greece and Rome political systems, the representative democracy of 
the bourgeoise in Europe and America, China’s scientific socialist theory 
and the construction of socialist system, the emergence of a multipolar world 
in contemporary age.  
The course dedicated to economic development in history requires: the 
study of the economy of ancient China (agriculture, handcraft and 
commerce), of economic change in modern China and of the construction of 
                                                 
11 PRC Ministry of Education, Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biaozhun (shiyan) (History 
curriculum standards (experimental) for normal senior secondary schools), Renmin Jiaoyu, 
Beijing 2003.  
12 For the relevance of values and emotions, see Fan L., “New curriculum reform”, p. 143 ff.  
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socialism with Chinese characteristics, social change in modern China, the 
age of world exploration and the development of colonialism and of the 
capitalist global market, Roosevelt and the self-correction of capitalism, the 
experience and lessons from Soviet socialism, and finally economic 
globalization. According to the official guidelines, the goal of this approach 
is to nurture students’ responsibility towards socialist modernization in 
China. 
In the third year the standards require a focus on cultural history. This 
means “to understand that culture and ideology have as main characteristic 
the variety […] different cultures and ideas develop together through 
reciprocal clashing and mingling”. Science, technology, ideology, literature 
and the arts are all included in this course. Topics include: the study of 
Chinese traditional mainstream culture, science, technology and culture in 
ancient China, the liberation of culture and ideas in modern China, 
theoretical results of the most important Chinese ideologies in the twentieth 
Century, science, technology and culture in contemporary China; science 
and technology in the modern world and world literature and art from the 
nineteenth century on.  
As a whole, the official guidelines emphasize the idea that the study of 
history should increase students’ individual commitment to gain knowledge 
of “Chinese national conditions” (Zhongguo guoqing 中国国情), to love and 
continue to transmit the cultural tradition of Chinese national people, to 
nurture the national spirit and stimulate the national and cultural pride. 
However, patriotism should be equally matched by a critical and scientific 
attitude and by a “world conscience” gained through the “awareness of 
unity” (tongyixing 统一性) and knowledge of a variety of human societies.  
The need to teach history by utilizing a more integrated perspective and 
balancing both patriotic feelings and international openess is a clear goal of 
the new official curricula. With this still a concern, the content of history 
textbooks has been controversial. This was especially the case during the 
initial years after the enactment of the experimental changes.  
The most notorious case of controversy took place not at the high school 
level, but with middle-high school history textbooks. This is worth 
mentioning as it has attracted much attention and further emphasizes the 
most critical points relating to history, education and nationalism.  
It involved the well-known historian Yuan Weishi 袁伟时, professor at 
the Zhongshan University in Guangzhou and public intellectual, who 
published an essay published in “Freezing Point”, a weekly supplement of 
the “China Youth Daily” in January 2006. Here he expressed his criticism 
regarding the way in which modern history was taught to Chinese students. 
He cited examples of the textbooks’ historical narratives on key-events in 
nineteenth century China such as the Taiping rebellion and the Second 
Opium War. Yuan's belief was that teachings related to the imperialist 
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invasion of China in the nineteenth century were inflated by hyperna-
tionalism and therefore invited xenophobia and violence. His ideas were 
vehemently criticized and in the end, the editor of the magazine was fired.13 
A second case occurred later in the same year when a correspondant of 
The New York Times wrote an article about a new set of history textbooks 
that were going to be published for high schools in Shanghai. According to 
the article, the new books gave scant attention to politics and ideology and 
very little mention of the peasant revolts, traditionally a fundamental topic 
in a history syllabus. Meanwhile, the textbooks supposedly dedicated more 
space to Bill Gates than to Mao Zedong 毛 泽东. A debate developed in 
specialized forums where opinions often severely critical of the new trends 
were expressed. Su Zhiliang 苏智良, the historian who was in charge of 
the project, declared that the goal of the new textbooks was to focus on the 
history of civilizations, not to reverse the interpretation of history based on 
historical materialism. Nevertheless, the Shanghai project froze.14  
These controversies could be considered as an expression of political and 
intellectual conflict amidst the intellectual and political elites. However, they 
reveal the sensitiveness surrounding the issue of nationalism in history 
education. While everyone agrees on the need to revise education in the new 
globalizing context, what this implies in practice proved not so simply 
agreed upon. The debates were strictly connected to the relevance of history 
for patriotic education and identity building, with a special reference to the 
relationship with the West. From this perspective, many of the issues raised 
in these discussions remain unsolved and are doomed to resurface in the 
future.15  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Yuan Weishi, “Xiandaihua yu lishi jiaokeshu” (Modernization and history textbooks), 
Bingdian, January 11, 2006.  
14 For the whole history and the positions of the Chinese historians involved see Su Zhiliang, 
“The new history books in Shanghai: it’s a change, not a coup d’Etat”, in Douglas Kerr, Tong 
Qing Sheng and Wang Shouren (eds.), Critical Zone 3: A Forum of Chinese and Western 
Knowledge, HKUP, Hong Kong 2009, pp. 171-178; Zhu Zhexin, “Zhu Zhexin reviews new 
history textbooks: a cannibalistic view of history produced wolves”, in D. Kerr, Q.S. Tong 
and S. Wang (eds.), Critical zone, pp. 178-182. The article of The New York Times’ 
correspondant was Jonas Kahn, “Where’s Mao? China revise history textbook”, The New 
York Times, September 1, 2006.  
15 The difficulties in dealing with hyper nationalist feelings in approaching modern history 
education still remains a concern; for an example of professionals’ reflections on teachers’ 
responsibilities, see Chen Zhigang, Liu Yazhong, Zhang Lihai, “Aiguozhuyi jiaoyu fangshi de 
fansi” (Reflections on the teaching methodology about patriotism), Lishi jiaoxue, 9, 2010, 
pp. 21-23.  
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A search for new approaches to history education? A synopsis  
of People’s Educational Press secondary school’s history textbooks  
 
Although official guidelines in history education are quite detailed, the very 
existence of controversies over textbooks proves the fact that in their 
compilation there is enough room for authors to apply varied angles on the 
same subject. Although textbooks are subjected to official authorization, the 
current situation could be described as “One program, many textbooks” 
(yigang duoben 一纲多本). There are several editions of history textbooks, 
reflecting different regional contexts and market differences. This is a 
consequence of the administrative decentralization in education, all decided 
by the government in the reform era.16  
In this section, I will only consider history textbooks published for 
senior-high-school students by the People’s Education Press in the second 
half of 2000s, widely adopted in the Beijing area. The series is entitled 
Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu. Lishi bixiu 1, 2, 3 
普通高中历史课程标准试验教科书. 历史必修 1, 2, 3, (Textbooks for the 
experimental standards for normal secondary school curricula. History, 
compulsory program), and it consists of three volumes, one for each year of 
schooling. The students’ textbooks are matched by detailed teacher’s 
guidebooks which contain methodological suggestions, a selection of 
documents to be used for classwork and even video instructions on how to 
manage classwork.17 
The revision of the history curricula has emphasized the concept of 
civilization as an important framework to organize the study of the past. 
History should be learnt by taking into account the various fields of human 
action, politics, economy and culture, and being aware of the evolution of 
human societies. This holistic approach is considered useful in offering a 
better understanding of the present time and of the relationship between 
China and the rest of the world. A reading of these textbooks reveals that 
history education is fundamental not only in building a national identity and 
nourishing patriotic feelings, but also in persuading students of the adequacy 
of the Chinese political system and official ideology in the global historical 
context.  
At any rate, national pride should not become pariochialism or 
conservatism, since it should be matched by an intellectual openess to the 
world and readiness to change. As it is expressed in the teacher’s guide, the 
feeling of attachment to the motherland should not be similar to Ah-Q 啊Q 
                                                 
16 Fan L., “New curriculum reform”. 
17 Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu. Lishi bixiu. 1, 2, 3, People’s 
Educational Press, Beijing 2007 (hereafter LSBX); Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun 
shiyan jiaokeshu. Lishi bixiu. Jiaoshi jiaoke yongshu. 1, 2, 3, People’s Educational Press, 
Beijing 2007 (hereafter LSBX. JKYS).  
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(evoking the well-known tale of Lu Xun 鲁 讯), boasting of the superiority 
of Chinese civilization, but it should promote a self-confident attitude that 
leads to cooperation with the rest of the world.18  
The textbook dedicated to political history serves as a comparison 
between the evolution of political systems in the West and in China. The 
preface of the book explains how students will learn  
 
the characteristics and the development of the Chinese and foreign political 
systems as the Chinese people’s assemblies and the parliaments of Western 
capitalist countries; the key political events as the bourgeois revolution in 
England and the republican revolution in China; the main heroes of history, 
as Washington and Sun Yat-sen 孙逸仙, and in the end the most important 
historical phenomena, as the characteristics and trends in the world political 
context.19  
 
This approach seems to suggest that the political differences between China 
and the West (Soviet Union is analyzed only with consideration to the 
October Revolution) are rooted in their respective pasts. The main concern 
of textbook’s compilers is, actually, to historically justify Chinese and 
current Western political systems and at the same time, value them 
according to a universal path towards democracy. Moreover, implicitly, the 
national State represents the main dimension for understanding progress or 
backwardness of human history. 
In fact, according to the textbook, China’s political identity is historically 
marked by a continuous strife towards “unity” (tongyi 统一). This is 
accurately demonstrated by the emergence of a centralized empire in ancient 
times and by the early integration of different ethnic groups in Chinese 
nationality (Zhonghua minzu 中华民族).20 The textbook offers a simplified 
analysis of the political evolution of ancient China, as it aims, above all, to 
interpret the past: the history of imperial China from Han to Yuan is 
compressed in a single chapter. More space is dedicated to the Ming and 
Qing dynasties, considered the age when imperial autocracy froze the 
Chinese political evolution. Late imperial and especially Qing absolutism is 
depicted as a major obstacle in China’s progress.21  
Parallelly, the political history of the West focuses on the democratic 
system in ancient Greece and the role of the law during the Roman Empire. 
                                                 
18 LSBX. JKYS, 2, p. 3. 
19 LSBX, 1, p. 3. 
20 For definition of Chineseness in history textbooks, see Edward Vickers, “Defining the 
Boundaries of ‘Chineseness’: Tibet, Mongolia, Taiwan and Hong Kong in Mainland History 
Textbooks”, in Stuart J. Foster and Keith Crawford (eds.), What shall we tell the children? 
International perspectives on School History Textbooks, Information Age Publishing, 
Charlotte, New York 2006, pp. 25-48.  
21 LSBX, 1, chapters 1-4.  
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Democracy is briefly discussed as a Western historical development that 
originated from a very peculiar geographical and social context (the Greek 
state-city). It is described as an ideal that is distant from factual reality and is 
characterized by the exclusion, for example, of women and slaves. After a 
very concise description of the Middle Ages, the narrative of the political 
evolution in the West continues with the bourgeois revolutions in England 
and France, the American Revolution and the constitutionalist government in 
Germany. Again, while it is mentioned that these events generated the idea 
of universal human rights, students are encouraged to understand the gap 
between the rhetoric of democratic institutions, originating in the capitalist 
system, and the reality of exclusion from political power for too many.22  
The central part of the textbook is dedicated to the history of modern 
China, from the Opium War to the post-Mao People’s Republic (PRC).  
There are three main sections. The first is entitled “The modern China’s 
tide to oppose imperialism and save democracy” (Jindai Zhongguo fan 
qinlüe, jiu minzhu de chaoliu 近代 中国 反侵略 救 民主 的 潮流) and 
opens with a photographic portrait of Sun Yat-sen. Historical narrative of 
this section does not present any divergence from the official line and is 
mainly focused on events: the Opium War, the Taiping movement as an 
example of peasant uprising against imperialism, the first Sino-Japanese War 
and the Eight Powers Expedition against the Boxers, the Republican 
Revolution, the May Fourth Movement, the foundation of the Communist 
Party and the First United Front, the ten-year confrontation between the 
Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, the War of Resistance against 
Japan and the War of Liberation. Endogenous factors of crisis and change 
are downplayed in favor of a narrative based on China’s reaction to foreign 
imperialism. 
The second section is dedicated to Marxism. This part focuses on the 
Paris Commune and the Bolshevik Revolution, with very few references to 
China. The last section deals with the People’s Republic, its institutions and 
its international relations. Political history of China is not developed because 
of the greater emphasis on the representative institutions in the PRC, the 
multi-party cooperation under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party 
and the establishment of the autonomous regions of national minorities. 
Students are invited to acknowledge a sort of ideal political continuity with 
the Hundred Days Reform and through the Republican Revolution to the 
People’s Republic in China’s march towards full democracy.23 Obviously, 
the Cultural Revolution is briefly presented as a temporary deviation from 
this track, even if its end is intended to coincide with the re-affirmation of 
the centrality of legality after 1978. Again, the chapter dedicated to 
                                                 
22 LSBX, 1, chapter 5. 
23 LSBX, 1, chapters 9-12. 
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contemporary China’s political system mentions the grassroot elections as a 
demonstration of its democratic essence. Moreover, democracy and China’s 
political unity are represented as inexorably intertwined. Focus is on Hong 
Kong and Macao unification to the motherland, analyzed as the historical 
premise for the future unification with Taiwan. The textbook briefly 
describes the process of re-approachment to Taiwan, symbolized by the 
photograph of the meeting between Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 and the Guomindang 
leader Lian Zhan 连战 (Lien Chan) in 2005.  
The history of People’s Republic’s foreign relations covers the last 
chapters of this section. This is only further enriched by the many 
photographs of Chinese leaders meeting their foreign counterparts. PRC’s 
foreign relations are presented as a drastic shift from the “humiliation” 
(chiru 耻辱) during the period 1840-1949,24 and at the same time as a 
process marked by the peaceful relations China was able to build with the 
rest of the world. 
The final part of the textbook offers a portrait of contemporary world 
trends towards “multipolarity” (duojihua 多极化). Pupils are taught that a 
post Cold War world made by “one superpower, many powers” (yichao, 
duoqiang一 超 多 强) is going to become “multipolar” due to the emergence 
of European Union, Japan and China. This evolution is characterized by 
instability, as demonstrated by the Yugoslavia wars and international 
terrorism. China’s role in the new context is, at any rate, minimized, 
although it is defined as the most powerful among developing countries. It is 
just an actor in a almost multipolar world where new political powers, such 
as United Europe and Japan, are gaining prominence.25  
In the textbook dedicated to economy and society the narrative is focused 
on economic organization and identifies the main factors of material progress 
in Chinese history with an emphasis on the role played by the State. While the 
birth of modern economy is credited to the European development of 
capitalism and colonialism, comparative perspectives are downplayed in favor 
of a China-centered approach, although interconnectedness, interdependency 
and exchange at an international level are strongly evident. 
Students first learn that agriculture in China had specific features and 
emerged independently from other civilizations. Two long chapters are 
dedicated to handcrafted work and commerce in ancient China. This 
attention to the material advancement of Chinese ancient civilization is due 
to the fact that it is considered an “emotional” topic. It serves to nourish 
                                                 
24 On “national humiliation” see Paul A. Cohen, “Remembering and Forgetting: National 
Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China”, Twentieth-Century China, vol. 27, n. 2, 2002, pp. 1-39.  
25 LSBX, 1, chapters 25-27. For representation of Europe in history textbooks, see Gotelind 
Müller, “Teaching the other’s history in Chinese schools; the state, cultural asymetries and 
shifting images of Europe (from 1900 to today)”, in G. Müller, Designing History in East 
Asian textbooks, pp. 32-59.  
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student’s national pride and their will to preserve ancient culture remnants. It 
also has a political and ideological meaning as students learn of the 
importance of science and technology as the first productive force of 
progress.26 The chapter about trade in ancient China gives a positive 
evaluation of commercial activities for the wealth of a State and a society. It 
also emphasizes the role of the State in the creation of the necessary 
environment for the market. The feudal ideological backwardness of the 
Chinese imperial State is explained as the main reason for the hindering of 
the development of international trade in traditional China. In all, openess to 
the world is a motor of material and spiritual progress of a country.  
The formation of a world capitalist market starting from the birth of 
capitalism in Europe represents the main section of the textbook dedicated to 
world history.  
European maritime explorations are presented in a substantially positive 
light. They are depicted to students as a demonstration of the relevance of 
curiosity and aspiration for knowledge and human progress. On the contrary, 
the historical assessment of colonialism is completely negative. Pupils are 
taught that capital accumulation in the West has been granted by colonial 
exploitation of non-Western people, as the Chinese. That  
 
students should understand the history is not just an abstract concept and they 
should know that the development of human societies is manyfolded, so they 
can make develop an international consciousness with a correct openess and 
be able to confront with opportunities and challenges in an active attitude.27  
 
Thus, openess should be matched by awareness of power relations and by 
patriotism. 
Consequently, the chapters dedicated to China’s economy from the Opium 
War to 1949 describe Western imperialism as a propeller for economic change 
in China, yet a damaging agent for the Chinese people. A favorable 
assessment is given to all national movements aimed at economic 
modernization and industrialization, starting at the Westernization Movement 
(yangwu yundong 洋务运动) in the nineteenth century. Students are invited to 
reflect on how the most important condition for the development of economic 
modernization should be identified in the political realm, and specifically in 
national unification and State independence. Unavoidably, a real economic 
development for Chinese people begins only after the foundation of the 
People’s Republic. Economic policy in the post-Mao era is credited as being 
congruent with the socialist policy of the 1950s. As a celebration of the 
improvement of material life of Chinese citizens compared to the previous 
period, an entire chapter is specifically dedicated to the analysis of economic 
                                                 
26 LSBX, 2, chapters 1-4.  
27 LSBX. JKYS, 2, p. 76.  
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and social change in contemporary China. This also represents an “emotional” 
topic, since progress should be understood referring even to personal 
memories of parents and relatives who have grown and lived in the previous 
decades.28  
The final section of the textbook offers analysis of the evolution of 
capitalism; from economic crisis of capitalism to Roosevelt’s new deal and 
the Russia economic history. The goal of the lesson is to understand the 
continuous need for adjustment and reform in economics, as well as the 
capitalist and socialist systems. Finally, great attention is dedicated to world 
integration and globalization. This understanding is deemed important in 
order for students to be aware of the relevance of economic international 
relations for State power and human development. China’s entrance into the 
WTO is analyzed as a fundamental contribution to a global integrated 
economy. However, the negative impact on economic globalization in Third 
World countries is underestimated. In comparison to the sections dedicated 
to international political dynamics in post Cold War era, the centrality 
attributed to economic globalization is much more evident with a much 
greater space dedicated to the study of WTO organization and statutes.29  
The third volume of the textbook series is dedicated to culture: philosophy, 
science, ideology, literature and arts. According to the introduction, pupils 
should be guided to understand how the progress of science and knowledge 
are founded on the legacy of the past and at the same time, that science and 
philosophy reflect the changes in social conditions inside a historical process 
that proceeds from bottom to top. The textbook postulates a sort of 
continuity between the golden age of Chinese philosophy in the Spring and 
Autumn period through the Neo Confucianism in Song and Ming eras to the 
Three Principles of People of Sun Yat-sen, Maoism and Deng Xiaoping 
邓小平 theory. Similarly, in the West, the line of development goes from 
ancient Greek philosophy to the Reinassance, the Protestant Reformation 
and the Enlightenment period. Ancient China and ancient West are discussed 
in comparative perspective, attempting to give an account of the unity of 
human values and variety of cultures in the world as well. Secondly, to 
emphasize cultural continuity with the past, a second dominant theme of the 
textbook is the interaction among cultures, especially in modern times. As a 
whole, notwithstanding the effort to develop a more global approach to 
culture and science, even in this volume the China-centered approach is 
quite dominant. Fifteen out of its twenty-four chapters are dedicated to 
China, and the rest to the West, while no other civilization is considered.  
The two sections dedicated to the ancient times are respectively dedicated 
to Chinese philosophy and to Western tradition. The first centers on 
                                                 
28 LSBX, 2, chapter 14.  
29 LSBX, 2, chapters 22-24.  
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Confucianism (although Daoism and Legism are briefly described too), Song 
Neo Confucianism and Ming and Qing thinkers as Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 
and Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, considered representative thinkers who were critical 
of absolutism; the implicit idea in the background is the endogenous capacity 
of reform and renovation of Chinese thought. The second section concerns 
ancient Greek philosophers, from Socrates to Aristotle, the Renaissance, the 
Protestant Reformation, and on Enlightment philosophers, seen as the main 
steps in the “liberation of thinking” (sixiang jiefang 思想 解放). 
The pupils are then invited to reflect on the “four great inventions of 
Chinese civilization” (gun powder, compass, paper and mobile print), on 
pre-modern sciences in China, and on traditional literature and arts, all 
considered as the main contribution of China to world human progress. On 
one side, the narrative aims to emphasize the impact of a Chinese collective 
genius on world evolution as a sign of cultural interaction between Chinese 
civilization and the world, and on the other side it exposes evidence of how 
Chinese literature and art were a product of a plurality of factors. They were 
the result of contact with foreign cultures, of different nationalities’ 
contribution and of social differentiation, as can be seen in Tang poetry, 
Song paintings, Ming’s novels, Beijing opera and so on.30  
After this section, three chapters are dedicated to “The historical 
scientific development of the modern world”. Modern science is presented 
not specifically linked to Western social and cultural context, but as an effect 
of the universal trend towards the “liberation of thought” from false beliefs. 
Mathematics and physics from Newton to Einstein, natural sciences to 
Darwin and evolutionary theory, and applied sciences from the steam-
engine, the discovery of electricity to Internet (considered since it is an 
important motor of globalization) are shortly described.  
The second part of the textbook is specifically dedicated to Chinese 
intellectual evolution in the modern era. The first topic concerns China’s 
learning from abroad. This narrative starts after the Opium War, from Lin 
Zexu 林則徐 to the 1898 reform, and then discusses the New Culture 
Movement and the introduction of Marxism to China. The leif-motif of these 
chapters is explained by the teacher’s guide: to learn from the West is strictly 
connected and justified by the will to save the nation and strengthen the 
State.31 This is shared by the first Chinese reformers to the intellectual 
heroes of the New Culture Movement, whose main contribution to the 
liberation of the Chinese mind is identified in the introduction of the 
concepts of democracy, freedom and equality in China. Consequently, they 
have prepared the terrain for an introduction and development of Marxism in 
China after the October revolution. 
                                                 
30 LSBX, 3, chapters 8-10.  
31 LSBX, 3, chapters 14-15.  
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Students are also encouraged to reflect on the legacy of the New Culture 
Movement and its relation to traditional culture. In order to reconcile 
contradictions and recognize both as important legacies for contemporary 
Chinese identity, teachers are urged to make pupils understand that New 
Culture’s vehement criticism of tradition was as a consequence of the 
historical and contingent connection between political conservatism and 
Confucian values. Confucianism, however, must not be totally rejected since 
it is the main philosophical tradition of China and it has granted social 
stability for a long time.32  
China’s twentieth-century culture is made to coincide with political 
ideology, as embodied by Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping up to 
Jiang Zemin 江泽民 “three-represent theory” (sange daibiao 三个代表). 
Their ideas are presented more as the “crystal” (jieti 晶体) of collective 
thinking than as the contribution of individual thinkers and share the attitude 
of “scientific” and pragmatic evaluation of societal needs.33 The following 
chapters are dedicated to China’s progression in education and in scientific 
research and appraisal of State policies in these fields. Only in the end does 
an interest for global developments re-emerge. Three chapters on world 
literature, music and arts from the nineteenth century, mainly dedicated to 
the West, mark the end of the course in history. From political ideology the 
attention moves to cultural production, including mass and popular culture.  
 
 
Conclusive remarks  
 
In contemporary China, history education is going through a phase of change 
and reform. Narrative and historical interpretation still conform to the 
officially sanctioned views: students must be educated to understand 
“scientific” laws of social evolution according to historical materialism, to 
consider socialism as the better response to China’s historical conditions and 
to love and be proud of their motherland. However, there is an increasing 
awareness that, in order to be effective, the study of history must also train 
students to have a global culture and a pragmatic and open attitude to 
innovation and interaction with foreign cultures. 
High-school revision of history textbooks aims to produce a more 
articulated view of the past, in the framework of a more coordinated 
approach to Chinese history and foreign history in a unitary vision of human 
progress. Nationalist emotions and political and ideological prejudices have 
been tentatively diluted to give space for concepts such as civilization, 
plurality, integration, exchange and mutual influence.  
                                                 
32 LSBX, 3, pp. 50-51; LSBX. JKYS, 3, pp. 145-148.  
33 LSBX, 3, chapter 21. 
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However, a reading of textbooks reveals that the new revised texts do not 
really represent a shift in historical narrative nor do they weaken the 
nationalist spirit and political concerns which inspire many interpretations of 
past events. 
First, the priority given to patriotic values and nationalist feelings in 
history learning is still evident in narratives of ancient and modern history as 
well. Confucian philosophy, material success of post-Mao reforms, 
technological advancements of the imperial age all are discussed as 
“emotional topics” in order to nourish students’ pride for national 
achievements. Moreover, Chinese state-centered approach is dominant not 
only in political history, but in the study of past economy, society and 
culture as well. The Chinese nation-state, taken for granted in ancient times, 
is the main source of understanding and judgement of historical events, 
processes and personalities. As for the last point, it is worth noting that 
textbooks implicitly suggest high school students’ identification with the 
educated patriotic élite of previous generations in order to nourish their sense 
of responsability toward the nation and the State.  
Secondly, in the textbooks considered in this paper, the need to integrate 
“foreign history”—which is exclusively constituted by Western countries’ 
selected historical experiences—to national history seems functional in 
building a tale of human progress where socialist China’s development 
becomes fully appreciated. On one side, the history of Western civilization is 
offered mainly from a comparative perspective to help students to 
understand the specificities of the Chinese historical path beginning from 
antiquity. On the other side, it represents a reserve of historical examples 
necessary to educate students on social and human values. These values are 
deemed important in the material advancement of contemporary China as 
pragmatism, rationality, readiness to innovate, and openess. As for relations 
between China and the rest of the world, while in the modern period their 
study is framed in the well-known paradigm of Chinese people’s fight 
against foreign imperialism, the development of economical and cultural 
exchanges between China and developed capitalist countries in the 
globalized world are presented as a confirmation of socialist China’s 
successful path towards modernization and international ascent.  
In conclusion, the attempt to offer a more integrated view of the Chinese 
and the world past in current Chinese textbooks does not seem to reflect a 
substantial will to re-discuss the relevance of nationalism and ideological 
training in history education, but it could be seen as the effect of a current 
reconfiguration of Chinese national identity in a more global context. It 
serves as a sign of stronger confidence of political and intellectual élites in 
their own country’s capacity to keep up with the West in world competition. 
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Smith, Marx and Weber 
 
Along with histories of power, histories of material life and economic 
growth are the most popular of metanarratives currently published in the 
growing field of global history. Indeed no surprise will be occasioned by the 
appearance in our times, of accelerated “globalization”, of histories seeking 
to encompass a “global economy”, dealing with chronologies going back 
millennia and written to expound upon the disparate levels of material 
progress achieved by tribes, societies, communities and national economies 
located on all the world’s continents. Such concerns continue to be the 
litmus test of the mission of global economic history to keep “humanity in 
view”. After all, most people, in most places for most of history have been 
preoccupied with obtaining food, shelter, clothing and other manufactured 
artefacts that they required to sustain either a basic, a comfortable and only 
latterly, an agreeable standard of living. 
Traditions of historical enquiry into the wealth and poverty of nations 
began with Herodotus but modern paradigms for investigation need be 
traced no further back than to the towering intellects of two cosmopolitan, 
but perhaps equally “Eurocentric” Germans: Karl Marx and Max Weber. 
Both scholars maintained a serious interest (admittedly as a counterpoise to 
Europe) in the evolution of the Indian, Chinese, American and Russian 
economies. Although Weber’s investigations into Oriental religions, 
philosophies, cities and states look far more serious than anything written by 
Marx and Engels. 
The vocabularies and concepts borrowed by generations of historians 
from the corpus of writings left by Marx and Weber can no longer be 
presented as coherent theory. Nevertheless, it is still heuristic – when trying 
to understand material progress and relative decline across continents over 
long spans of time – to distinguish Marxian from Weberian approaches. The 
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former has classically been concerned to investigate the potential for 
material progress embodied in distinctive “modes of production” observed 
for different parts of the world. While the Weberian “research programme” 
can be divided into two major strands of inquiry: firstly, a comparison of 
hegemonic systems of belief (cultures), operating to promote or constrain 
personal and group behaviour in economic life; and coupled secondly, with 
an empirical analysis of how the political, legal and institutional frameworks 
within which economic activity is embedded has operated historically to 
foster or hinder economic development around the world. 
In classical Marxian thought, the only mode of production capable of 
generating sustained material progress, “capitalism”, is based upon wage 
labour and the accumulation of capital. Marx found that the first transition 
from pre-capitalist to capital modes of production occurred first in Western 
Europe. Thereafter global historians (working within a Marxian tradition) 
have addressed his question of when and why did the transition occur there 
before considering the obverse question: what sorts of “pre-capitalist” modes 
of production prevailed throughout Africa, Asia and the Amerindian 
Americas that delayed or arrested comparable transitions to capitalism upon 
other continents? 
Recently a “deviant” (or supplementary) Marxian paradigm has been 
elaborated in an impressive volume of research conducted by the World 
Systems School of Historical Sociology. This “School” maintains that the 
transition to capitalism (or commercial society) that led eventually to the 
establishment of successful industrial market economies occurred initially in 
Western Europe because Europeans reaped timely and decisive gains from 
intercontinental trade and the colonization of the Americas for some three or 
more centuries before the onset of the French and Industrial Revolutions. 
Europe’s economic benefits from centuries of participation in inter-
continental commerce and imperialism are broadly conceived to encompass 
positive externalities as well as a range of favourable political, institutional 
and cultural feedbacks and spin-offs connected to ever increasing flows of 
commodities shipped into European ports from all over the world, from 
across the Atlantic and Indian oceans. 
Unsurprisingly, the World System Schools’ emphasis upon the extension 
of markets for European exports to Asia, Africa and the Americas and above 
all its insistence on the pervasive significance of imports (embodying 
productive knowledge) from other continents has been contested. Classical 
Marxist scholars defend canonical texts concerned with progressive and non-
progressive modes of production and thereby implicitly join forces with neo-
classical economic historians who continue to regard the particularities of 
Europe’s own history as the motor of its earlier transition to capitalism or 
commercial society. Parenthetically, and for this particular debate, neither of 
these representations, nor that other unresolvable discussion about continuous 
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versus discontinuous transformations from one kind of traditional economic 
system to another, and ultimately more progressive, system seem to matter. 
What is now at issue is to specify and measure the significance of 
endogenous compared to exogenous forces promoting economic growth in 
one part of the world economy (Europe) and restraining a similar momentum 
on the continents of Asia, Africa and Southern America. 
Unfortunately, Marxian scholarship concerned with Asiatic modes of 
production and with the presence, or absence, of peculiar forms of 
“feudalism” found outside Europe now looks more theoretical than 
historical. Furthermore, (and perhaps because the tradition was ostracized 
and ossified during the Cold War) classical Marxism seems less influential 
than its Weberian counterpart in establishing the parameters, structure and 
vocabulary of a discourse concerned with “restraints” which for several 
centuries operated to prevent Asiatic economies from following the 
“European trajectory” which was leading towards divergent standards of 
living between the West and the Rest that became discernible by the 1700s 
and conspicuous over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Unfortunately, the ad hoc comments made by Marx on Asian societies are 
now regarded as little more than typical Eurocentric speculations of his time, 
which led generations of his followers down a blind alley in search of 
supposedly ubiquitous and unchanging Asiatic modes of production. 
Max Weber’s erudition is more impressive. His approach, questions and 
topics for investigation have effectively set the parameters for the 
construction of global histories of material progress written in recent 
decades. He dealt with long spans of time, read widely about classical and 
oriental civilizations and used comparative methods in order to comprehend 
why capitalism arose in the West and not in the East. Reading, as he did, 
over chronologies covering millennia, he recognized that the economies of 
India and China displayed impressive scientific and technical precocity. 
Weber appreciated that Arabs and Asians had established sophisticated 
systems and efficient institutions for the conduct of internal and overseas 
trade long before European ships and merchants began to sail regularly into 
and around the Indian ocean and China seas during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. 
Weber remained less impressed than Adam Smith or Karl Marx, with the 
economic significance for European development of the discovery and 
colonization of the Americas. He was not inclined to rank the gains from 
trans-Atlantic trade and colonization above endogenous forces, operating 
over centuries of history to promote economic growth within Europe. Thus 
in line with classical Marxism, Weber retained an appreciation of how and 
why the accumulation of capital and the evolution of slave, through feudal to 
free markets for labour mattered as “proximate” determinants of material 
progress within Western Europe. 
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For a growing band of scholars, concerned to include an analysis of 
intercontinental connexions in their metanarratives about the long run history 
of material progress, Weber elaborated upon themes that have exercised a 
powerful impact on modern stories told about the economic success of the 
West and the relative failures of the East over the past 400 years. Along with 
Montesquieu and other thinkers of the Enlightenment, Weber (and 
Weberians) believe that discernible contrasts in the institutional, ideological 
and legal frameworks within which economic activities (especially internal 
and overseas trade) were embedded in Europe compared to Asian economies 
had prevailed for several centuries and that marked differences in religious 
beliefs, family life, cultural conditioning, institutional frameworks and 
political systems promoted divergent paths of economic growth that 
eventually produced a clear divide within the world economy into affluent 
and poor nations. 
 
 
The New Global History of “Surprising Resemblances” 
 
In recent decades, a modern generation of economic historians have carried 
forward the Weberian tradition of attempts to explain for what became for at 
least three centuries increasingly visible economic achievements of Western 
societies in a global perspective. Weber left them with an approach, a 
vocabulary and several suggestive hypotheses that have been accepted, 
modified and also rejected by two generations of post war and post colonial 
historical research. There are now libraries of books and articles dealing with 
“Eastern” agricultures, industries, towns, commercial networks, communications, 
trade, science, technologies, cultures, business organization, taxation, state 
systems, government policies and cosmologies for the comprehension of 
nature covering the centuries since the Tang dynasty (618-907) – some based 
on research by historians from universities, not long emancipated from 
imperial rule. This impressive, but still less than comprehensive, volume of 
historical investigations has, moreover, been communicated to the West by 
specialists in area studies from North American, European, Australian and 
Japanese universities. Not long after the second world war and during an era 
of decolonization, historians were offered an opportunity – provided by the 
accumulation of a large and sophisticated body of knowledge (long available 
about Europe and North America), but emerging on Asia, the Middle East 
and Africa and Latin America – to reposition their hitherto disconnected 
histories of wealth and poverty one against another in order to construct 
global histories of material progress that might have satisfied the aspirations 
of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Smith and their “enlightened” followers and 
pleased Max Weber. 
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Clearly, and as a prelude to any scholarly analysis, and explanation, it 
will be necessary to date the divergence in living standards between the 
western and eastern ends of the Eurasian landmass because the assumption 
that unmistakable gaps in real incomes per capita and labour productivities 
(measured for the decade preceding the Great War) must have evolved and 
prevailed for centuries prior to that time, cannot supported with hard 
economic data. Indeed recent historical research on Asia has produced some 
partial, regionally specific and still inconclusive evidence to suggest that 
standards of living in Western Europe and the maritime provinces of China, 
South India and South East Asia may not have differed perceptibly much 
before the eighteenth century. 
That contestable suggestion has led global historians, labelled as 
“Eurocentric” by their opponents, to fall back upon unquantified “Weberian” 
(and “Marxist”) assertions that the economies of “North Western” Europe 
were surely on potentially more promising trajectories for early transitions to 
efficient industrial market economies for “several” centuries before even the 
more developed regions of Asia. Europe’s cultures, political systems, 
property rights, legal frameworks, regimes for the discovery and diffusion of 
reliable knowledge, commercial and financial organizations, trading 
networks, markets for commodities, labour and capital are conventionally 
represented as being altogether more likely, than anything discernible in 
Asian systems of production to have generated: preconditions for factories, 
mechanized industry and steam-powered transportation by land and sea; for 
the generation of inanimate forms of energy; for the reorganization of 
agriculture and commerce into concentrated locations and functional farms 
and firms. 
More than three decades ago, Marshal Hodgson (one of the Godfathers of 
modern global history) opined that “all attempts to invoke pre-modern 
seminal traits in the occident to account for the divergence in living 
standards can be shown to fail under close historical analysis”. Two 
generations of post war research on India, China and South East Asia 
(synthesized in the recent writings by Fernand Braudel, Kirti Chaudhuri, 
Gunder Frank, Jack Goldstone, Jack Goody, John Hobson, Ken Pomeranz, 
John Reid, Kaoru Sugihara, David Washbrook, Bin Wong, Harriet 
Zurndorfer, Prasannan Parthasarathi, Victor Lieberman, et al) concur. From 
his own impressive and detailed comparisons of levels and types of 
economic development achieved by European and Asian economies during 
the early modern period, Braudel inferred that “the populated regions of the 
world faced with demands of numbers seem to us to be quite close to each 
other.” But there is, he observed,  
 
a historiographical inequality between Europe and the rest of the world. 
Europe invented historians and made good use of them Her own history is 
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well lit and can be called as evidence or used as claim. The history of non-
Europe is still being written. And until the balance of knowledge and 
interpretation has been restored, the historian will be reluctant to cut the 
Gordian knot of world history. 
 
One distinguished historian of Western Europe, David Landes, displays no 
such reluctance and his celebrated book, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations 
(1998) elaborates over some 600 odd pages on an “historical record”, of 
“Weberian” preconditions which he claims demonstrates why “for the last 
thousand years Europe (the West) has been the prime mover of development 
and modernity”. 
Modern historical research, has, however virtually “degraded” (or at least 
severely qualified) repetitions of Marxist and Weberian assertions that the 
political, institutional and cultural frameworks within which economic 
activities in Asia were embedded for centuries before the Industrial 
Revolution, differed from Europe in ways that clearly and significantly 
impeded: the evolution and integration of commodity and factor markets, the 
development of financial intermediation, the spread of private property 
rights, the operations of mercantile networks, proto industrialization and 
above all the commercialization of agriculture. What recent but different 
syntheses of whole libraries of historical research on the economies of Asia 
(as well as Europe) observe and document are not only a range of advanced 
and less developed regions across Western Europe, but (to use a now famous 
phrase by Ken Pomeranz) a “world of surprising resemblances” across 
Eurasia. Surveys of monographic literature have effectively rendered a 
whole corpus of Marxian and Weberian interpretations redundant. It can no 
longer be taken for granted that for centuries before the Industrial Revolution, 
European economies experienced virtually exceptional transitions to 
capitalism; evolved discernibly more efficient legal, behavioural, institutional 
and political frameworks for the formation, integration and operation of 
markets, and thereby allowed for progress (albeit at a slow rate and with 
limited help from new technologies) down a path prescribed for in models of 
Smithian growth. Historians of pre-industrial Asia have, furthermore, 
analysed “cultures” that encouraged industrious and ambitious households to 
transform their extra earnings into displays of possessions and luxuries. 
Their work reveals that, contrary to the expectations of Werner Sombart (and 
his modern European followers), common attributes of material life 
appeared in too many cities, towns and villages across the Eurasian 
landmass, for anyone to single out the “rise of material culture” as something 
peculiar to the supposedly uniquely “acquisitive” and “industrious” 
households of Western Europe. 
Furthermore and before the era of liberal imperialism (from the Opium to 
the Great War) states everywhere placed impediments in the path of 
Smithian growth that emanated essentially from the spread and integration of 
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markets. That endlessly repeated (endemic but always implausible) notion 
that dynastic and territorial rivalries among European states consistently 
provided more favourable (less unfavourable) conditions for the operation of 
market forces during the early modern era of mercantilism and warfare has 
also been questioned. More simplistic versions of the hypothesis conflate 
virtuous circles and cycles for development flowing from “competition” with 
the destructive violence and rivalries of early modern European power 
politics. Notions (that have been floating around since Montesquieu) that the 
emperors, sultans, kings and bureaucracies of “despotic” eastern empires 
ruled over their economies (and ergo their fiscal bases) in irrational ways 
that can be represented as more predatory, arbitrary and consistently and 
peculiarly malign towards Smithian growth now look increasingly obsolete 
as historical scholarship. 
In the recently reconstructed economic histories of a “world of surprising 
resemblances” canonical accounts of Smithian growth – of European 
economies growing up gradually but inexorably on distinctive market led 
trajectories within their restricted and relatively underdeveloped promontory 
of Eurasia – look untenable simply because too many “seminal” traits of the 
Occident turn out to be not only ubiquitous, but prior features of the Orient. 
Perhaps such Weberian (and/or Marxian) perceptions will be revived and 
underpinned by further research and debate. Research (or even a renewed 
search among extant histories) might delineate and perhaps measure 
unmistakeable/incontestable differences in the scale, scope and intensity of 
Smithian growth across time and space. Meanwhile and as recent 
reconfigurations of Asian economic history become known and acceptable 
(to all but an anachronistic generation of historians and a-historical 
economists) and debate moves on from the realm of acrimony towards 
conversation, we may well witness a revival of more nuanced and carefully 
specified long run historical explanations for divergencies in productivity 
and living standards between east and west, that historians have long agreed 
became predictable during the eighteenth, unmistakable over the nineteenth 
and stark during the twentieth century, but which are disappearing today. 
 
 
Revisionist Explanations for Delayed and late Divergences Between 
Eastern and Western Economies 
 
Meanwhile to suggest (as anti Weberian revisionists do) that an unexpected 
and unpredictable conjuncture between East and West appeared quite 
suddenly in the late eighteenth century also remains too fragile to stand as a 
core hypothesis about long-run global economic development. That is so 
because they offer three contested explanations for both this ostensibly 
“late” and “great divergence”.  
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The first contention is that in different ways, for different reasons and 
along different chronologies, imperial governmental structures in the Orient 
became increasingly incapable of providing their subject populations and 
territories with the good order, protection against external aggression and other 
public goods required to maintain satisfactory levels of private economic 
activity, market integration and innovation. In short, strategic and 
administrative defects afflicting the Safavid, Ottoman, Mughal and Ming-Qing 
empires, intensified through time and thereby made space for the rise of the 
West. Investigations into the nature, extent and significance of political crises 
(clearly affecting three of these Oriental empires in the eighteenth century and 
China by the time of the White Lotus Rebellion) continue and are leading to 
the kind of insights now coming on stream from comparative histories of early 
modern European states, concerned to contrast the evolution of political 
arrangements and policies conducive or obstructive towards economic growth 
and innovation within Western Europe. This debate about the constitutions of 
government and behaviour of states will only be taken forward by social 
scientists who know something about the histories of political and other 
subordinate institutions, their diverse forms and the precise ways they 
interconnected with the economic activities of households, farms and firms not 
only in early modern Europe, for Asia as well. Repetition of recycled 
enlightenment equations between republicanism, liberty and parliamentary 
forms of governance on the one hand and transitions to industrial market 
economies on the other, seem less and less satisfactory. The theories, concepts 
and taxonomies now emerging in illuminating forms from neo institutional 
economics, need to feed into and be reformulated in the light of historical 
investigations into specific political, legal and institutional frameworks that 
promoted and restrained national, regional and sectoral rates and patterns of 
economic growth across the whole of Eurasia. 
Secondly, and at the heart of the key revisionist explanation for 
divergence, between East Asia and Western Europe is a quintessentially 
classical growth story which is based upon an impressive array of historical 
scholarship investigating connexions and mechanisms derived ultimately 
from the writings of Smith, Malthus and Ricardo. For example, Pomeranz 
agrees with classical economists who represented cultivable land as a 
relatively fixed factor of production and who perceived that additions to the 
stocks of useful and reliable knowledge could only generate incremental and 
strictly limited rates of technological progress. Historians know that 
upswings in population growth led (only in extremis and in some Asian 
regions) to Malthusian crises, but more commonly both in Western Europe 
and in the Ming-Qing Empire to constricting shortages of land intensive 
crops and agrarian raw materials, including: basic foodstuffs, timber utilized 
for manufacturing and construction, wood converted into fuel and energy for 
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both industrial and domestic purposes and fibres derived from plants and 
animals for purposes of transformation into textiles. 
Over some two or more centuries, before 1750, when population growth 
rates in Europe and China advanced at comparable rates, the Chinese 
economy coped with the “pressure of numbers” basically by intensifying 
labour in order to relieve shortages of food and agrarian raw materials. For 
Pomeranz, and other scholars (who reject Eurocentric explanations for the 
great divergence cast in terms of Smithian growth), the core problem is to 
explain how and why European economies did not proceed down the same 
path as China, but instead avoided diminishing returns to labour engaged in 
agricultures and proto-industries and gradually diffused mechanized 
techniques of production across manufacturing and transportation. Pomeranz 
reposed the key question very cogently: “why” he enquired, “did England’s 
economy not continue to develop like the economy of the Yangzi Delta?” In 
other words modern revisionism insists, as Marc Bloch advised long ago, on 
carefully specified and reciprocal comparisons of economics with 
comparable geographical endowments. 
The answers offered by the new global history are carefully supported with 
a reflexive reading of modern scholarship on China and Europe, and refer to 
contrasts between endogenous and exogenous potential for the avoidance of 
diminishing returns to the land and other natural resources available to China 
and to Europe. They suggest that after millennia of successful land 
management, Chinese agriculture stood closer to its production possibility 
boundary than European agricultures. Possibilities for coping with population 
pressures by extensions to margins of cultivation and cropping, through 
tenurial reform, investments in the infra-structure for intra-regional trade and 
specialization, by reallocating pasture to arable, improving the control of water 
supplies, implementing efficient food stabilization policies, etc., had already 
been carried further in China than Europe. 
Europe not only enjoyed some discernible (alas, unmeasurable) 
opportunities for taking up “slack” within the agrarian system, but the 
potential gains from trade and specialization in foodstuffs and raw materials 
within northern and southern, eastern and western parts of western Eurasia 
remained greater than the long exploited patterns of intra-regional trade 
within the Chinese Empire. Indeed (and as demographic pressures 
intensified over the eighteenth century), the potential for trade diminished 
because, unfortunately, rates of population increase became faster among 
China’s poorer, less urbanized, provinces of primary production. The 
empire’s northern and inland provinces then adjusted by: reallocating surplus 
agricultural labour into proto-industry; consuming higher proportions of both 
the food and agrarian raw materials produced within their regional 
boundaries and by importing less manufactured goods. Thus China’s 
tradition of precocious Smithian growth, high levels of trade and path 
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dependency based upon a mix of labour intensive crops (particularly rice), 
rendered the imperial economy more “ecologically vulnerable” than most of 
Europe to population pressures when they intensified over the century before 
the Industrial Revolution. 
Nevertheless, revisionists insist (and have traduced a not entirely 
convincing body of evidence to support their view), that Britain and all other 
the organic economies of Western Europe were also on a similar trajectory 
of diminishing returns and rising costs for the production of food, fuel and 
fibres, but the “core” postponed the onset of more severe ecological 
problems and shortages during the early phases of industrialization in the 
eighteenth century and circumvented them over the nineteenth century by 
exploiting two “windfalls” of massive significance, namely: endowments of 
cheap and accessible energy in the form of coal, and the fecund soils and 
abundant natural resources of the Americas. 
In bringing to the foreground the contribution of the Americas, 
revisionists have returned our attention to exogenous (overseas) sources of 
Western Europe’s economic advance, underlined by Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx and reified in recent decades into a “primus mobile” by Wallerstein, 
Chase-Dunn, Blaut, Frank, Gills and others grouped into the World Systems 
School of Historical Sociology. 
As for coal and other natural endowments, Wrigley and an earlier 
generation of British economic historians had already explored the profound 
significance and widespread ramifications of endowments of cheap fossil 
fuels in allowing Britain to escape (before the rest of Europe) from potential 
“Malthusian traps”. Although precise calculations are difficult to make and 
several figures (including revised estimates from Pomeranz) jostle for 
recognition the tradition of energy accountancy as a way of explaining 
increasing and decreasing returns go back to the nineteenth century. It is not 
difficult to accept that school’s major conclusions, namely that the 
substitution of coal and steam power to provide for the heat supplied to 
Britain (and with lags to other European economies) by oxen, horses, wood 
and manpower for various benchmark decades after the Napoleonic Wars, 
would (counterfactually) have absorbed ever increasing and implausibly 
large shares of Europe’s inelastic supplies of agricultural land. Furthermore, 
all forms of heat intensive industry and transportation (metallurgy, glass, 
pottery, beer, sugar and salt, refining soap, starch, railways and ships) 
benefited from the substitution of coal for other more costly and less 
efficient organic forms of energy. Feedbacks and spin-offs from the mining, 
transportation and utilization of coal, including the construction of canals, 
precision engineering and, above all, the impetus provided by coal for the 
development, improvement and diffusion of engines for the provision of 
energy from steam, remain impossible to calculate. They became central for 
Europe’s aptly named “age of steam”. Yet that age (1846-1914) remained 
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imminent rather than dominant during the first stages of the industrial 
revolution, which occurred decades before that particular golden age of 
liberal capitalism. 
Furthermore (and to revert to Bloch’s reciprocal mode of comparative 
history), the question of why China failed to exploit its known and very 
considerable deposits of coal, and thus become more like England, Belgium 
and Westphalia has not been, pursued in the depth that such a salient contrast 
demands. Chinese coal may or may not have been more combustible and less 
well located than European deposits, but it stayed below ground as an 
abundant and presumably as a potentially more efficient source of energy, 
compared to the manpower, wind and water that the Chinese, Japanese and 
other Asian economies continued to utilize throughout the nineteenth 
century. References to geology, geography and transportation problems do 
not seem to be sufficient to explain why China neglected to exploit its 
endowments of coal throughout the age of steam? 
 
 
The Significance of Intercontinental Trade for European Transitions to 
Industrial Market Economies 
 
Finally, (to return to Adam Smith and overseas expansion) Europeans (not 
Chinese, Arabs or Indians) discovered, conquered, infected, plundered, 
colonized and eventually established mutually beneficial, commercial 
relationships with the Americas. That protracted enterprise should neither be 
designated as “peripheral” nor reified (as it continues to be in the writings of 
Immanuel Wallerstein, James Blaut and the world systems school of 
historical sociology) as the ‘motor’ driving Europe’s benign transformation 
towards successful industrial market economies over the course of the 
nineteenth century. 
Material benefits from the rediscovery of the Americas did not come on 
stream for a long time after 1492, and accrued disproportionately to two 
latecomers and free riders – the Netherlands and England. No doubt 
quantitative exercises in national accountancy designed to measure the 
macro-economic significance of transatlantic commerce for either the 
development of Europe as a whole, or even for particular countries such as 
the Netherlands or Britain (most persistently and profitably involved with 
expansion overseas) are fraught with conceptual and statistical difficulties. 
No economic historian could deny that the establishment of colonies 
regulated along mercantilist lines, together with slave plantations in the New 
World, turned the terms and conditions for trans-Atlantic trade in favour of 
the West, compared to a counterfactual scenario, whereby the settlement and 
the build-up of viable and independent economies in the Americas depended 
upon unregulated, but unprotected private investment and the immigration of 
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free labour from Europe rather than the enslavement of millions of Africans. 
Furthermore, recent research into world trade in bullion has clarified the 
importance of the complex and multifaceted role played by Chinese, Indian 
and South East Asian demand for New World silver in maintaining the 
profitability and momentum of European investment in the Americas for 
some two centuries before the Industrial Revolution. That investment also 
promoted an entirely gradual movement towards the integration and growth 
of an embryonic global economy, within which the separated maritime 
towns and regions of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas interacted – 
usually with more positive and widespread effects for European than for 
South and East Asian development. 
Nevertheless, a national accounts framework continues to be the only 
viable perspective available to historians who wish to specify and quantify 
the overall significance of variables, such as intercontinental exports and 
imports for national (and European wide) rates of capital formation and 
structural change and innovation from 1492 to 1815. If (as Paul Bairoch’s 
imperfect and badly referenced data suggest), European exports to other 
continents and imports from the Americas, Asia and Africa are but “small” 
percentages of the total value of European output, then inferences that either 
the Americas (or the none-European World as a whole) continued, as late as 
the end of the eighteenth century, to play a comparably minor role for the 
advance of the West could only be meaningfully challenged in two ways. 
First, (and this logic could be compelling), in early modern Europe, 
economic growth took place as specific margins and if a large share of the 
annual increment to total European (or to particular national products) can be 
connected directly or indirectly to intercontinental commerce, then that over-
publicized and glamorous sub-sector of several maritime economies might 
indeed be plausibly represented as “highly significant” for the economic 
advance of the West. Quantitative tests could then relate the gains from 
intercontinental trade to “net” capital formation and to aggregated volumes 
of potentially “tradable outputs” in order to manufacture ratios that are more 
relevant for locating, dating and comprehending the sources of economic 
growth from, say, 1500 to 1800. Revisionists, who take their perceptions 
from Adam Smith, will prefer to shift the focus for concentration to Britain, 
which over time became more involved than any other European economy 
(including The Netherlands) with intercontinental commerce and 
colonization. Perhaps, however, that shift looks far too convenient, simply 
because the “ratios of significance” for a precocious and quintessentially 
“British” Industrial Revolution (diffused as traditional and now degraded 
stories would have us believe with lags onto the mainland) will become that 
much larger and rhetorically more persuasive as numbers, designed to 
represent the importance of the Americas (and via their connexions with 
Asia) for the transitions of the West into modern industrial market 
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economies. Britain cannot represent the West and its peculiar transformation 
to an industrial market economy and was never a paradigm for its rivals on 
the mainland to follow. 
Another route that can be followed in order to make the case in a less 
parsimonious way, but which comes closer to the details of micro dynamism 
favoured by economic historians (like Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein 
and Ken Pomeranz) is to construct narratives built around the array of 
imports that Europeans transhipped from the New World and Asia back into 
their famous maritime ports (Lisbon, Seville, Cadiz, Antwerp, Amsterdam, 
Bordeaux and London). Imports represent tangible manifestations of the 
“bounty” that Europe eventually obtained from investments in commerce 
and colonization in the Americas and (by way of extension and linkages) to 
gains from trade and unequal exchanges with Asia as well.  
American and Asian commodities carried into Europe included: bullion, 
foodstuffs, manufactured goods, industrial inputs and raw materials. These 
imports, obtained in very large part through the exercise of coercion 
designed to secure favourable terms of trade, increased in volume with the 
incorporation of maritime Atlantic economies into global commerce, slowly 
at first, but more rapidly as the infra-structure and organizations required for 
long distance trade were built up over the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Histories of spin-offs and externalities have been woven around 
most of the major imports from other continents shipped into European 
ports. Their connexions to the extension of benefits from long established 
patterns of intra-European trade, to the foundation of new food processing 
industries, to geopolitical rivalry and state formation, to the growth in the 
wealth and powers of merchant oligarchies, to the rise of maritime cities, to 
changes in science, technology and the arts; indeed to almost all aspects of 
European economic, political and urban life have been elaborated in a 
plethora of histories of sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, maize, rice, tobacco, 
tropical fruit, tomatoes, beans, chillies, potatoes, timber hardwoods, 
dyestuffs, wax, fish, oils, cotton fibres; quinine, curveé sarsparilla, pecal, 
laxatives; porcelain, silk and cottons, textiles and above all to silver and 
gold. That bibliography is long. Volumes imported fluctuated but increased 
on trend. Points of entry and distribution for Asian and American imports 
changed through time from city to city and from country to country. The 
problem of interpretation is how to plausibly connect imports from other 
continents to narratives (or models) of early modern European development 
in which national economies are carried forward to plateaux of possibilities 
from where transitions to industrial market economies became probable? 
Fernand Braudel, Giovanni Arrighi and Charles Kindleberger find the 
key mechanisms they wish to underline in a geopolitical matrix of dynamic 
circuits between maritime cities, big merchants and nation states. Pomeranz 
devotes his research and analysis to two possible macro-economic 
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connexions. One operates through a thesis recently elaborated by Jan de 
Vries about Europe’s pre-modern “industrious” revolution, which emanated 
from decisions by myriads of western households to work harder and to 
allocate more of the labour time and other resources under their control to 
production for markets. Behind such decisions are shifts in tastes or 
propensities to consume, stimulated by the availability of “exotic” and 
“addictive” foodstuffs – such as sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, tropical 
fruit, tomatoes and spices; pharmaceuticals, opiates and luxurious but 
affordable Asian manufactures such as silks, jewels and porcelain, and above 
all, cottons from the East. In brief, the rise of material culture in Europe has 
been linked, in carefully specified and documented ways, to intercontinental 
trade and colonization to changes in consumption and investment and to the 
patterns of work by European households. 
Apparently nothing comparable occurred in East and South Asia because 
the consumption of tropical groceries, porcelain, silks and cotton textiles and 
other indigenous products had already diffused down the social scale. In the 
Orient, imperial states had virtually no fiscal or other interest in the 
promotion of commerce and colonization that might in the fullness of time 
pay for itself in the form of imported and taxable luxuries. At the same time, 
Chinese and Indian demands for foodstuffs and manufactures produced in 
Europe remained limited in volume and scope. Although the new world 
silver that European merchants exchanged for Asian foodstuffs, manufactures 
and raw materials presumably promoted monetary transactions and internal 
trade in China and India in the same way that American bullion did within 
Europe? 
Revisionists have made the most of a not unconvincing case for 
symbiotic linkages between the luxurious, exotic, addictive and desirable 
characteristics embodied in imports from Asia and the Americas to: the 
industrious revolution, the maintenance of European commitments to 
intercontinental trade, the enslavement of Africans and flows of investment 
into colonization and plantations in the New World. They cite literature 
which locates the impetus to development from urban processing industries 
(sugar refining, coffee roasting, tea and tobacco blending, etc.) in maritime 
cities, heavily engaged in trans-oceanic commerce. They are familiar with 
histories that explain how the manufacture of cotton textiles in Britain 
developed over the eighteenth century within a matrix of trade with India, 
the import of cotton fibres from slave plantations in the Americas, state 
involvement with its East India company and the promotion of a functional 
process of import substitution by English Parliaments from 1660-1721. 
It should be heuristic to confront this argument, which foregrounds the 
role of Asian and Americas imports in bringing about divergent economic 
developments between Western Europe and East Asia. First the share of the 
calorific intake supplied by sugar, tea and other tropical groceries could only 
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have been small. Growing proportions of British merchant ships were indeed 
built in North American colonies (and in Asia) even before the French 
blockades cut off supplies of Baltic timer and other naval stores (pitch, tar 
and hemp) during the Napoleonic Wars. Nevertheless, established patterns of 
East-West and intra-European trade in timber reverted to normal after that 
war, and iron rather than American forests alleviated European shortages of 
wood for construction and for shipbuilding in the nineteenth century. 
Yes, a statistically compelling case for the substitution of cotton fibres 
grown on slave plantations in the Americas, for supplies of flax, hemp, silk 
and wool grown in Europe can be made. Yet, once again, the scale of 
imports in relation to total consumption of indigenous fibres becomes 
important later rather than earlier in the nineteenth century. The suggestion 
that supplies of cotton wool from the Americas had long been “virtually 
indispensable” for the development of mechanized cotton textile production 
in Europe is not convincing because an equally plausible counterfactual 
scenario can be formulated to suggest that the accumulating and steadily 
improving capacity to produce mechanized cotton yarn and cloth first in 
Britain and then elsewhere on the continent, would have stimulated other 
primary producers in Asia (even China) and the Middle East to respond to 
European demand for cotton fibres. 
New economic history consigned axioms of indispensability to the realms 
of improbability four decades ago. There is certainly a more nuanced but less 
dramatic argument to be made for the importance of supplies of slave 
produced cotton fibres, namely that cheap raw materials promoted the 
growth of one major manufacturing industry in Europe and that the 
engineering problems involved in the mechanization of spinning and 
weaving cloth were more easily solved with fibres with the tensile properties 
of cotton, than thrown silk (not so clear!), wool, flax, and hemp. 
Nevertheless, in rather short compass the problems of mechanizing all major 
processes in the production of cloth made from the entire range of natural 
fibres were solved. By then supplies of cheap flax from Russia and wool 
from Australia, Argentina and other primary producers come on stream to 
supply Europe’s textile industries with all the fibres that they could process 
mechanically. 
 
 
Divergence and Convergence 
 
The problem of “the Great Divergence” between Western Europe and East 
Asia is important for social scientists to address simply because it is still 
with us as a North-South divide. We can agree that the early shift from 
organic to inorganic forms of energy provided Europe (particularly Britain) 
with an early start. Nevertheless, and for several reasons, the other leg of the 
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revisionist explanation (which follows the line taken by Adam Smith, Karl 
Marx and the World Systems School) that the discovery, conquest and 
exploitation of the Americas also generated comparably large windfall gains 
and allowed Western Europe to circumvent the problems of diminishing 
returns afflicting oriental empires carries less conviction. 
First of all, classical diminishing returns to land seem less applicable to 
India and South East Asia than to China. Furthermore, the convergence of 
Japan (despite a poor endowment of natural resources) undermines histories 
based on classical growth models. Secondly, and on any recasting and 
reconfiguration of the data, now available to measure the significance of 
intercontinental commerce, standard exercises in national income 
accountancy are unlikely to provide persuasively large ratios. Meanwhile the 
now fashionable post-modern retort that large outcomes could flow from 
small changes to exogenous variables, simple destroys any claims that 
economic history might have to precision. We might rhetorically enquire if 
small outcomes could flow from large changes to endogenous variables? 
Thirdly, it is not at all clear that the arable land, pastures, forests and seas 
of Western Europe, together (and through trade) with its periphery to the 
East and South could not have sustained the rates of population growth, 
industrialization and urbanization experienced say, down to the mid-
nineteenth century, without massive imports of primary produce from the 
Americas. To hark back to the central point of Mark Elvin’s classic book, 
was it not the case that China had exhausted more of the potential gains from 
intra-regional trade, intensification of labour inputs and agrarian 
improvements well before the growth of its population accelerated in the 
eighteenth century. Elvin’s thesis can moreover, be reformulated in the 
language of classical economics. Compared to Western Europe, just how far 
were China (and other regions of Asia) away from their (technologically 
constrained) production possibility boundaries or what historians of the Qing 
empire refer to as involution. Classical economists (Smith and Malthus) both 
perceived that China had proceeded further and had continued to move faster 
down the path of diminishing returns. 
Leaving coal aside, the intercontinental trade data suggests that Europe 
possessed the foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials required to persist 
with Smithian growth and the urbanization and industrialization of the 
workforce without recourse to massive imports of primary produce from the 
Americas until well into the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the 
accumulation, testing and application of a body of reliable knowledge 
required to carry the mechanization and transformation of industry and 
transport, the deployment of steam power, urbanization and reorganization 
of finance and commerce had proceeded a long way and perhaps beyond a 
point of no return. 
THE DEBATE ON ECONOMIC DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE OCCIDENT AND THE ORIENT 189 
With these observations, which are concerned with the unavoidable and 
important demarcation of relevant chronologies in place, I wish to underline a 
distinction that has perhaps not been made clearly enough throughout the 
modern debate about interconnexions between “The Industrial Revolution” 
and “The Great Divergence”. The Industrial Revolution owed something – but 
probably not as much as Adam Smith suggested to the incorporation of the 
Americas into global commerce. That remains clear, if we look again at the 
volume and array of imports entering European ports before 1846. On the 
whole (and with the conspicuous exceptions of maize, potatoes and cotton 
fibres) imports merely “supplemented” supplies of the continents’ own basic 
foodstuffs and raw materials. The cargoes carried by ships into European ports 
were dominated for centuries by tropical groceries and manufactured luxuries. 
At most they embodied attributes that scholars (who “represent” the “rise of 
material culture”, “industrious revolutions” and the multifaceted role of grand 
merchants engaged in oceanic commerce as “preconditions” for Western 
Europe’s early industrialization) find appealing to place at the centre of their 
narratives about the origins of the North-South divide. 
Agreed the Great Divergence and the Industrial Revolution form part of 
an interconnected narrative and the degree of divergence in labour 
productivities and real incomes between Europe in China, that had so clearly 
appeared by 1914, looks inconceivable without the massive supplies of basic 
foodstuffs and raw materials imported from the Americas and other primary 
producers. But since those supplies came on stream over the second half of 
the century, questions of what started and what sustained the Industrial 
Revolution should not be conflated. 
In most of its essentials, the Industrial revolution which demarcates the 
beginnings (sources?) (origins?) of divergence had appeared several decades 
earlier. During its early stages tenuous and not highly significant connexions 
can be constructed between intercontinental commerce on the one hand and 
the substitution of coal-based forms of heat and power for traditional forms 
of energy derived from wood, wind, water, animals and human muscles on 
the other. Some elements of early and gradual mechanization of industrial 
processes (particularly for textiles can be linked to trans-oceanic trade, but 
again the connexions still seem more tangential than central. There are 
missing elements in current explanations for divergence which are concerned 
with “regimes” for the production and diffusions of useful and reliable 
knowledge in Europe and China. Technology really mattered for the 
Industrial Revolution and if the English and follower economies on the 
mainland might well (but for coal and close involvement with the Americas) 
gone the way of the Yangzi Delta, then why has even that commercialised 
and advanced region of the Manchu Empire taken such a long time to regain 
the economic rank and status it held in the world economy in the mid-
eighteenth century and is regaining today? 
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Our present-day globalisation does not represent an unprecedented historical event, 
at least if we consider it a phenomenon that draws the world into a state of greater 
connectedness and interdependence. In fact, forms of worldwide connectedness and 
interdependence―such as modernisation, industrialisation or colonialism―can be 
found in the past as well. A common feature of all of these forms of globalisation is 
the threat they pose to culture and identity, since they differ dramatically from past 
human experience. Not unlike what happened to those living in times of 
modernisation, industrialisation or colonialism, historians today are called upon to 
look at the different responses that formulate this new global phenomenon in terms 
of culture and identity, as well as to re-examine the past in light of current events. 
Thus, even though globalisation is still underway, historiography has provided 
different tools to both interpret the present and re-examine the past. 
Global history or (as Patrick O’Brien calls it) the “restoration of global history” is 
one result of such activity. When possible, it offers a method and a framework that 
allows one to “construct negotiable meta-narratives”. For historians specialising in 
East Asia, examining the various micro-histories within and between East Asian 
societies entails numerous complications, such as the need to constantly re-
formulate a vocabulary to interpret and narrate these histories. Thus, they should 
reconsider the value and meaning of micro-histories in terms of negotiable meta-
narratives. In fact, by focusing on reading the particular language used by a given 
East Asian population to represent themselves and the outside world, we gain access 
to various inflections of global phenomena, in both the present and the past. 
This chapter addresses Japan’s interaction with modernity originating in the West 
and its reverberation at the nation’s peripheries, especially Okinawa. I (1) delineate 
how some Japanese scholars interpreted Okinawa from the perspective of Japan’s 
interaction with modernity, and (2) examine how Okinawa’s interaction with 
modernity was perceived by local scholars, especially Iha Fuyū (1876-1947). Finally, 
I (3) consider how attempts by both Japan and its periphery to construct their own 
version of modernity were thwarted by dominant Euro-American conceptions of 
modernity and their assumption of universality. 
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History Textbooks 
 
In the last decade, some relevant changes have taken place in the teaching of history 
to high school students in P.R. China. It is noteworthy, for example, that in 2003, the 
Ministry of Education has issued new experimental educational standards for the 
history curriculum in schools, in order to modernize the approach to Chinese and 
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world past and the teaching methodology. Following the new directives, new history 
textbooks have been published. However the issues concerning which kind of 
historical knowledge is suited to educate Chinese youth in contemporary age were 
controversial and this process was matched by the development of some limited, but 
anyway, significant public debate among historians and intellectuals.  
This chapter offers a first-hand reading of one set of the most currently used 
history textbooks produced in China according to the new standards in history 
curriculum, the one published by the People’s Educational Press; its aim is to offer 
some insights about the approach about history teaching that seems currently 
emerging in China and about the self-representation of China’s identity in world 
history as it is being constructed in the age of globalization.  
 
 
Kent G. DENG 
Role of the State and State-building in Modern China: Review and New Insight 
 
During the period from 1800 to 2000 China endured a great many serious crises and 
changes. The common root of changes in China can be traced to state-building, 
something that has been overlooked so far. The failure of the Qing Confucian state 
opened many doors for non-Confucian state-builders to impose different type of 
state on Chinese society. They had two things in common: they were all Social 
Darwinists and formed a tiny minority in society.  
In this context, not all changes were that necessary. This is justifiable given that 
with the changes, the living standards of the ordinary Chinese declined. By the end 
of Mao’s rule, about half of the population were under the official poverty line. 
China did not become a better place to live until 1978. 
This chapter probes into the issue of state-building and its impact on the well-
being of the general public. 
 
 
Samuel GUEX 
Overcoming the Frame of National History in South Korea 
 
Korea is probably one of the most homogenous societies in the world. The peoples 
that entered the peninsula in antiquity gradually merged into a single ethnicity. 
Before its partition in 1945 and except for some brief periods, Korea had also been 
one of the oldest continuously unified states in the world. This unity and 
homogeneity, that emerged progressively over the centuries, has become an 
important part of Korean identity. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Koreans, who shared a common language, culture and history, but who had no 
nation-state of their own, found in nationalism, especially in its ethnic dimension, a 
powerful ideology of resistance against colonialism. After the liberation, nationalism 
provided an important tool to legitimize the regimes of Rhee Syngman and Park 
Chung Hee. To date, South Korean history textbooks still bear the signs of the 
master narrative developed at that time. This chapter examines the problems posed 
by such a “state-sponsored” history and explores some of the attempts in South 
Korea to overcome the frame of “national history”.  
ABSTRACTS 201 
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The Japanese Colonial Historiography in Korea (1905-1945) 
 
Korea, conquered in 1905, was the “pearl” of the Japanese modern colonial empire. 
Although many Japanese and American writers have drawn up appraisals of post-
1945 historiography after the decolonisation, very few have studied colonial 
historiography in Korea, which is to say the one written during colonisation. 
This chapter does not deal with Japanese historiography of colonisation in Korea in 
the general sense, but on colonial knowledge, which studies the history of Korea in the 
wide sense of the word (every historical era) during the first half of the twentieth 
century. We also mention the discourses that dealt with the history of modern Korea or 
the history of colonisation at the same period. There were a plurality of historian 
discourses on Korea, which is not discussed here: as early as the 1910s and 1920s, 
English-speaking historians were analysing modern Korea and colonisation, and found 
Japanese presence in Korea perfectly legitimate. At the same time, Korean 
historiography of Japanese colonisation in Korea was starting. In other words, there 
was, a long time before decolonisation and synchronously with the “general” history 
of Korea, a historiography of the contemporary, and therefore colonial, period. 
I limit myself to clarifying a few time periods, drawing an institutional overview 
and call up a few figures. Firstly, we see the links between history and 
colonialism―the discourses supporting colonisation―at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Colonial history during the years 1905 to 1921 is then introduced. 
Finally and thirdly, I examine the links between the institutions of colonial Korea 
and the imperial university. As a conclusion, we give an overview of the post-
colonial studies and their timeline. 
 
 
Laurent NESPOULOUS.  
Memories from Beyond the Past. Grasping Prehistoric Times in Japan:  
the Birth and Evolution of an “Archaeological Consciousness”  
(Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries) 
 
Archaeology, both in Western Europe and Japan, implies a very unique relationship 
to time. First, let us say that although it has been for a long time specialised in the 
very distant past―often forgotten or even out of the reach for the common historical 
consciousness―on the scientific disciplinary plan, it is one of the “youngest” human 
sciences. Then, in order to exist as the very contemporary approach of the past it 
constitutes, its existence relies on a complicated background of consciousness and 
awareness of the past, which has much to do with the diffused rise of interest toward 
ancient times, interest itself inscribed in modern times (or pre-modern times if we 
follow the English historical terminology) rather than in contemporary times 
(modern times). archaeology’s historicity is indeed an unusual “blend”. 
In Japan, from an epistemological point of view, archaeology, as a method of 
investigating the past, came to its first maturity around the 1920s/1930s (not so 
different from its European sister). But in order to understand why such a 
disciplinary perspective was able to bloom, we need to keep in mind the long 
chronology of the numerous disrupted attempts in giving life and sense to ancient 
times, and, in this process, the encounter with unexpected times that went even 
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further back: what would later be eventually called “prehistory”. The making of this 
new consciousness of the beginning of times starts as soon as the seventeenth 
century, and we would like to emphasize its chronology and its turning points from 
then to nowadays. 
 
 
Patrick Karl O’BRIEN 
The Debate on Economic Divergence Between the Occident and the Orient.  
An Essay in Bibliography and Criticism 
 
Modern debates on the ancient narrative of when, how and why the economies of 
western Europe diverged from those to the south and east of Eurasia originated with 
the publication of three controversial books at the turn of the century by David 
Landes, Andre Gunder Frank and Ken Pommeranz. Their hypotheses derived from 
Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber has spawned what has been a prolonged, 
widespread and heuristic debate in the burgeoning field of global history and has 
given rise to several ongoing programmes of research. It is the aim of this chapter in 
bibliography and criticism to survey and mediate its way through this stimulating 
discourse of which “History at Stake in East Asia” is a most worthy contribution. 
 
 
Guido SAMARANI 
Recent Trends in Chinese Historiography and the Debate on the 1911 Revolution  
 
The 2011-2012 biennium is particularly relevant with regards to the historical 
memory of China: in particular, we commemorate the centenary of the Revolution 
of 1911 and the birth of the Republic of China.  
The conferences and debates over the 1911-1912 centenary occur in a general 
context characterized by a steady growth of Chinese historiography. This reflects a 
process that took shape in the 1980s and that over the past two decades has seen 
enormous progress, even though certain themes and areas of research still remain 
insufficiently developed. 
This chapter proposes, in the first part, to highlight certain recent trends in 
historiographical thinking in China on the periodization of Chinese history and, in the 
second part, to shine a light more specifically on the new analyses that emerged during 
the recent debate on the Revolution of 1911 and on the birth of the Republic of China. 
 
 
Pierre-François SOUYRI 
Representations of the “History of Japan” During the Meiji Era: Future at Stake 
 
This chapter concentrates on Japan during the Meiji era between the years 1868 and 
1912. In order to tackle the issue of representations in history, it focuses on two 
moments: the first period is between the years 1868 and 1872. At the time, the new 
government implemented numerous institutional reforms and finally ended the 
Japanese old order, known as the Tokugawa regime. The second period I 
concentrate on is between the years 1905 and 1910. It was during this time that 
Japan, who had been victorious over China and Russia, began to see itself as an 
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imperialistic power. They launched a policy of colonial expansion and became 
increasingly nationalistic. The goal of this chapter is to prove how the 
representations of people influence their political practices. Our visions of the past 
therefore mold our practices in the present. Ideological representations are always 
more complex than one would expect. The Meiji Restoration is a time where old or 
ancient Japan was overestimated with the ideal regime of the Emperor as the core of 
the State. This representation is no more useful after the military victories of Japan. 
Japan then creates the need to develop another historical narrative, where Japan’s 
history looks like Europe. How and why do these changes occur? 
 
 
Brij TANKHA 
Religion and Modernity in Meiji Japan: Strengthening the People 
 
The certainties of nationalist historiography were lost a long time ago but many of 
the assumptions on which it was based continue to exercise a pervasive influence. 
The trajectory of Japanese history is still framed in the narrative of a modernising 
Meiji leadership and its creation of a nation-state. Are there other narratives at work 
that sought a different future? 
The chapter focuses on the neglected question of religion and its role in shaping 
the discourse of modernity in Japan. Religion is usually seen as peripheral and left to 
specialists in religious philosophy but, as an increasing body of work demonstrates, 
religious leaders and ideas inspired and shaped the public discourse both to sustain 
the dominant state narratives as well as to question and pose alternative ways of 
being modern and Japanese. These debates drew upon and were a product of global 
and regional networks. They drew both on these “outside” influences but were also 
crucially shaped by their local roots. If history is not the past but the consciousness 
of the past used for present purposes (G. Dening) then this history allows a recovery 
of a neglected past and is suggestive for present predicaments. 
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